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Abstract
There is a growing literature by political scientists and increasingly economists on 
the institutional determinants of public policy, in particular broad constitutional 
parameters such as presidential versus parliamentary regimes and different 
electoral systems. However, given the fact that resource allocation is at the heart 
of the political process, surprisingly little work supports a theoretically rigorous 
assessment of the cross-national distribution of parliamentary power over budget 
policy. This thesis presents an explicitly comparative analytical framework for 
assessing legislative budgeting and applies this framework to a sample of 
contemporary democracies. The focus is on how institutional arrangements 
determine both the extent of legislative control as well as budget outcomes. The 
thesis uses a unique dataset on legislative budget institutions in 36 industrialised, 
developing and transition countries, along with case study evidence.
The historical evolution of legislative budgeting underscores the importance of 
institutions in achieving democratic control. One way of enabling rigorous cross­
national comparison is to focus on a set of essential institutional prerequisites for 
legislative control of public finance. These variables are operationalised in the 
form of an index of legislative budget institutions, which demonstrates substantial 
variation in the budgetary role of legislatures across liberal democracies. Former 
UK colonies have particularly poorly developed legislative capacity for financial 
control, whereas the opposite typically holds for countries with protracted periods
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of minority government. While a number of institutional arrangements determine 
the extent of legislative control, the empirical evidence supports the theoretical 
prediction that few variables unambiguously affect fiscal outcomes, notably the 
nature of legislative powers to amend the budget tabled by the executive. 
Legislatures that self-impose constraints to support fiscally prudent choices, such 
as the Swedish Parliament, can nonetheless remain powerful budgetary actors, as 
long as they retain control over the design of the process itself. In taking the 
institutionalist agenda in political science further, this thesis demonstrates the 
benefits of complementing research on broad constitutional differences with more 
nuanced studies of the institutional setting in particular policy areas.
4
Table of contents
1 INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGISLATIVE BUDGETING 14
1.1 E x is t in g  t h e o r e t ic a l  a n d  e m p ir ic a l  w o r k  17
1.2 B u il d in g  o n  t h e  f is c a l  in st it u t io n a l is t  a p p r o a c h  23
1.3 T h e  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 31
2 THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF PUBLIC FINANCES 34
2.1 R e v o l u t io n a r y  o r ig in s  o f  pa r l ia m e n t a r y  c o n t r o l  3 5
2 .2  T h e  r is e  o f  m o d e r n  b u d g e t in g  41
2.3 T h e  b u d g e t a r y  d e c l in e  o f  p a r l ia m e n t  49
C o n c l u s io n s  56
3 ANALYSING THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE
CONTROL 58
3.1 A m e n d m e n t  p o w e r s  62
3.2  THE REVERSIONARY BUDGET 69
3.3 E x e c u t iv e  v e t o e s  75
3.4  E x e c u t iv e  f l e x ib il it y  d u r in g  e x e c u t io n  80
3.5  L e g is l a t iv e  o r g a n is a t io n  a n d  t h e  u s e  o f  f o r m a l  p o w e r s  89
C o n c l u s io n s  92
4 A CROSS-NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ‘THE POWER OF THE PURSE* 95
4.1 V a r ia b l e s  99
4 .2  D a t a  105
4.3 C o n s t r u c t in g  t h e  in d e x  110
4 .4  D is c u s s io n  a n d  a n a l y s is  113
C o n c l u s io n s  119
5 THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE BUDGET INSTITUTIONS 123
5.1 E x p l a n a t o r y  v a r ia b l e s  124
5.2 A n a l y s is  133
5.3 S o m e  im p l ic a t io n s  142
C o n c l u s io n s  148
5
6 THE EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS ON FISCAL POLICY 150
6.1 In s t it u t io n a l is t  h y p o t h e s e s  152
6 .2  D a t a  a n d  m e t h o d s  158
6.3 C r o s s -s e c t io n a l  a n a l y s is  171
6.4  TIME-SERIES CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS 183
C o n c l u s io n s  191
7 BUDGET REFORM AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL IN SWEDEN 194
7.1 So u r c e s  o f  a  l e g is l a t iv e  p r o -s pe n d in g  b ia s  199
7.2  Re f o r m in g  t h e  Sw e d is h  b u d g e t  p r o c e s s  205
7.3 A s s e s s in g  t h e  im p a c t  o n  l e g is l a t iv e  b u d g e t in g  21 4
7 .4  T h e  c h a l l e n g e  o f  a  n e w  a c c o u n t a b il it y  223
C o n c l u s io n s  227
8 CONCLUSION: BEYOND MACRO-CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTIONS 230
8.1 T r a je c t o r ie s  a n d  p a t t e r n s  o f  l e g is l a t iv e  b u d g e t in g  23 0
8.2  E x p l a in in g  t h e  d if f e r e n c e s  234
8.3 L e g is l a t u r e s  a n d  f is c a l  d is c ip l in e  2 36
8.4  T a k in g  l o w e r  l e v e l  in s t it u t io n s  s e r io u s l y  240
C o n c l u s io n s  249
BIBLIOGRAPHY 251
APPENDIX 289
A  D a t a  a p p e n d ix  289
B  Su m m a r y  s t a t is t ic s  298
C OECD a n d  W o r l d  B a n k  s u r v e y  i te m s  u s e d  in  t h i s  s t u d y  30 0
D U s e  o f  t h e  x t f e v d  c o m m a n d  in  S t a t a  30 6
6
List of tables
T a b l e  1: Sp e a r m a n  c o r r e l a t io n s  b e t w e e n  in d ic e s  113
T a b l e  2: B u d g e t -a m e n d in g  a n d  n o n -a m e n d in g  l e g is l a t u r e s  118
T a b l e  3: D a t a  f o r  t h e  in d e x  a n d  a m e n d m e n t  d u m m y  121
T a b l e  4 : C o n s t r u c t io n  o f  c o m p o s it e  v a r ia b l e s  122
T a b l e  5: P e a r s o n  c o r r e l a t io n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b l e s  13 2
T a b l e  6: OLS e s t im a t e s  o f  t h e  t r a n s f o r m e d  in d e x  134
T a b l e  7: V a r ia n c e  in f l a t io n  f a c t o r s  135
T a b l e  8: P r e d ic t e d  a n d  a c t u a l  in d e x  s c o r e s  s o r t e d  b y  d if f e r e n c e  139
T a b l e  9: OLS e s t im a t e s  o f  t h e  t r a n s f o r m e d  s u b - in d ic e s  141
T a b l e  10: S u m m a r y  o f  f in d in g s  142
T a b l e  11: R e c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  t h e  A l e s in a  a n d  V o n  H a g e n  in d ic e s  160
T a b l e  12: T h e  a v a il a b l e  e x p e n d it u r e  d a t a  b y  c o u n t r y  164
T a b l e  13: P e a r s o n  c o r r e l a t io n s  b e t w e e n  d if f e r e n t  e x p e n d it u r e  d a t a  165
T a b l e  14: OLS e s t i m a t e s  o f  V o n  H a g e n ’s  v a r i a b l e s  173
T a b l e  15: OLS e s t im a t e s  o f  A l e s in a ’s v a r ia b l e s  175
T a b l e  16: OLS e s t im a t e s  o f  o t h e r  v a r ia b l e s  178
T a b l e  17: R o b u s t n e s s  c h e c k s  182
T a b l e  18: T im e -s e r ie s  c r o s s -s e c t io n  a n a l y s is , 1971 t o  2003 190
T a b l e  19: Su m m a r y  o f  f in d in g s  r e l a t in g  t o  in s t it u t io n a l  h y p o t h e s e s  193
T a b l e  20: H y p o t h e t ic a l  b u d g e t a r y  o u t c o m e s  w it h  it e m -b y - it e m  v o t in g  207
T a b l e  21: C r o s s -s e c t io n  s u m m a r y  st a t is t ic s  f o r  c o n t in u o u s  a n d  q u a s i-c o n t in u o u s
VARIABLES 298
T a b l e  22: C r o s s - s e c t i o n  s u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  d i c h o to m o u s  v a r i a b l e s  299
7
List of figures
F i g u r e  1: A m e n d m e n t  p o w e r s  64
F i g u r e  2: R e v e r s i o n a r y  b u d g e t s  70
F i g u r e  3 : E x e c u t iv e  v e t o e s  77
F i g u r e  4 : E x e c u t i v e  f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  r e a l l o c a t i o n  83
F i g u r e  5: E x e c u t iv e  f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  s iz e  o f  t h e  b u d g e t  86
F i g u r e  6: T h e  in d e x  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  b u d g e t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  114
F i g u r e  7: T h e  e f f e c t  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  a s  d iv id e d  g o v e r n m e n t  i n c r e a s e s  136
F i g u r e  8: P u b l i c  s p e n d in g  in  25 OECD c o u n t r i e s ,  1970 t o  2003 185
F i g u r e  9: P u b l i c  s p e n d in g  in  25 OECD c o u n t r i e s ,  1970 t o  2003, b y  c o u n t r y  186
F i g u r e  10: C o m m it te e  s t r u c t u r e s  f o r  b u d g e t a r y  d e c is io n - m a k in g  202
F i g u r e  11: G e n e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  f i n a n c e s  in  S w e d e n , 1985 t o  2005 209
F i g u r e  12: R ik s d a g  a m e n d m e n ts  t o  b u d g e t  p r o p o s a l s ,  1985/86 t o  2005 217
F i g u r e  13: N e t  c h a n g e  d u e  t o  R ik s d a g  a m e n d m e n ts ,  1985/86 t o  2005 218
8
Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to many individuals. Warren Krafchik, my former boss at the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), raised my interest in the topic of 
legislative budgeting. In December 1997 he asked me to conduct some 
background research on the role of legislatures in the budget process. At the time, 
South Africa’s new democratic Parliament had begun to rethink its role in public 
financial management. Out of this work came a first article on the topic, published 
in the South African Journal o f Economics (Krafchik and Wehner 1998). While 
very descriptive and, with hindsight, lacking analytical sophistication, this work 
guided me towards the underlying approach for this thesis, in particular its focus 
on institutional arrangements. At the London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE), where I started my doctoral thesis on the topic in 2003, the input 
and guidance of my supervisor, Patrick Dunleavy, was decisive. He challenged 
me to become more theoretically rigorous, explore different methodological 
approaches and interpret my results in a wider context.
In developing the theoretical analysis in chapter three, comments by Torun 
Dewan, Patrick Dunleavy and Christian List from the LSE Government 
Department as well as Barry Anderson from the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) were particularly valuable.
9
Work on my index of legislative budget institutions, presented in chapter four, 
benefited from comments by Keith Dowding, Patrick Dunleavy, Achim 
Hildebrandt, Jouni Kuha, Ian Lienert, David Marshall, Michael Ruffiier, Carlos 
Santiso, Sally Stares and Andreas Wamtjen. Also thanks to Vasilios Alevizakos, 
Mario Arriagada, Jon Blondal, Torun Dewan, Gabriel Farfan-Mares, Hajime 
Isozaki, Keiichi Kubo, Rajagopalan Ramanathan, Vinod Sahgal, Mike Stevens, 
and Francesco Stolfi for their help with various issues. I am particularly indebted 
to Michael Ruffiier, previously with the OECD, for patiently dealing with my 
questions about the 2003 Survey of Budget Practices and Procedures. The work in 
this chapter dates back to the first stage of my doctoral research, which was partly 
funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). I presented some 
initial ideas for the index at the at the LSE Government Department Doctoral 
Programme Seminar as well as the Sixth Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and 
Parliamentarians at Wroxton College in 2004, and I wish to thank Philip Norton 
for his enthusiasm and encouragement to further develop this work. An earlier 
version of chapter four of this thesis was published in Political Studies in 2006, 
and comments from the anonymous referees and the journal editor, Martin Smith, 
helped to improve the script (Wehner 2006a). Anna Kovacikova from the 
Chancellery of the National Council and Alexander Cirak of the Finance Ministry 
in Slovakia, as well as Marcel Mihalenko, subsequently contributed towards 
clarifying a question about the country’s legislature that prompted a small 
correction to the dataset.
10
Chapter five benefited from comments by Elena Bechberger, Bernard Casey, 
Patrick Dunleavy, Achim Goerres, Achim Hildebrandt and Daniel Sturm. Earlier 
versions of this chapter were presented at the 2005 Southern Political Science 
Association conference in New Orleans and at the 2005 Political Studies 
Association conference in Leeds.
In completing chapter six, Bernard Kittel and my colleagues at the Essex Summer 
School in 2006 helped me to get to grips with some of the issues in pooled time- 
series cross-section analysis. Thomas Plumper made available the ado file for the 
xtfevd command in Stata to apply fixed effects vector decomposition to the panel 
dataset, and kindly agreed to discuss my application of it with me. I had 
particularly helpful discussions with Torun Dewan and Daniel Sturm about 
aspects of the econometric analysis in chapter six. Earlier versions of this chapter 
were presented at the Government Department Seminar and the Political Science 
and Political Economy (PSPE) Research Group Faculty-PhD Workshop at the 
LSE. Thanks to participants for their feedback and suggestions, in particular to 
Simon Hix and Valentino Larcinese. A version of this chapter was prepared for 
presentation at the 2007 Public Choice Societies Meeting in Amsterdam, where I 
received excellent comments from Masami Imai. This version is also available as 
a PSPE Working Paper (Wehner 2006b).
With regard to my research in Sweden, I am indebted notably to Ake Hjalmarsson 
(Ministry of Finance) and Ove Nilsson (Secretariat of the Finance Committee of 
the Riksdag) as well as Dag Levin Sparr (Swedish National Audit Office) for their
11
help with organising interviews for my visit to the country in May 2005, gaining 
access to relevant data and documents, and for unwearyingly responding to a 
number of follow-up requests and queries. Daniel Bergvall, Torun Dewan, Patrick 
Dunleavy, Simon Hix, Deborah Mabbett, Roy Meyers, Per Molander, Johann 
Olsson, Ed Page, Waltraud Schelkle and Mark Thatcher provided comments on 
drafts of this chapter. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the LSE 
Government Department Seminar and published in the Journal o f  European 
Public Policy (Wehner 2007a). I received helpful comments from the anonymous 
reviewers and the journal editor, Jeremy Richardson.
Moreover, I would like to thank a number of individuals for useful discussions 
during a visit to South Africa in March 2005, in alphabetical order: Francois 
Beukman (former Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 
National Assembly), Cobus Botes (Parliamentary Office of the Auditor-General), 
Neil Cole (National Treasury), Hildegarde Fast (former Manager of the 
Parliamentary Office of the Financial and Fiscal Commission), Christina Murray 
(Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town), Nhlanhla Musa Nene 
(Chairperson of the Joint Budget Committee, National Assembly), Adrienne Shall 
(Consultant to the National Treasury), Albert van Zyl (formerly with the Western 
Cape Provincial Treasury), Gavin Woods (former Chairperson of the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts, National Assembly). I conducted these interviews 
at a stage of this research when I intended to include a country study on South 
Africa in the thesis. Although I ended up not pursuing this project as my research
12
design evolved further, these discussions were nonetheless important in revisiting 
my initial thinking on the topic and helped to clarify my approach.
On occasional visits to Germany, my family, and in particular my parents Jurgen 
and Bettina, learned to be cautiously inquisitive about my progress. I am grateful 
for their interest and support. In my new home, London, I was fortunate to have a 
supportive environment in which to complete the thesis. In particular, I would like 
to mention Wright’s Bar, Don Quixote (under its previous ownership) and Caffe 
Amici, which were reliable suppliers of copious cups of coffee necessary to help 
me through tired patches and motivational slumps. Also thanks to the Polish Bar 
near Holbom tube station, the venue of a series of lunches and conversations with 
Elena Bechberger, which were extremely helpful for the research process. Many 
thanks also to colleagues at the LSE Government Department and the MPA 
Programme, who provided a supportive environment. At the very end of the 
process, David Marshall kindly agreed to proof-read the script and Elena 
Bechberger provided last comments on the concluding chapter. I also wish to 
thank my examiners, Martin Lodge and Bernard Steunenberg, for a very 
constructive and helpful discussion of this work. The usual caveat applies: I alone 
am responsible for any remaining mistakes or misrepresentations.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to Aline, who suffered most from my 
obsession with it.
13
1 Introduction: Perspectives on legislative budgeting
Political scientists have an established tradition of studying and debating 
differences in political institutions between countries (e.g. Lijpart 1984 and 1999, 
Weaver and Rockman 1993, Tsebelis 2002). This is complemented with a 
burgeoning interest amongst economists in the policy effects of institutional 
arrangements (Persson and Tabellini 2003, Congleton and Swedenborg 2006a). 
Arguably the primary focus in the literature is on fundamental constitutional 
choices, such as between presidential versus parliamentary regimes, federal versus 
unitary states, and proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems. For 
instance, Persson and Tabellini (2003) study the economic effects of constitutions 
and find that presidentialism and plurality rule electoral systems result in lower 
levels of central government expenditure compared with parliamentary regimes 
and proportional representation electoral formulas.
Fundamental constitutional differences are important, but to properly assess the 
impact of institutional arrangements on policy outcomes it is at least equally 
important to look beyond these broad systemic features into the more detailed 
machinery for policy-making. For instance, Cheibub and Limongi (2002: 176) 
reconsider the presidential versus parliamentary regime distinction in relation to 
the survival rates of democracies, and conclude that institutional effects derive not 
from such macro-level constitutional fundamentals, but rather ‘the way the 
decision-making process is organized.’ Similarly, Congleton and Swedenborg
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(2006b: 27) acknowledge that ‘the details of democratic constitutional design 
matter.’ One challenge for the institutional debate in political science and 
economics is to broaden the analysis beyond broad macro-constitutional 
differences to the institutional setting in particular policy areas (Bechberger 2007). 
I argue here that this is a crucial point of departure for research on the policy 
effects of institutions. The focus in this thesis is on one particularly important 
aspect of legislative decision-making, the annual decision about the allocation of 
public funds, and the way in which institutions shape legislative control over 
budgets and fiscal policy outcomes.
A core concept at the heart of this thesis is that of institutions. Institutions have 
experienced a revival in political science since March and Olsen’s (1984) 
reminder of the importance of organisational factors in shaping political 
behaviour. With the term ‘institutions’ I refer to ‘formal rules that have been 
decided in a political process’ (Rothstein 1996: 145). This excludes concepts such 
as culture and social norms that might be regarded as ‘informal’ institutions. The 
stricter definition enables a focus on how formal political institutions, in particular 
constitutional features, affect public policy (Weaver and Rockman 1993, Tsebelis 
2002). Despite a revival, the ‘new institutionalism’ in political science is far from 
united (Hall and Taylor 1996). For instance, historical institutionalism emphasises 
path dependence and unintended consequences (Pierson 2000, Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002), whereas rational choice institutionalism, or the analytical politics 
approach, stresses the rationality of organisational choice in the context of 
addressing problems of collective action (e.g. Shepsle 1979). I will argue that both
15
perspectives can make a unique contribution to understanding legislative 
budgeting, but that the analytical politics approach is more useful for the purpose 
of systematic cross-national comparison. It will be useful to revisit this conceptual 
issue following the empirical analysis, with a stronger sense of the strengths and 
limitations of this approach.
The emphasis on budgets, too, requires conceptual clarification. The word budget 
can mean very different things to different people. Some see its essence as an 
impenetrably dense collection of quantitative details: ‘It’s got a lot of numbers in 
it’, according to George W. Bush.1 Somewhat more nuanced, Aaron Wildavsky 
skilfully summarises the budget’s multiple meanings as ‘a prediction’, ‘a series of 
goals to which price tags are attached’ and ‘a contract’ (Wildavsky and Caiden 
2001: 1-2). The word budget developed from bougette or ‘small bag’ in old 
French. The use of the word spread to England, where it came to designate the 
leather bag in which ministers of the Crown carried financial plans to parliament,2 
and eventually it became synonymous with its contents. In the UK the word 
budget now refers to the spring financial statement, which focuses on taxation 
measures. In most countries, however, the term refers to the annual expenditure 
and revenue plans tabled in the legislature, and I use the word in this broader
1 Reported by Reuters on 5 May 2000, and quoted from http://www.slate.com/id/76886/.
2 I use the terms parliament and legislature interchangeably throughout this thesis.
3 During the 1990s, there was a short-lived experiment with unifying expenditure and revenue 
proposals and table them at the same time, bringing the country more into line with most o f the 
rest of the world, but the Labour government discontinued this practice upon gaining power in 
1997 (Dorrell 1993).
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sense. Probably the first legal definition of the budget is contained in a French 
decree of 1862: ‘The budget is a document which forecasts and authorizes the 
annual receipts and expenditures of the State...’ (quoted from Stourm 1917: 2). 
Although budgets have been derided as ‘useless and demeaning’ and allegedly 
‘suck enormous quantities of time away from real work’ (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992: 117), they are essential for democratic accountability. Moreover, they 
reflect the balance of power between political actors (Wildavsky 1961).
1.1 Existing theoretical and empirical work
Theories of budgeting have evolved considerably over the past century (Kraan 
1996: 1-8). A first milestone was Aaron Wildavsky’s (1964) theory of budgetary 
incrementalism, according to which budgeting is so complex that decision-makers 
largely forfeit a review of existing expenditure, referred to as the ‘base.’ Rather, 
‘this year’s budget is based on last year’s budget, with special attention given to a 
narrow range of increases or decreases’ (Davis et al. 1966: 529-530). 
Incrementalism was a theory of organisational behaviour, rather than a theory 
specific to budgeting (Schick 1988b: 62). Although Wildavsky clarified his 
concept in later years (Dempster and Wildavsky 1979), incrementalism has been 
heavily criticised as ‘an extraordinarily elastic and elusive concept’ (Schick 1983: 
2, see also the powerful critique by Meyers 1994). The theory was eventually 
abandoned by Wildavsky (1988) himself, as it became evident that its core ideas 
did little to explain budgetary trends and interactions in times of economic
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stagnation and fiscal adjustment. Moreover, this work is very specific to the US 
context, rather than explicitly comparative.
Another theoretical approach is associated with William Niskanen (1971 and 
1973) and his theory of budget-maximising bureaucrats. Niskanen put forward a 
microeconomic theory of bureaucracy that dealt specifically with the interaction 
between bureaucrats and their legislative sponsor in the budget process. In 
Niskanen’s basic model, assumptions of asymmetrical information, bilateral 
monopoly, and the power to make package proposals heavily favour bureaucrats 
over their legislative sponsor (for some modifications, see Niskanen 1975). While 
Niskanen focuses on bureaucratic supply, later work in the public choice tradition 
explored some conditions that may facilitate greater legislative control (in 
particular Miller and Moe 1983, Bendor et al 1985). Niskanen’s book provided 
the intellectual foundation for the new right attack on big government and was 
‘hugely influential’ (Hindmoor 2006: 152) with conservative politicians in the US 
and elsewhere. His theoretical contribution was to bring the public choice 
approach to the study of budgeting, in particular the tools of microeconomic 
analysis, with its focus on methodological individualism, the rationality 
assumption, the search for equilibria, and formal modelling. Yet, Niskanen 
assumes a weak and passive sponsor, which is ‘extremely artificial’ (Dunleavy 
1991: 211). While relaxing Niskanen’s extreme institutional assumptions can tell 
us something about how alternative arrangements can yield more optimal results 
(Mueller 2003: 368), his account of the demand side remains under-developed.
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For legislative scholars, a proper assessment of the design of the budget process is 
important for understanding the balance of power between different actors in a 
political system. Control of financial measures is the original function of modem 
legislative bodies, and the requirement for legislative approval of taxes and public 
expenditures is a constitutional fundamental of democracy.4 Yet, the cross­
national study of legislative budgeting, despite some progress in recent years, is in 
a lamentable state. Legislative scholars have contributed a number of descriptive 
country studies of financial scrutiny, often laced with normative connotations.5 
Although the comparative study of legislatures has become more systematic in 
recent years, for instance through the work of Doring (1995a) as well as Doring 
and Hallerberg (2004), this does not yet extend to legislative budgeting. Perhaps 
the most substantial collection of country studies on legislative budgeting is 
several decades old (Coombes 1976), and while it provides rich information on a 
few countries it lacks a rigorous theoretical basis that would make the studies 
comparable and enable an overarching perspective. Thus, the legislative studies 
literature on financial scrutiny is largely outdated and methodologically weak.
4 Stourm (1917), Einzig (1959), Harriss (1975) and Webber and Wildavsky (1986) provide some 
interesting historical accounts.
5 Some examples are Amselek (1998), Chinaud (1993) and Lalumiere (1976) on France; Burnell 
(2001) on Zambia; Chubb (1952), Einzig (1959) and Reid (1966) on the UK; Premchand (1963) 
on India; Young (1999) on Australia; Leston-Bandeira (1999) on Portugal; Eickenboom (1989), 
Friauf (1976), Gerster (1984) and Sturm (1988) on Germany; LeLoup (2004) on Hungary and 
Slovenia; and Krafchik and Wehner (1998) on South Africa. See also the collections by Olson and 
Mezey (1991) as well as Coombes (1976).
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In contrast, political economists have made a number of important contributions 
that are relevant for the comparative study of legislative budgeting. Following a 
period of economic crisis in the advanced industrialised countries during the 
1970s, countries displayed remarkably different speeds of adjustment. This puzzle 
prompted some to explore determinants of fiscal policy beyond purely economic 
variables, for instance party political factors (Roubini and Sachs 1989, Franzese 
1999, Alt and Lowry 1994). Other authors found that one of the keys to 
understanding fiscal policy is the design of the budget process itself (Poterba and 
Von Hagen 1999, Strauch and Von Hagen 1999, Kirchgassner 2001). This fiscal 
institutionalist perspective has been influential with policy makers (Molander 
1999). Compared with the legislative studies literature, this work is typically more 
quantitatively oriented and methodologically sophisticated, but its consideration 
of legislative aspects tends to be very selective and focused on particular details 
rather than providing an overarching perspective.
In addition to partisan and fiscal institutionalist theories, a more recent strand of 
constitutional economics has investigated the fiscal policy effects of fundamental 
features of the design of political systems (for an overview, see Congleton and 
Swedenborg 2006a). However, the most important contribution to this strand of 
the literature, by Persson and Tabellini (2000 and 2003), has focused on two 
constitutional aspects only, i.e. electoral rules and forms of government. The 
authors ‘leave out many potentially important constitutional features, including... 
budgetary procedures...’ (Persson and Tabellini 2006: 85). The strengths of the 
constitutional economics literature are its attention to rigorous theoretical methods
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and quantitative analysis, but it adds little to our understanding of how legislative 
institutions shape fiscal policy.
The fiscal policy effects of institutions are of increasing interest to policy makers 
themselves. One reason is a concern with fiscal sustainability, for instance in the 
context of European Monetary Union (Hallerberg 2004), and how to limit the 
potential for legislatures to threaten fiscal discipline. Moreover, and more broadly, 
the 1990s saw a substantial number of developing and post-communist countries 
move towards democracy. This often required the wholesale redesign of political 
institutions, including legislative bodies. Their performance has increasingly come 
under the spotlight as donor agencies and international organisations seek to 
promote ‘good governance’ by enhancing accountability with initiatives that aim 
to ‘strengthen’ the legislative branch (Messick 2002: 1, see also US Agency for 
International Development 2000, Hudson and Wren 2007). This concern fits into a 
broader debate on institution-building in countries receiving foreign aid, in 
particular as donors move from project specific funding to general budget support 
(Stapenhurst and Pelizzo 2002, UK Department for International Development 
2004, De Renzio 2006). The idea is to improve domestic oversight in order to 
fight corruption and enhance the effectiveness of aid (Santiso 2006). Yet, it is not 
clear what is required for ‘strong’ legislative financial scrutiny, and whether it 
really delivers the desired effect.6
6 At the time of writing, I am advising the UK Department for International Development on how 
to strengthen legislative financial scrutiny in countries that receive donor funds (Wehner 2007b).
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It is paradoxical that many public choice theorists and public finance practitioners 
regard legislatures as fiscally dangerous, and argue for limitations on their powers, 
while legislative strengthening is fashionable with legislative studies scholars and 
in parts of the development community. Some go as far as to boldly claim that 
‘the presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for 
democratization’ (Fish 2006: 5), which is also reflected in the aid policies of some 
donor governments (UK Department for International Development 2006: 19-32). 
Yet, the relationship between legislative control of public finances and democracy 
remains empirically very poorly understood. These debates add urgency to the 
need for additional and more systematic analysis.
Thus, the state of the literature and practical concerns generate a number of 
questions about the role of legislatures in public finance: How can we measure 
and compare legislative budgeting across countries? What factors explain cross­
national variation? If countries differ in the way in which legislatures engage with 
the budget, how does this affect fiscal policy? What are the implications for 
institutional reforms? This thesis addresses these questions in an explicitly 
comparative framework focusing on the institutional design for legislative 
budgeting. More specifically, the aims of this thesis are (i) to establish and apply a 
framework for assessing how institutional arrangements affect the budgetary role 
of legislatures, (ii) to explore the determinants of cross-national variation in these
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institutional arrangements, and (iii) to assess empirically the impact of legislative 
budget institutions on fiscal policy.7
1.2 Building on the fiscal institutionalist approach
In tackling these questions, I build on the work on the effect of institutions on 
fiscal policy. This work draws on the basic idea that spending will be higher when 
decision-makers do not internalise the full costs of their actions. Weingast, 
Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) expressed this as the ‘law of 1/n’ (see also Shepsle 
and Weingast 1981). In their model, expenditure x can be targeted at a particular 
geographical district where it produces benefits b, while costs c are shared equally 
across all districts. This implies that the optimal level of spending for district i is 
achieved when its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost:
b](x) = - c \ x )  . (1)
n
The larger the n in equation (1) the smaller the share of the tax burden that is 
considered in spending decisions. Hence, the authors conclude that ‘the degree of 
inefficiency in project scale... is an increasing function of the number of districts’ 
(Weingast et al. 1981: 654). In other words, the possibility to disperse costs and
7 Schick (1986 and 1988a) further distinguishes between macro and micro-budgetary institutions. 
He defines the former as institutions that affect aggregate spending, and the latter as those that 
affect particular programmes and decisions. I do not make this distinction here.
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target benefits leads to higher spending as the number of decision-makers who
o
have these incentives increases.
Von Hagen and Harden (1995: 772-775) present a much-cited model that builds 
on the same idea, but which is more directly linked to formulating 
recommendations for the design of the budget process. They model decision­
making in a government consisting of i spending ministers, each of whom gets 
funds z/ that are used to produce activities They assume spending ministers to 
have a simple linear production function jq = fzi where f  captures the ability of 
each minister to convert funds into policy output. Each spending minister pursues 
a policy target x*. The government’s joint utility function is:
Here a determines the utility loss from not fully meeting the policy target; B2, B = 
ZiZj, is the excess burden from taxation to society; and m, 0 < m < 1, is the share 
of this excess burden considered in decision-making. In their paper, Von Hagen
8 For a critique, see Primo and Snyder (2005). Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) and Bradbury and Crain
(2001) present empirical evidence.
(2)
and Harden assume th a t /=  1 and x* = x* for all i, and common knowledge of/
and x *. The joint utility function thus simplifies to:
(3)
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Setting up the first order condition, solving for x,■ and multiplying the result by the 
number of spending ministers n yields a total optimal budget for the government:
B° = nax 
nm + a (4)
However, each spending minister individually has different incentives compared 
with the government as a whole as represented by equation (2). While each has an 
interest in achieving her policy target and minimising the excess burden from 
taxation, each also receives a private utility gain from her budget allocation, for 
example because it enhances electoral prospects in her constituency. Moreover, 
each spending minister only considers her constituency’s share i«/ of the total 
excess burden.9 Hence, Von Hagen and Harden posit the following utility function 
for individual spending ministers:
9 This assumption is justifiable. As Hallerberg (2004: 24) notes, ‘ministers are often judged by 
how well they protect the interests of the constituents of their particular ministry... [Wjhere one 
stands on budget issues within one’s party depends on where one sits at the cabinet table.’ The 
case studies in his book illustrate the point, as does the empirical work by Perotti and Kontopoulos
(2002). Using a panel of 19 OECD countries over the 1970 to 1995 period, they find that cabinet 
size is a determinant of fiscal outcomes. More consistent with the underlying theoretical argument, 
Volkerink and De Haan (2001) investigate the fiscal impact of the number of spending ministers, 
i.e. the total number of government ministers minus the minister of finance and/or the budget as 
well as the prime minister. They find that this measure affects budget deficits in a panel of 22 
OECD countries covering the years 1971 to 1996.
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(5)
Here, y determines the extent of private utility gain from spending. Given the 
simplifying assumptions that f  -  1 and x* = x  for all /, equation (5) can be 
rewritten as:
= (6)
If the budget process follows a bottom-up approach that allows each spending 
minister to separately draft a budget, so that the total budget consists simply of the 
sum of all bids submitted by the spending ministers, each of them will maximise:
v, = yci ~ ( xi - x' f  (7)
^  j * i
If m = Zjtrii equation (7) yields a total budget of:
B = n(ax' + y) . (8)
m + a
The aggregate budget outcome resulting from the bottom up process (8) is larger 
than the optimal total of the government as a whole (4). This result holds as long 
as a spending minister derives private utility from expenditure, i.e. y > 0, and as 
long as there is more than one spending minister, i.e. n > 1. Von Hagen and
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Harden (1995) go on to show that when a minister without portfolio, who has an 
incentive to consider the overall impact of excess taxation, is given strategic 
power vis-a-vis his colleagues in spending ministries, the resulting amount of total 
spending is closer to the joint optimum than under the bottom-up process. The 
model can be adapted to different contexts, such as legislative decision-making, or 
where the process involves disciplined political parties in a coalition government 
(Hallerberg 2004: 22-27, Hallerberg 1999). The basic result is always that a 
spending bias will result when decision-makers do not internalise the full cost of 
their actions, i.e. when they suffer from ‘fiscal illusion’ (Von Hagen and Harden 
1995: 772).
The fiscal institutionalist response to what is also referred to as the ‘common pool 
resource’ or ‘fiscal commons’ problem is to impose hierarchical budget 
institutions. These are institutional arrangements that centralise budgetary 
decision-making in the hands of an actor who is more likely to consider overall 
costs, such as the finance minister or the prime minister, than a spending minister 
in order to contain free-riding and to safeguard fiscal discipline (Von Hagen 1992, 
Poterba and Von Hagen 1999, Strauch and Von Hagen 1999). This has spawned a 
substantial body of empirical work on the fiscal effects of budget institutions, for 
instance in Western Europe (Von Hagen 1992, Hallerberg 2004), but also Latin 
America (Stein et a l 1998, Alesina et al. 1999b, Hallerberg and Marier 2004), 
and more recently Central and Eastern Europe (Gleich 2003, Ylaoutinen 2004).
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While the institutionalist literature has contributed an important perspective on the 
determinants of fiscal performance, it also has limitations. First, there is a 
theoretical contradiction in the sense that formal modelling efforts produce 
predictions about spending levels (Von Hagen and Harden 1995, Hallerberg 1999 
and 2004) whereas empirical work ‘has consistently found an impact of budget 
institutions on fiscal deficits and debt, but almost as consistently has failed to find 
an association with government size’ (Stein et a l 1998: note 35). Moreover, some 
papers do not properly justify the choice to use other dependent variables when 
the theoretical discussion calls for the use of indicators of government size, in 
particular public spending. For instance, the paper by Alesina et a l (1999b: 263), 
which is one of the most widely cited works on the topic, uses primary deficits as 
the dependent variable and contains only a short justification. Interestingly, the 
paper by Stein el a l (1998), using the same dataset, finds no association between 
budget institutions and government size, and their results are strongest when using 
the primary balance as the dependent variable. Sceptics might be forgiven for 
thinking that some of this literature uses post-hoc justifications for the choice of 
indicator of fiscal performance. In this thesis, I develop a theoretical framework 
that generates predictions about the impact of particular institutional features on 
spending levels, and use appropriate data to test these.
Another limitation of the fiscal institutionalist literature, in the context of this 
thesis, is that it typically investigates only a limited range of legislative 
institutions. The most widely considered variable is legislative powers to amend 
the budget tabled by the executive (Von Hagen 1992, Alesina et a l 1999b, Stein
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et a l 1998). Another legislative variable considered in earlier studies is the 
sequencing of the voting process (Von Hagen 1992), but subsequently Von Hagen 
acknowledged the theoretical work by Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) and modified 
his claims about the effects of sequencing (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1997). 
Crain and Muris (1995) consider how legislative committee structure affects 
spending levels. Other relevant features of the budget process, such as execution 
rules, are rarely considered from a legislative perspective. Moreover, in some of 
the empirical work the institutional variables are under-theorised or based on 
simple conjectures, such as the claim that the reversionary budget affects fiscal 
policy (Alesina et al. 1999b, Hallerberg and Marier 2004). In this study, I bring 
together a range of relevant variables in a more unified framework of legislative 
budget institutions than was previously available.
I accept the basic premise of the common pool literature, that budgetary decision­
making in legislatures is vulnerable to free-riding, and that the resulting pro­
spending bias can be mitigated by institutional arrangements. However, it is far 
too simplistic to argue that ‘constraints’ on the power of the legislature to shape 
the budget will improve fiscal performance. A core argument of this thesis is that 
the effect of legislative institutions on fiscal performance needs to be analytically 
separated from understanding how institutional arrangements affect the set of 
outcomes available to the legislature. Put differently, we need a more thorough 
understanding of how exactly a constraint works before it is possible to generate 
predictions about its impact on fiscal outcomes. Paradoxically, institutional 
arrangements may constrain legislative choice without affecting fiscal outcomes,
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and some constraints on legislative powers may even have adverse effects on 
fiscal policy. In short, if an institutional feature constrains the budgetary options 
available to the legislature, it does not necessarily follow that it also constrains 
spending. Once the predictions about the fiscal effects of legislative budget 
institutions have been clarified, this provides a strong theoretical basis for 
empirically investigating the fiscal effects of legislative budget institutions.
From an empirical perspective, this study is also more comprehensive in terms of 
countries covered than previous research related to legislative budget institutions. 
Oppenheimer’s (1983) thorough literature survey may be slightly outdated, but it 
still highlights the scarcity of research on the impact of legislatures outside the US 
on policies and budgets (see also Mezey 1983). It is in fact only more recently that 
innovative survey work by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has started to address the lack of data on comparative 
legislative budget practices (OECD 2002b and 2006, OECD and World Bank 
2003). I adapt and use these data to present the most broadly based comparative 
overview of legislative budgeting to date.
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Moreover, this thesis combines quantitative and qualitative methods.10 Some 
recent research on fiscal institutions complements quantitative analysis with 
qualitative work (Hallerberg 2004), but overall the bias in this literature is heavily 
towards quantitative methods. One of the advantages of case studies is that they 
allow us to gain a deeper understanding of exact causal mechanisms (Gerring 
2004 and 2005, George and Bennett 2005, Bennett and Elman 2006). The debate 
about the pros and cons of quantitative and qualitative analysis in the social 
sciences is not new (Jackman 1985, Ragin 1987 and 2000, King et a l 1996), but 
the choice of research techniques does not have to be exclusive. For instance, 
Lieberman (2005) propagates a ‘mixed methods’ approach to harness the 
respective strengths of different methods of inquiry. I use a case study approach to 
complement and deepen my more broadly based quantitative analysis.
1.3 The structure of the thesis
I commence with a short historical excursion in chapter two, which looks at the 
evolution of parliamentary control of public finance in the UK, with additional 
comparative references. This is useful for understanding the origins of
10 Mahoney and Goertz (2006: 245-246) challenge these two labels, which in their view ‘do a poor 
job capturing the real differences between the traditions. Quantitative analysis inherently involves 
the use of numbers, but all statistical analyses also rely heavily on words for interpretation. 
Qualitative studies quite frequently employ numerical data; many qualitative techniques in fact 
require quantitative information... [Better labels] would be statistics versus logic, effect estimation 
versus outcome explanation, or population-oriented versus case-oriented approaches.’
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institutional arrangements for financial scrutiny, how they have developed over 
time, and how they are intimately connected with parliamentary control of public 
finance. I develop the formal theoretical basis for most of the empirical analysis in 
the thesis in the second chapter, in which I discuss a range of institutional 
arrangements and how they affect the budgetary choices available to the 
legislature. In this chapter, I also generate a number of testable predictions about 
the impact of these features on fiscal policy.
Following these historical and theoretical parts, chapter four moves on to 
empirical analysis. Using data from a 2003 survey of budget processes in the 
industrialised democracies as well as additional countries, I translate the 
theoretical framework of chapter three into an index of legislative budget 
institutions, and present the resulting ranking for 36 countries. The following two 
chapters are dedicated to working with these data. In chapter five, I first explore 
factors that account for cross-national variation in legislative financial scrutiny, 
considering variables that relate to colonial history, party political dynamics, other 
fundamental features of political systems, as well as the development context of a 
country. In chapter six, I move to the core concern of the institutionalist research 
agenda, and systematically test the impact of various legislative institutions on 
fiscal policy. This also entails a detailed reconstruction and disaggregation of two 
other and influential measures of legislative budget institutions.
The thesis concludes with case study evidence on budget reform and legislative 
control. Because Sweden implemented radical reforms to the budget process in
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the mid-1990s that directly followed the recommendations of Von Hagen (1992), 
and since we now have a reasonable amount of data for the years prior to as well 
as after the reforms, this provides an ideal choice to further test several 
institutionalist hypotheses. Moreover, for reasons discussed more fully in chapter 
seven, some of these cannot be investigated properly with the available cross- 
sectional and panel data. A further contribution of the case study material is that it 
facilitates a broader understanding of the determinants of reforms, while at the 
same time allowing the use of precise data and in-depth qualitative analysis to 
consider the impact on legislative control and fiscal policy. The conclusion draws 
together the main findings, highlights several cross-cutting themes and 
implications, and explores possible directions for follow-up research.
33
2 The evolution of democratic control of public finances
The finance of the country is ultimately associated with the liberties of the country. It is a 
powerful leverage by which English liberty has been gradually acquired... If the House of 
Commons by any possibility lose the power of the control o f the grants of public money, 
depend upon it, your very liberty will be worth very little in comparison. That powerful 
leverage has been what is commonly known as the power of the purse -  the control of the 
House of Commons over public expenditure.
William Ewart Gladstone, 1891 (from Einzig 1959: 3)
Parliament does have control in the sense that the Government cannot obtain funding 
from the public purse without Parliament’s consent... [The current procedures] are also 
the lever which ensures a wide range of financial information is made available to the 
House each year. But this is, at present, the limit of the House’s power: if not a 
constitutional myth, it is close to one.
House of Commons Procedure Committee, 1998 (from Walters and Rogers 2004: 257)
Nowadays parliamentary approval of taxation and public spending is a regular, 
usually annual routine in any democracy. There was a time when this function 
was bitterly contested. It took a series of long and often violent conflicts for this 
principle to acquire the ubiquitous constitutional importance that it enjoys across 
democratic countries today. The UK House of Commons was at the vanguard of 
this struggle for parliamentary supremacy in public finance. As the annual budget 
is a key economic policy tool of the government, and constitutes arguably its most 
comprehensive statement of priorities, one might expect that once gained,
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parliamentary powers over financial decisions would be jealously guarded. Yet, 
there is broad agreement that the present financial scrutiny arrangements of the 
Commons are deficient and in need of reform (Davey 2000, Schick 2002, Brazier 
and Ram 2005). Paradoxically, the financial role of the Commons is considered 
ineffective as well as essential to democracy.
This chapter summarises the development of parliament’s budgetary power by 
focusing on three particularly important stages, viz. the struggle to ensure consent 
to taxation during the seventeenth century, the rise of modem budgeting and 
expenditure control in the nineteenth century, and the decline of parliament’s 
power of the purse in the twentieth century. This discussion cannot do justice to 
the rich history of budgeting (see Webber and Wildavsky 1986 for a 
comprehensive account). Rather, it serves to highlight stages and issues in the 
battle for parliamentary supremacy in public finance that are important for 
understanding how parliament acquired the budgetary role it exercises today, and 
how institutional arrangements for financial scrutiny evolved. The chapter makes 
occasional reference to relevant developments in other countries, in particular the 
US and France, to place the experience of the UK in a comparative context.
2.1 Revolutionary origins of parliamentary control
The struggle to ensure consent to taxation was a central battlefield in the evolution 
of parliament in medieval England (Harriss 1975). Parliament sought to limit
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royal powers to impose taxes in order to curtail their ability to maintain a standing 
army beyond times of war and immediate threat. The principle of parliamentary 
consent to taxation gained constitutional recognition in the Magna Carta, a list of 
concessions to the barons that King John signed at Runnymede in 1215: ‘No 
‘scutage’ or ‘aid’ may be levied in our kingdom without its general consent...’11 
But this agreement did not resolve the conflict over the power to impose taxes, 
which continued to simmer throughout the following centuries. The Stuart 
Parliaments of the seventeenth century proved to be crucial in the development of 
parliamentary control of taxation (Smith 1999: 49-63).
During the reign of Charles I the relationship between Crown and Commons 
deteriorated sharply. The House stubbornly refused to grant sufficient subsidy to 
the king, whose finances suffered from substantial debt inherited from his father 
and an unsuccessful military campaign in Spain. Charles I continued to 
unilaterally impose taxes despite his undertaking in the Petition of Right in 1628 
that no tax should be levied without the consent of the nation. Resistance to the 
‘ship-money’ triggered civil war, which, however, failed to clearly establish the 
principle that was being contested. Parliament’s power over the purse remained 
defective after the demise of Charles I in 1649.
11 A ‘scutage’ was a tax paid in lieu of military service in feudal times, and was used by the king to 
maintain a paid army. In times of emergency and on special occasions, such as the marriage of his 
eldest daughter, he could also impose a levy known as an ‘aid.’
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A crucial shortcoming of parliamentary control was that it did not extend to royal 
borrowing on the monarch’s personal credit. After Charles II claimed the throne in 
1660 parliament started to demand estimations of cost before voting money to be 
granted to the king, who claimed to get short shrift. To evade expenditure control, 
a popular royal tactic was to resort to borrowing with the hope that parliament 
would subsequently consent to the raising of funds to repay such loans. But this 
practice was not sustainable as parliament refused to oblige. In 1672 the 
government in effect declared the only state bankruptcy in British history when 
payments on loans from City bankers were suspended initially for twelve months, 
which was later on repeatedly renewed (Einzig 1959: 98). Only after the 
revolution was executive borrowing tied to parliamentary consent, which restored 
trust with lenders and ensured large-scale access to finance for imperial expansion 
over the following centuries.
Nonetheless, the bitter contest between kings and parliaments in the seventeenth 
century precipitated procedural innovations that advanced parliamentary control 
of state finance. In particular parliament’s increasing use of a Committee of the 
Whole House brought several advantages, due to the fact that the procedures of 
committees applied for such deliberations, rather than the standard rules. This 
allowed the Commons to appoint their own chairperson, which reduced the 
influence of the Speaker, who at the time was generally regarded as aligned with
i  *y
the monarch (Reid 1966: 45). The committee procedure also allowed each
12 As from 1641 taxation proposals were discussed in the Committee of Ways and Means. 
Although the committee was abolished in 1967, making way for a standing committee to consider
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member to speak more than once and thus facilitated much freer debate. It became 
easier for the Commons to delay passing the bill to grant subsidies to the Crown 
until the end of a session, a tactic that afforded time to extract concessions from 
the monarch (Einzig 1959: 55). Initially, Smith (1999: 73) emphasises, the 
procedure was ‘certainly not intended as a weapon against the Crown.’ Rather, it 
was convenient to remove portions of the debate from the floor of the House. 
Once established, however, the strategic advantages of the procedure were soon 
discovered. But clever use of these procedural devices was not enough to establish 
parliamentary supremacy over taxation.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought a decisive victory for parliament, and it 
is a landmark in the evolution of its financial role. Most importantly, the 
revolution firmly established the principle that only parliament could authorise 
taxation. The 1689 Bill of Rights captures the outcome of the struggle. William III 
and Mary II had to accept its principles as a condition for ascending the throne in 
1689, including the provision ‘That levying money for or to the use of the Crown 
by pretence of prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in 
other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.’ Still, at this stage 
there was still no such thing as an annual budget, and there was no comprehensive 
control of expenditures.
parts of the annual finance bill, the chairman of ways and means still generally occupies the chair 
during the budget speech.
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Before the revolution the royals freely mingled public and private income. The 
idea of public finance with concomitant notions of accountability could not be 
established as long as there was no distinction between the property of the 
monarch and that of the state (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 212). In 1698 
parliament passed the Civil List Act that granted the Crown tax revenues of 
£700,000 per annum ‘to meet the costs of the civil government and the royal 
establishment’ (Smith 1999: 63). The monarch in turn relinquished most of the 
hereditary revenues. Originally, the list was intended to cover the financial 
requirements of the king and his household as well as the expenditure of the 
central civil government excluding debt charges. Expenditure items for civil 
administration were gradually transferred from the list to the supply services and, 
later, the consolidated fund, in a process that lasted until 1830 (Einzig 1959: 149). 
The creation of the civil list put a decisive end to the tradition that the king should 
‘live of his own’ (Smith 1999: 61-63). At the same time it was the first step 
towards the separation of public and royal expenditures.
Paradoxically, lasting and significant limitations on parliament’s fiscal role 
originated during these early days of growing financial control by the Commons. 
Although the revolution of 1688 brought an important breakthrough in terms of 
the formal recognition of parliamentary powers, during much of the following 
century parliament was politically weak vis-a-vis the monarchs, whose 
governments were usually able to secure majorities. Direct bribery was not 
uncommon and the royal powers of patronage further helped to ensure a generally 
compliant parliamentary majority (see Namier 1929). During the early eighteenth
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century unexpected revenue surpluses tempted private members to secure a share
of these funds for spending in their constituencies (Einzig 1959: 130-131). The
Commons proceeded to resolve in 1706 ‘That this House will receive no Petition
for any sum of Money relating to public Service, but what is recommended from
the Crown’ (quoted from Reid 1966: 36). The financial initiative of the Crown has
been enshrined in the standing orders since 1713 and this limitation on the power
of the purse is considered an essential constitutional principle to this day (May 
1  ^ •1997: 770). Without sufficiently strong influence of the executive over the 
Commons it is hard to imagine that parliament would have agreed to the lasting 
curtailment of its newly gained budgetary powers. Therefore, while the British 
Parliament was at the forefront of claiming budgetary rights, it was also the first 
parliament to voluntarily cede the right to financial initiative (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 1986: 1093):
Parliament still respects this long-standing custom and practice and, as a result, it may not 
vote sums in excess of the Government’s estimates. Consequently, the only amendments 
that are in order are those which aim to reduce the sums requested and have as their 
purpose the chance for Members to raise explanations before the sums in question are 
approved.
After the Glorious Revolution, it was not long before parliamentary control over
taxation spread beyond Britain. Parliament proved to have a short memory of the
13 At the time of writing, Standing Order No. 48 of the House of Commons reads: ‘This House will 
receive no petition for any sum relating to public service or proceed upon any motion for a grant or 
charge upon the public revenue, whether payable out of the Consolidated Fund or the National 
Loans Fund or out of money to be provided by Parliament, or for releasing or compounding any 
sum of money owing to the Crown, unless recommended from the Crown.’
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passions that could be incited by unilateral imposition of fiscal measures. As 
imperial finances were exceedingly stretched by the task of protecting vast 
colonial territories, parliament sought to force the inhabitants of the empire’s 
North American possessions to contribute towards the defence of their territory. In 
1765 it ordered the imposition of a tax on a stamp affixed to a range of documents 
including such essentials as newspapers and playing cards. This gave rise to great 
discontent in the colonies, and led to a boycott of British goods by the colonialists. 
Despite a partial retreat by parliament, which abolished the ‘stamp tax’ and 
several other duties, the continued imposition of a duty on tea was sufficient to 
provoke unrest and ultimately led to the war of independence. At the First 
Continental Congress in 1774 delegates from the colonies rejected ‘every idea of 
taxation, internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America, 
without their consent’ (Ford et a l 1904-37: 1:69). After the decisive battle of 
Saratoga parliament abolished the hated duty and resolved not to impose further 
taxes on America.
2.2 The rise of modern budgeting
Parliamentary control remained incomplete as long as governments continued to 
enjoy extensive discretion in expending public revenues. Without detailed 
knowledge of expenditure needs parliament could not properly evaluate the 
government’s requests for funds. Moreover, the absence of comprehensive 
accounting and audit procedures meant that parliament was not positioned to
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authoritatively ascertain whether moneys were actually spent for the purposes for 
which they had been requested and appropriated. Following the Glorious 
Revolution, it took parliament two further centuries to put in place a 
comprehensive system to oversee public expenditures. There were some interim 
achievements, but the development of modem budgeting as a means of 
parliamentary control took longer in the UK then in some other countries.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the US Congress already constrained 
executive discretion through detailed line item appropriations, including strict 
limits on specific expenses such as firewood and candles in particular offices 
(Schick 2000: 11). This tradition has its origins in colonial times, when 
legislatures were distrustful of British rule and invested much effort in 
scrutinising administrative expenditures. The colonialists were suspicious of 
governors they did not appoint and who were regarded as agents of the king in 
distant Britain. They thus devised stringent and humiliating control mechanisms 
including the annual voting of salaries, detailed specification of the object of 
spending and the amount to be spent, and the reversion of unspent funds to the 
treasury at the end of the fiscal period (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 365). This 
advanced level of congressional scrutiny of expenditures was exceptional 
compared with other countries at the time.
The rise of modem budgeting in nineteenth century Europe was linked to the 
Enlightenment idea that government, through conscious effort, could be made 
rational (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 323-326). France was first in developing
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modem expenditure control mechanisms, starting with reforms of state audit 
during the first half of the nineteenth century.14 Napoleon put in place the 
institutional fundamentals of modem public audit when he created the cour des 
comptes in 1807. In the initial years following the creation of the court the 
benefits of the new audit system for the French National Assembly were marginal. 
Many audit reports were ‘lost in the library’ despite apparently frequent but ‘in 
vain’ demands for them by parliamentary committees (Stourm 1917: 577). To 
ensure effective reporting to the assembly, the publication and distribution of 
audit reports was made a legal requirement in 1832. Since 1819 the assembly 
passed an annual law approving the execution of each budget, as the accounting 
officer was held personally responsible for any misspent funds until the passing of 
a formal vote for ‘granting discharge.’15 The assembly also gradually broadened
14 The history of state audit in France can be traced back as far as the reign of Philippe V in the 
fourteenth century (Stourm 1917: 551). Feudal monarchs used early forms of audit to protect 
themselves against excessive theft from revenue collection agents, and audit was not used to hold 
kings to account for expenditures. Article 14 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen that was adopted with the French revolution in 1789 promised greater parliamentary 
control: ‘All citizens have the right to ascertain, by themselves, or through their representatives, 
the need for a public tax, to consent to it freely, to watch over its use, and to determine its 
proportion, basis, collection and duration.’
15 Ren6 Stourm (1917: 595) reminisces about the debates that ensued when the laws on regulation 
where discussed during the 1820s: ‘Not only did each discussion terminate in a proper resolution, 
but the general rules resulting from it brought our system of budgetary accounting to a high degree 
of perfection in a short time.’ By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the interest of 
parliamentarians had waned. They paid scant attention and the approval o f the law on regulation 
frequently took place more than a decade following the end of the relevant fiscal year. To this day,
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its control over the approval of expenditures until the specification of detailed 
items of expenditure for each ministry became a legal requirement in 1831. By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, France had put in place a sophisticated public 
financial management system with most of the core elements that are associated 
with modem budgeting. These included a comprehensive written budget 
encompassing all revenues and expenditures of government, analytical procedures 
for estimating financial requirements, a standard fiscal year and the principle of 
annual authorisation, as well as a developed system of accounting and audit 
control.
Control of expenditures evolved somewhat more haphazardly in the UK, where 
parliament appropriated money many centuries before the use of budgets became 
common. A first known instance of parliamentary appropriation dates back to 
1340, when a grant to Edward III was explicitly earmarked for ‘the Maintenance 
and Safeguard of our said Realm of England, and on Wars in Scotland, France and 
Gascoign, and in no places elsewhere during the said Wars’ (Einzig 1959: 79). 
Particular sources of revenue were also frequently tied to specific expenses in 
order to exercise some control over royal spending. However, parliamentary 
oversight of expenditures remained patchy and incomplete. An important 
improvement was the creation of the consolidated fund in 1787 for the purposes of
however, a formal vote on budget execution closes the cycle of financial control in public finance 
systems that were influenced by the French traditions (National Audit Office 2001: 23). Refusal to 
grant discharge can be a serious political threat. When the European Parliament rejected the 
discharge motion for the 1996 budget, this eventually led to the resignation of the entire 
commission in March 1999 (Miller and Ware 1999).
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collecting revenues and disbursing all monies for the supply of public services 
(Reid 1966: 57): ‘This broke the disorder caused by assigning particular taxes to 
special purposes and it provided the means of infinite expenditure control through 
comprehensive appropriation schedules.’ But full parliamentary control of 
expenditures had to wait until the rise of modem budgeting.
The decisive steps towards modernisation of public finances are inextricably 
linked to William Ewart Gladstone, who first became Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in 1852. He favoured liberal policies that aimed at loosening economic 
restraints, minimising the costs of running an empire and curbing public debt. His 
approach reflects the orthodox economic thinking that started to shape fiscal 
policy by the middle of the nineteenth century, when the norm of balanced 
budgets became fashionable (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 302). Gladstone was 
determined to force greater economy in public finance and introduced reforms in 
the 1860s that made annual and comprehensive estimates central to legislative 
oversight.
An essential advance was made in 1861 when the Commons, based on the 
initiative of Gladstone, resolved to establish a Public Accounts Committee 
(Chubb 1952: 32).16 The following year the committee was made permanent and
16 However, despite common perception, Gladstone did not invent the Public Accounts 
Committee. The first such committee was appointed in 1690 under the Act for Appointing and 
Enabling Commissions to Examine, Take and State the Publick Accounts of the Kingdom (Einzig 
1959: 168). But this burst in parliamentary supervision of public accounts under William III was 
not sustained. The use of the committee for political purposes undermined its reputation and
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tasked with ‘the examination of the accounts showing the appropriation of the 
sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure’ (see current Standing 
Order No. 148). The provision of relevant information was ensured by statute 
when, the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866 required all government 
departments to produce appropriation accounts for audit purposes. The act also 
created the Comptroller and Auditor General by merging the ex ante function of 
authorising the issue of money to departments with a new ex post function of 
examining every appropriation account and reporting the results to parliament 
(National Audit Office 2001: 236). The Public Accounts Committee acquired its 
full functionality when the first complete set of accounts was presented and 
examined in 1870 (Chubb 1952: 43). Gladstone’s reforms established an audit 
model predicated on close interaction between the committee and the Auditor 
General, which has been widely adopted throughout the Commonwealth (McGee 
2002, Wehner 2003, Pelizzo et a l 2006).
The unique success of the Public Accounts Committee among the financial 
committees of the Commons can to a significant extent be attributed to the 
confluence of three crucial factors, viz. the initiative and sustained support of 
Gladstone during the initial years, the co-operation of the treasury, and the quality 
of the committee’s work (Chubb 1952: 36). Gladstone did not regret his initiative 
and in subsequent years remained a firm supporter of the committee’s work. The 
treasury came to regard the committee as an ally in the struggle to control
effectiveness, and the practice of parliamentary audit lapsed under Walpole’s administration. It 
also appears that similar committees operated in Canada as from the 1830s (Reid 1966: 95).
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spending departments. This was crucial, as the committee had no power to enforce 
its own recommendations, but relied on the persuasive power of its reports and the 
co-operation of the government. Co-operation was facilitated by efficient 
practices that the committee developed in the years after its inception. The main 
targets of the committee’s work became bureaucrats rather than the politicians of 
the day, and the nature of its work was kept strictly financial and was not allowed 
to drift into policy debates. To this day, inquiries of the committee focus on the 
accounting officers of departments rather than the relevant ministers. In addition, 
access to the specialist advice of the Auditor General became a resource that has 
remained unique among parliamentary committees in the UK (Laughame 1999). 
As a result, the work of the committee developed to a high standard of scrutiny 
and contributed significantly to improvements in the disclosure of financial 
information in the following decades (Chubb 1952: 42-70).
A final step towards the democratisation of the budget was taken when the 
hereditary chamber was stripped of its veto power over financial legislation. The 
Commons considered the Lords unable to amend tax and spending bills by the end 
of the seventeenth century (Einzig 1959: 114). The formal removal of remaining 
veto power was triggered by the dramatic struggle over the 1909 budget of 
Chancellor Lloyd George, who sought increased tax revenues in order to pay for 
pensions and defence (Porritt 1910). When the Lords rejected the entire Finance 
Bill, this prompted the passing of the Parliament Act of 1911, the purpose of
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which was to debar the Lords from rejecting ‘money bills.’17 Since then, the 
supremacy of the elected chamber is firmly established. Budgetary bicameralism 
of various forms continues in countries where second chambers of parliament 
have democratic credentials (Patterson and Mughan 1999).
Parliamentary fiscal power in the UK was at its peak in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, when the Commons frequently amended spending and 
revenue proposals. Paul Einzig (1959: 264-276) lists 26 instances of government 
defeat over estimates between 1858 and the turn of the century. On many other 
occasions, government accepted parliamentary proposals when criticism was 
compelling or to avoid defeat.
17 The term covers appropriation and tax bills, although this is an over-simplification. The full 
definition is rather more intricate (May 1997: 806): “Section 1(2) of the Act defines a ‘money bill’ 
as a public bill which in the opinion of the Speaker of the House of Commons contains only 
provisions dealing with all or any of the following subjects, namely, the imposition, repeal, 
remission, alteration, or regulation of taxation; the imposition for the payment of debt or other 
financial purposes of charges on the Consolidated Fund or the National Loans Fund, or on money 
provided by Parliament or the variation or repeal of any such charges; Supply; the appropriation, 
receipt, custody, issue or audit of accounts of public money; the raising of guarantee of any loan or 
the repayment thereof; or subordinate matters incidental to those subjects or any of them. For the 
purposes of this definition the expressions ‘taxation’, ‘public money’, and ‘loan’ respectively do 
not include any taxation, money, or loan raised by local authorities or bodies for local purposes, 
matters which, on the other hand, are included within the scope of Commons financial privilege.”
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2.3 The budgetary decline of parliament
In truth, the principal peculiarity of the House of Commons in financial affairs is 
nowadays not a special privilege, but an exceptional disability... The House of Commons 
-  now that it is the true sovereign, and appoints the real executive -  has long ceased to be 
the checking, sparing, economical body it once was. It is now more apt to spend money 
than the Minister of the day.
Walter Bagehot (1867: 154)
In the early days of parliamentary involvement the need for consent served to 
restrain profligate monarchs and to limit the burden of taxation. By the time that 
Walter Bagehot published The English Constitution in 1867 parliament’s 
budgetary function had started to fall into disrepute. Critique of the alleged 
profligate tendencies of parliamentarians is not justified when considering the 
fiscal effect of parliamentary amendments, which according to constitutional 
tradition involved cuts in expenditures. To the contrary, Einzig concludes his 
analysis of parliamentary amendment activity during this period by pointing out 
that ‘in many instances criticisms by the House drew the Government’s attention 
to the possibility of justifiable economies’ (Einzig 1959: 276). The success of the 
Public Accounts Committee also ensured a focus on potential savings and the 
elimination of waste in spending. Bagehot’s critique reveals his deep-seated 
discomfort with the overall expansion of public spending during this period, 
which parliamentary scrutiny did not reverse or significantly contain.
Elsewhere, too, parliaments acquired a reputation for fiscal profligacy. The 
perhaps first ever cross-national survey on budgeting practices, conducted by the
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Cobden Club during the 1870s, reveals discontent with parliaments in a number of 
countries. For instance, the French Finance Minister Leon Say complained that the 
budget equilibrium was being compromised ‘by those very persons whose proper 
mission should be that of restraining the public administration, in the matter of 
expenditure, instead of encouraging the augmentation of its Budgets’ (quoted 
from Probyn 1877: 49). Decades later, France eventually constrained 
parliamentary powers by curbing the right to financial initiative and powers of 
amendment over executive budgets (Hoffman 1959: 339, Loewenstein 1959: 
223).18 The survey shows that towards the end of the nineteenth century, critique 
of parliament’s budgetary role was not unique to the UK.
But the zenith of fiscal power at Westminster was short-lived. The emergence of
organised political parties towards the end of the nineteenth century is
significantly associated with the decline of parliament in policy-making (Adonis
1993, Norton 1993). In the wake of the 1867 Reform Act the balance between the
Commons and the cabinet began to shift as governments became increasingly
reliant on the approval of the electorate and parties sought to project a coherent
image to the public (Mackintosh 1962: 161-209). The independent tendencies of
members survived for a while, but by 1874 Dod’s Parliamentary Companion
added ‘Lib’ and ‘Cons’ after the names of candidates. Government by cohesive
parties meant that the interests of the executive and its parliamentary majority
18 Article 40 of the France’s 1958 Constitution establishes limitations: ‘Bills and amendments 
introduced by Members of Parliament shall not be admissible where their adoption would have as 
a consequence either a diminution of public resources or the creation or increase of an item of 
public expenditure.’
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gained in congruence. The antagonistic contest between the executive and 
parliament that characterised past centuries was being supplanted by one that 
pitched the opposition against the majority and for which parliament provided the 
arena. This required a tightening of party discipline that commensurately 
diminished the space for individual members to shape public spending and taxes.
At the same time, the reform of parliamentary procedure emerged on the agenda 
as governments struggled to facilitate smooth passage of legislation and to ensure 
the voting of supply by August of each year. The deliberately obstructive 
behaviour of Charles Stewart Pamell and his Irish nationalist followers during the 
1870s and 80s provided impetus for such reforms (Mackintosh 1962: 179-182). 
The government in 1872 obtained concessions that restricted the opportunity for 
amendments to the motion to move into committee of supply. A decade later, 
Gladstone proposed a series of reforms to the standing orders that resulted in the 
prohibition of dilatory motions for adjournment, required speeches to be relevant 
and allowed a simple majority vote to bring about closure of debate. This was 
followed in 1896 by the limitation of the number of supply days and the 
inauguration of the guillotine for the supply procedure (Einzig 1959: 245). Before 
the latter restrictions were introduced, each departmental vote had to be moved 
separately, affording ample opportunity for debate and the discussion of 
amendments. These procedural adjustments made it substantially easier for 
subsequent governments to get their proposals through the Commons.
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Party discipline and procedural restrictions reined in parliamentary activism, and 
amendments to the estimates came to be regarded as fundamental challenges to 
the government during the beginning of the twentieth century.19 When in 1919 the 
Commons took government calls for economy seriously and denied the Lord 
Chancellor funding for a second bathroom, Lord Birkenhead refused to move into 
his official residence. The government considered this incident so embarrassing 
that the treasury initiated a seemingly innocuous but consequential change in 
procedure that removed the drafting of money resolutions from the public bills 
office of the Commons to the treasury. Subsequent governments drafted more 
restrictive money resolutions that increasingly curtailed the scope for amendments 
and debate. This ended the practice of the preceding two centuries when royal 
recommendations and money resolutions were sufficiently permissive to allow 
amendments as long as the stipulated expenditure total was not breached. As 
successive governments became ‘hypersensitive’ to parliamentary challenges, 
every step in the financial procedure became linked to the question of confidence 
(Reid 1966: 77). Nowadays, amendments to executive budget proposals, if 
successful, are tantamount to a vote of no confidence. The last government defeat
19 Amendment experience in many other Westminster type legislatures is similarly dated. It 
appears that the last time an allocation was reduced in the New Zealand Parliament, for instance, 
was in 1930 when the vote for the Department of Agriculture was reduced by five pounds. At the 
time, a minority government had to rely on shifting coalitions (Finance and Expenditure 
Committee 2001: 11).
20 A money resolution is required for any new bill introduced in parliament which would lead to an 
increase in public spending (Einzig 1959: 290-294).
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over estimates was in 1921, when members’ travelling expenses were the object 
of criticism.
Political constraints combined with technical disadvantages to further undermine 
parliamentary scrutiny. As public spending expanded and financial management 
grew in complexity, budgeting increasingly required expertise that largely resided 
in the Treasury. Towards the end of the nineteenth century it became the 
prevailing view that only the executive could have ‘so extensive and impartial a 
view of the mass of these details, and no one can compromise the conflicting 
interests with so much competence and precision’ (Stourm 1917: 54). The US 
Congress held out longest compared with other legislatures by denying the 
president a formal role in preparing budgets. But it, too, conceded the 
establishment of an executive budget in 1921 when the Budget and Accounting 
Act stipulated that the president co-ordinate the drafting of a budget before its 
submission to congress (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 411-416). The emergence 
of modem executive budgeting not only facilitated parliamentary control, but 
paradoxically it also made many parliaments more reactive and, eventually, 
passive recipients of financial proposals. As Allen Schick (2002: 21) puts it, 
executive budgets became ‘the authoritative metric for measuring legislative 
action.’
The decay of financial scrutiny was hastened by parliament’s failure to adapt the 
budget process to changing circumstances. In seventeenth century Britain the 
delay of approval for financial measures was a clever strategy that forced
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economy in the royal handling of public funds and gained parliament time to 
extract concessions from the monarch. Erskine May (1997: 794) still attempts to 
rationalise the late approval of the budget by venturing that ‘the impracticality of 
framing Estimates too long in advance’ makes it impossible to pass the budget in 
time for the beginning of a financial year. This argument is clearly contradicted by 
the fact that most industrialised nations have no difficulty to ensure timely 
passage under normal circumstances.21 Nowadays, tardy approval serves to 
marginalise parliamentary involvement (Schick 2002: 18): ‘With appropriations 
voted after the fiscal year was underway, Parliament came to merely endorse 
spending that had already been incurred.’
In most other countries specialised committees have become the focus of financial 
decision-making in parliament (OECDb 2002: 164).22 Specialised committees 
allow members to acquire relevant expertise and provide a forum for more
21 The OECD’s (2002a) Best Practices on Budget Transparency recommend: ‘The government’s 
draft budget should be submitted to Parliament far enough in advance to allow Parliament to 
review it properly. In no case should this be less than three months prior to the start of the fiscal 
year. The budget should be approved by Parliament prior to the start o f the fiscal year.’ This is 
standard practice in most member countries, as chapter four will show.
22 In 24 out of 27 OECD member countries that responded to the survey, there are specialised 
budget committees. For instance, to consider revenue measures the US House of Representatives 
established the Ways and Means Committee in 1802 and the Senate its Finance Committee in 
1816. The House Appropriations Committee was established in 1865 and its Senate counterpart in 
1867. In addition, in 1974 these committees were complemented with Budget Committees in each 
chamber to facilitate the control of fiscal aggregates during the congressional budget process 
(Schick 2000: 15).
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technical and in-depth discussions than are possible in the politicised atmosphere 
of the chamber (Mezey 1979, Mattson and Strom 1995). In the UK the Public 
Accounts Committee has maintained and, as a result of the explicit provision of 
value for money audit in the 1983 National Audit Act, even enhanced its role in ex 
post financial scrutiny. But the Commons have no similar institution for the 
approval stage of the budget process and other financial committees have 
amounted to little else but ‘temporary experiments’ (Chubb 1952: 42). For a long 
time, it appears that governments objected to the establishment of a select 
committee on estimates on the basis of a misguided argument that this would 
interfere with the financial initiative of the Crown (Einzig 1959: 256). When such 
a committee was set up in 1912 it did not live up to expectations (Chubb 1952: 
198-210). The 1979 reforms of the committee system devolved consideration of 
estimates to the current departmental select committees (Flegmann 1986). 
Although these committees have powers to examine the expenditure of the 
relevant government departments, as well as policy and administration, a recent 
report found that in the 1997-8 and 1998-9 sessions only about a third of select 
committee inquiries considered any form of expenditure issue and less than a 
tenth of these specifically examined the estimates (Hansard Society Commission 
on Parliamentary Scrutiny 2001: 160).
The underdevelopment of specialised committees also characterises the 
parliamentary approval process for taxation measures. Until 1967, all finance bill 
committee stages were taken on the floor of the House in the Committee of Ways 
and Means. To save time, a standing committee stage for the finance bill was
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introduced in the following year to deal with the less controversial aspects of the 
legislation (House of Commons Information Office 2003: 3). Therefore, the 
Commons today have no specialised committee expertise for the scrutiny of 
neither spending plans nor revenue measures.
Conclusions
The budgetary role of legislatures is the outcome of a centuries-long struggle for 
supremacy in public finance. The English Parliament first fought for the right to 
consent to taxation and achieved proper recognition of this principle with the 
revolution of 1688. However, the seeds for the eventual decline of its budgetary 
function were planted only shortly after this important victory when members 
surrendered their right to financial initiative at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. Over the following two centuries, the Commons gradually devised 
mechanisms to control the expenditure of public funds. The decisive breakthrough 
came with the Gladstonian reforms in the 1860s, which put in place the 
institutional machinery for modem expenditure control and successfully revived 
an earlier experiment with a parliamentary committee to scrutinise government 
accounts. The twentieth century has been characterised by increasing executive 
dominance and the withering of parliament’s financial prowess. The rise of party 
discipline towards the end of the nineteenth century reined in members’ 
independence and successive governments initiated restrictive procedural reforms 
that imposed limitations in order to smooth the path of financial proposals. The
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financial procedure became linked to the question of confidence. Lack of 
specialised financial committees in the Commons to scrutinise expenditure and 
revenue proposals and the outdated timing of the budget process further ensured 
that parliament became sidelined from substantive decision-making.
The historical perspective in this chapter highlights that institutional arrangements 
reflect the power of different actors in the budget process, and that they are shaped 
over time by struggles for political control. Thus, country-specific factors and 
contingencies affect institutional design, which we will revisit in chapter five. 
However, while the historical approach is crucial for understanding the evolution 
of legislative financial scrutiny in a particular context, it has limits for the purpose 
of cross-national comparison. While influential, the UK case represents a rather 
extreme outcome of the executive-legislative struggle for power over budget 
policy. To gain a broader understanding, a more universal framework is needed. 
All countries with democratic institutions need to define the budgetary role of the 
legislature, and certain institutional choices are central to that role. As a first step 
in developing a tractable framework for comparing and assessing legislative 
budgeting, the following chapter turns to the analysis of how a set of core budget 
institutions affect legislative control and fiscal policy.
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3 Analysing the institutional foundations for legislative control
Institutional arrangements fundamentally affect public policy and the balance of 
power between different political actors. In this chapter, I explore and demonstrate 
the impact of different procedural rules on the role of a legislature in budgeting. 
Other authors have considered some of the features discussed in this analysis, but 
not always in a rigorous way. Moreover, what is lacking thus far is a 
comprehensive view that integrates the various elements. This synthesis is 
important because looking at the impact of particular decision-making rules in 
isolation may lead to wrong predictions. The effect of one institutional feature 
may be balanced or neutralised by another, and hence analytical omissions may 
lead to unrealistic expectations about the impact of institutional arrangements on 
fiscal policy. An incomplete analysis may also obscure the fact that similar aims 
can be achieved with different combinations of institutions. While some authors 
have developed models that incorporate some of the institutional aspects 
discussed here, these accounts focus on individual countries (for instance Pereira 
and Mueller 2004, Baldez and Carey 1999). This leads to a final and perhaps most 
crucial point in the context of this analysis, i.e. cross-national research requires 
tools that enable the assessment of institutional arrangements on the basis of a 
rigorous common framework.
The focus here is on (i) how institutional arrangements influence the legislative- 
executive balance of power, and (ii) how they affect fiscal policy outcomes. I
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consider how different types and configurations of certain fundamental budgetary 
decision-making rules constrain a legislature, by exploring the size and shape of a 
legislature’s feasible set of budgetary choices under different rules and 
procedures. Which outcome from the feasible set will be realised depends on the 
exact legislative preferences, but by focusing on the feasible set, it becomes 
possible to explore the exact nature of the constraint imposed by institutional 
arrangements on legislative choice. This also allows us to make testable 
predictions about their impact on fiscal performance, defined here in terms of the 
total level of public spending. The analysis considers four sets of essential formal 
rules, namely those that regulate legislative amendments of the budget, 
reversionary budgets, executive veto authority, and executive flexibility during 
implementation. This is the approximate sequence in which these rules are 
relevant over the budget cycle, and hence I will introduce them in this order. In 
recognition that budgetary decision-making is not costless, I also consider aspects 
of legislative organisation that enable a legislature to use its formal powers.
I make several core assumptions. First, I assume a two-dimensional policy space. 
A single dimension is insufficient to explore the differences between different 
versions of a constraint, such as different types of amendment powers or executive 
vetoes. The choice of two-dimensional space can of course be challenged as 
unrealistic, since many government budgets have more than two dimensions. In 
the US, for instance, Congress approves separate appropriation bills for different
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spending areas. However, two-dimensional space is intuitive in this context, 
since many fundamental budgetary choices involve trade-offs between two broad 
categories, such as health versus defence, primary versus secondary education or 
current versus capital spending. Moreover, an extension of the analysis into n- 
dimensional space would be more complicated and less accessible, although in 
principle it is possible. In two-dimensional space, the argument can be illustrated 
with the help of straightforward diagrammatic exposition. Therefore, thorough 
two-dimensional analysis is the logical starting point and the extension into n- 
dimensional space is reserved for later work.
Second, both the executive and the legislature are modelled as unitary actors. I do 
not consider the interaction of the executive and particular members of the 
legislature (Huber 1996). Also, this analysis does not extend to dynamics within 
the legislature, for instance between different chambers of a legislature (Tsebelis 
and Money 1997, Heller 1997 and 2001, Patterson and Mughan 1999). Nor do I 
cover intra-executive negotiations, such as between cabinet committees (Breton 
1996: 98-111) or government departments and the central budget authority 
(Steunenberg 2005). This simplification facilitates analysis without challenging 
the key results of this work. As Tsebelis (2002: 38-63) demonstrates, it is possible 
to approximate the ideal points of collective actors in spatial models. Moreover, 
this assumption allows me to focus on the main purpose of this analysis, to 
23 Up to the 2005 fiscal year, Congress considered 13 regular appropriations bills. In 2005, a 
reorganisation of the Appropriations Committees cut the number of subcommittees to ten in the 
House of Representatives and 12 in the Senate. As a result, the House had 11 such bills and the 
Senate 12 (Streeter 2006).
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delineate a legislature’s feasible set of budgetary choices within different 
institutional settings. Third, I assume Euclidean preferences over the space of 
budgetary alternatives. This implies circular indifference curves in the two- 
dimensional space. Hence, for any set of alternatives an actor prefers the one that 
is closer to his ideal point to the one that is further away. While circularity is a 
standard assumption in spatial analyses, it can be relaxed, although the 
implications are not always straightforward (Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987: 316).
Some further assumptions are convenient but somewhat less fundamental. Fourth, 
I assume that the executive makes the first move and tables a budgetary proposal 
that has to be approved by the legislature. Without this assumption, amendment 
powers would not be important as the legislature could simply draft a budget 
according to its preferences. In practice, the task of drafting a budget for debate in 
the legislature is typically delegated to the executive. While some legislatures 
retain formal powers to draft a budget on their own, few have the prerequisite 
technical capacity (Schick 2002), and Von Hagen (1992: 41) notes that ‘this 
possibility is of no practical importance.’ Hence, the assumption of executive 
proposal power is very realistic. Fifth, I initially assume that decisions in a 
legislature do not entail any transaction costs. This assumption is not realistic, 
which is acknowledged in the final section of this chapter, where I discuss how 
legislative organisation complements formal powers to enable their utilisation. 
Finally, I make the assumption that all spending is in principle variable on a year- 
on-year basis, but I will show that this assumption can be relaxed without 
affecting the substance of the analysis.
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3.1 Amendment powers
After the tabling of a budget, the scope for the legislature to directly write budget 
policy is defined by its powers to amend the executive proposal. I make a 
distinction between three broad types of amendment powers, i.e. unfettered, 
‘balanced budget’ and ‘cuts only.’ These stylised types reflect the most commonly 
found constellations (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1986: Table 38A). With 
‘balanced budget* powers, I refer to a situation where a legislature may not 
increase an item proposed by the executive unless it makes a commensurate 
adjustment elsewhere so as to meet an aggregate constraint, typically either the 
amount of total spending or the budget balance proposed by the executive. With 
‘cuts only’ powers, I refer to the situation where a legislature may only reduce 
items proposed by the executive, but not increase them or introduce any new 
items. For now, I leave aside the possibility of non-approval. Some legislatures 
have no powers at all to amend the budget and may only accept or reject the 
executive’s proposal, which I consider separately in the following section.
Figure 1(a) explores the effects of the three stylised versions of amendment 
powers. The point labelled E  identifies a hypothetical ideal budget of the 
executive. If this budget is tabled, unfettered powers allow a legislature to move to 
any other combination, such as Lj. Under a balanced budget configuration, 
however, aggregate spending is constrained by the total amount proposed by the
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executive. This is represented by a budget line with a slope of -1 that passes 
through E. The budget line connects the points that represent the maximum 
amounts that could be spent on item X  or Y respectively if spending were 
concentrated on one item only (see also Pereira and Mueller 2004: 792).24 With 
such a constraint, the legislature can amend spending to any combination that is 
on the line or below it, but it cannot increase spending to any combination beyond 
the line.25 If its preferred spending package is Z,/, then the closest feasible budget 
is now L j\  The feasible set with balanced budget powers is the triangle OYbXb, 
formed by the budget line and the two axes of the diagram.
24 When modelling outputs the slope of the budget line depends on the price ratio of the relevant 
goods or services. However, appropriations on an output basis are rare despite widespread 
enthusiasm for the idea of performance budgeting (Schick 2003).
25 If  the legislature may not increase the deficit proposed by the executive, the budget constraint 
can be more or less hard. If  it is relatively easy to add revenues by adjusting economic 
assumptions, the legislature may effectively be able to push out the budget line. The ‘softness’ of 
the constraint is then determined by the extent to which this is possible.
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Figure 1: Amendment powers
Spending on Y
V,E
0 Xp XE Xg Spending on X
a) Restricted amendment powers contain total spending
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Spending on X
In contrast, the ‘cuts only’ configuration essentially breaks down legislative 
decision-making into separate choices on each spending item. In other words, 
when a legislature can only reduce an existing item point E imposes a total cap for 
each individual item. Under this configuration, the feasible set is represented by 
the area 0YeEXe. The resulting rectangular shape is smaller than the triangular 
feasible set for balanced budget amendment powers. Still assuming that the 
legislature’s preferred package is Lj the closest feasible budget is now Z,/", which 
is further than Z,/. Note also that total spending is lower at L j” than at L j\ Hence, 
the size of a legislature’s feasible set varies depending on its amendment powers. 
More specifically, it decreases from unfettered to balanced budget and to cuts, only 
powers.
Whether any amendment constraints ‘bite’ depends on the exact preferences of the 
legislature compared with those of the executive. Figure 1(a) also depicts a 
fiscally conservative legislature that prefers lower spending on each item 
compared with the executive, represented here with another hypothetical ideal 
budget L2 . Such a legislature can obtain exactly its ideal budget even when its 
amendment powers are constrained by balanced budget or cuts only provisions. 
This suggests that a fiscally conservative legislature, relative to the executive, is 
more powerful than a profligate one.
What happens if we allow for zero spending on items? If proposed spending on 
either X  or Y is zero, then the shape of the feasible sets for unfettered and balanced 
budget powers are identical. However, for cuts only powers the feasible set is
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reduced from an area to a line, i.e. the choice to cut the non-zero expenditure item 
only. In the highly unrealistic event that the executive proposes a zero spending 
budget, so that proposed spending on both X  and Y is zero, and still leaving aside 
the possibility of non-approval, the feasible set with restricted (either cuts only or 
balanced budget) amendment powers consists of one point only. The possibility of 
either of these scenarios is very remote if we apply the analysis to the main 
functional divisions of a budget, since it is typically difficult to completely cancel 
expenditures on, say, health or education. Hence, in the following I assume that 
A > 0 a n d T > 0 .
However, in practice most governments are to some degree constrained in their 
flexibility to vary the budget year-on-year. Employment contracts and loan 
agreements typically impose long-term obligations on government, such as civil 
service pensions and debt servicing costs. There may also be powerful political 
considerations that protect parts of the budget from adjustment, for instance when 
the government has to ensure support from trade unions or other pressure groups 
by maintaining spending on certain programmes. This implies that a substantial 
proportion of spending may be considered fixed in the short-run, i.e. beyond the 
scope of the annual budget process. Figure 1(a) incorporates constraints on short- 
run variability, where the dashed lines indicate hypothetical proportions of 
spending that are non-adjustable in the short-run. If Xf and indicate arbitrary
fixed levels of spending on X  and Y respectively, then only spending beyond these 
amounts is variable in the short-run. As long as the share of variable expenditure 
is not exactly zero, which is unlikely except in very extreme cases, the relaxation
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of the variability assumption reduces the feasible set at the margin for any 
constellation of amendment powers, for example to the triangle ace for balanced 
budget powers and to the rectangle bcdE for cuts only powers. However, it is still 
true that the feasible set is largest under unfettered powers, and is consecutively 
reduced by balanced budget and cuts only amendment powers. Relaxing the 
variability assumption does not fundamentally challenge the analysis.
The potential for compromise is illustrated in Figure 1(b) for a legislature with 
balanced budget amendment powers. As in the preceding analysis, proposal E 
would result in outcome V. Figure 1(b) includes the indifference curve for the 
legislature in relation to L \  represented by the circle centred on L and with radius 
LL\ which can be written as (L, LL'). The diagram also contains the indifference 
curve of the executive (E, ELf). Both would benefit from moving to a point inside 
the winset of L \  defined as the intersection of the two indifference curves, which 
contains all points that both the legislature and the executive prefer to L '. More 
specifically, they would benefit from moving to a point in the winset and on the 
contract curve between E  and L, which contains all Pareto efficient outcomes. So 
if the executive were to offer a budget such as E \  just inside the winset and on the 
contract curve, both actors would be better off. The problem with this offer is that 
the legislature has a second-stage incentive to use its amendment powers to 
approve budget L", which it prefers to V. This, however, leaves the executive 
worse off than with outcome L\ Hence, the executive would be unwise to 
negotiate a compromise E' unless there is a commitment device to ensure that the 
legislature is not going to renege. Cooperation may also emerge if the time
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horizon is extended and both actors value future co-operation highly enough. In 
the absence of such solutions, executive compromise proposals are unstable, and 
the best offer is E.
The main conclusion from this section is that different arrangements of legislative 
powers of amendment over the budget impact on the shape of a legislature’s 
feasible set of budgetary choices. Restricted amendment powers limit the potential 
for legislative choice, since the budget proposal in effect fixes either a total 
expenditure ceiling (balanced budget amendment powers) or a ceiling on each 
item contained in the budget (cuts only amendment powers). In terms of fiscal 
performance, the analysis demonstrates that limitations on amendment powers, if 
enforced, are powerful devices for containing public spending within an aggregate 
constraint imposed by the government. More specifically, cuts only amendment 
powers result in at most the same level of total spending as balanced budget 
amendment powers, which in turn result in at most the same level as unfettered 
powers. Hence, my analysis predicts public spending to be lower in countries that 
limit parliamentary powers to amend the executive budget proposal compared 
with countries where legislatures have unfettered amendment powers.
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3.2 The reversionary budget
The reversionary outcome takes effect when a previous budget has expired but a 
new one has not yet been approved. In most countries, there are provisions 
governing this circumstance in either the constitution or organic budget laws, 
although there are a few exceptions. Norway is an example where there are no 
clear formal rules describing the consequences when approval is delayed beyond 
the beginning of the relevant fiscal year (OECD and World Bank 2003). Although 
there are variations, we can distinguish three main reversion scenarios: zero 
spending, last year’s approved budget, or the executive budget proposal. The 
reversionary budget may induce the executive to make concessions in order to 
avoid rejection or non-approval of the budget (Einzig 1959: 55, Schick 2002). In 
the following I explore the conditions under which this is likely to occur.
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Figure 2: Reversionary budgets
Outcome
M -
0
a) Feasible
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outcomes in a single dimension by legislative location
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equidistant to E and R
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b) The reversion circle (M ,  M R )  in two-dimensional space
I assume the absence of any legislative powers to amend, so that the executive and 
the legislature are playing a veto game (Crombez et al. 2006, Tsebelis 2002). The 
executive has to move first and proposes a budget, which the legislature can either 
accept or reject. If the executive had gatekeeping powers, this would alter the 
analysis below, since the process would start with a consideration by the executive 
whether it should table a budget in the first place. However, the absence of 
gatekeeping powers is a very realistic assumption, since constitutions or other 
legislation, such as the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act in the US, typically 
require the executive to table a proposal. Therefore, I leave the theoretically 
entertaining but practically irrelevant possibility of budgetary gatekeeping to be 
explored elsewhere. If the executive proposal is rejected, the exogenously 
determined reversionary outcome takes effect. The executive has agenda setting 
power and makes the proposal at the closest point to its ideal budget that will 
receive legislative approval (Romer and Rosenthal 1978). I assume that when the 
legislature prefers the proposal to the reversionary outcome, or when it is 
indifferent between the two, it will approve the proposal.
In this case, it is easier to start the analysis with a single budget item, and to 
translate the results into a two-dimensional space later on. Figure 2(a) shows the 
location of a reversionary outcome R and an executive ideal point E  on the 
horizontal axis. I assume that R < E. Total nominal expenditure typically expands 
from year to year, so that last year’s nominal budget is likely to be less than the 
executive’s preferred budget. To an extent determined by inflation, fiscal 
retrenchment in real terms would still be possible within these assumptions even if
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the nominal amount in a given budget year is greater than in the previous year. I 
exclude the case of R = E  to avoid trivial solutions. Figure 2(a) also indicates the 
midpoint M  between R and E, which has particular properties that will help to 
extend the findings into two-dimensional space. In Figure 2(a), the vertical axis 
indicates the outcomes of the veto game for each possible location of the 
legislative ideal point L. When L < R, there are no concessions the executive could 
make to obtain an outcome closer to its ideal budget than R. When R < L < M, the 
executive can exploit its agenda setting power and proposes budget 2L -  R, which 
is the closest possible outcome that it can achieve. Finally, when M  < L, the 
legislature never prefers reversion to the executive’s ideal budget, and hence the 
executive has no incentive to make any concessions, resulting in outcome E.
The analysis yields some important results. First, the feasible set is the closed 
interval [R, EJ. By implication, the further away the reversionary outcome is from 
the executive’s preferred budget, the greater the number of potential budgets that 
the executive prefers to the reversionary budget and hence the greater the potential 
for the legislature to extract concessions. Tsebelis and Chang (2004: 460) have 
calculated that year-to-year shifts between major spending categories seldom 
exceed one percentage point in industrialised countries. Hence, in a typical 
situation, budgeting is incremental and successive budgets are likely to be very 
close. In practical terms, this suggests that reversion to zero spending typically 
provides greater scope for the legislature to extract concessions than reversion to 
last year’s expenditures. Second, the analysis allows conclusions about the impact 
of the reversionary budget on fiscal performance. As long as R < E  in nominal
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terms, the most realistic assumption about their relative size, the simple veto game 
in a single dimension does not undermine fiscal discipline. If anything, it 
empowers fiscally conservative legislative bodies to contain spendthrift 
executives. However, if a legislature is profligate relative to the executive, as is 
often assumed (Bagehot 1867: 154, Schick 2002, Hallerberg and Marier 2004), 
the reversionary budget has no effect at all on total spending. This result directly 
challenges Alesina et al. (1999b: 258), who argue that reversionary outcomes 
unfavourable to the executive give rise to ‘incentives to propose a larger budget.’ 
My analysis suggests that this effect requires that (i) reversionary spending is 
higher than the executive prefers, i.e. a nominal cutback scenario, and (ii) that the 
legislature is more profligate relative to the executive.
Figure 2(b) translates the analysis into two-dimensional space to make it 
comparable with the discussion in the rest of this chapter. In Figure 2(a), M is the 
midpoint of the interval of all possible outcomes, which is bounded by R and E. In 
Figure 2(b), I use this property of M to find the two-dimensional equivalent of this 
outcome set, represented with the shaded circle (M, MR), which I call the 
reversion circle. To illustrate, consider two hypothetical legislative ideal points, Lj 
and Z,2- The point Lj is closer to E  than to R, as are all other legislative ideal points 
to the right of the dashed line representing all points that are equidistant to E  and 
R, which implies that the executive will propose its ideal budget. On the other 
hand, L2 is closer to R than to E, and hence induces the executive to propose 
budget E' to ensure approval. More formally, the executive faces a minimisation
73
problem in deciding which budget to table in the legislature. The executive’s 
equilibrium offer E* solves:
min \E -  E'\ subject to \L -  E'\ < \L -  J?|.
Note that some outcomes within the reversion circle require legislative 
preferences in the negative domain, which may not be realistic. If the possibility 
of negative spending is excluded, the reversion circle does not represent the 
feasible set. Suffice it to note here that all outcomes outside the reversion circle 
are infeasible.
This analysis yields implications for fiscal performance. Unlike in a single 
dimension, the veto game in two-dimensional space does not always contain 
outcomes below the aggregate level preferred by the executive. To see why, 
imagine a budget line through E  in Figure 2(b). Some points inside the reversion 
circle are above this imaginary budget line, implying higher aggregate spending 
than the executive desires. However, under the assumption that nominal 
reversionary expenditure for each item is lower than the executive prefers, at most 
a small proportion of the reversion circle contains budgets that result in higher 
aggregate spending compared with the executive’s ideal budget, and most 
outcomes are lower. In fact, as long as last year’s total is smaller than the 
executive’s ideal total in nominal terms, the majority of outcomes in the reversion 
circle imply lower aggregate spending.
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To conclude, the analysis shows that the size of the feasible set depends on the 
distance between the executive’s ideal budget and the reversionary outcome. In 
most realistic scenarios, reversion to zero spending will imply a larger feasible set 
than reversion to last year’s spending. Moreover, the analysis shows that the 
impact of the reversionary budget on fiscal policy is conditional on the position of 
the ideal points of political actors. If aggregate reversionary spending is lower 
than the executive prefers, then the majority of feasible aggregate outcomes are 
also lower than the executive prefers. Contrary to the conjecture offered by 
Alesina et al. (1999b), the threat of non-approval may have no impact on the level 
of total spending, and it may even lead the executive to propose aggregate budgets 
that are smaller than it prefers. Hence, the impact of particular reversionary 
arrangements on fiscal performance is ambiguous, and I do not expect this 
variable to play a significant role in the determination of fiscal policy.
3.3 Executive vetoes
In some political systems, the executive has the power to veto either a budget bill 
in its entirety or individual items within a budget bill approved by the legislature. 
In the following I exclude vetoes that may be overridden by the legislature with a 
simple majority, because voting an already approved budget a second time with 
identical majority requirements would be only a minor inconvenience from a 
legislative perspective. To keep the analysis simple, I also assume that there is no 
legislative override possibility, or that the hurdle of assembling the relevant
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supermajority is too high to override an executive veto. Figure 3 draws on the 
analysis by Carter and Schap (1990) to explore the effects of these two types of 
veto, respectively referred to as a package and line item veto. Similar to the 
preceding section, I assume that the executive will not veto any point that is closer 
or equidistant to its proposal compared with the reversionary outcome. I also 
again assume that the reversionary budget is less than the executive’s proposed 
level of spending for both items in the budget. In Figure 3, X r  and Y r indicate a 
hypothetical reversionary level of spending on items X  and Y respectively.
Figure 3 considers a system where a legislature has unfettered powers to amend 
the budget. In this case, the effect of the package veto is to limit the feasible set to 
all points that are on or within the circle (E , ER), which represents the executive’s 
indifference curve in relation to the reversionary budget. This implies that the 
greater the distance between E  and R the larger the circle. For instance, with 
reversion to zero spending the circle would be substantially larger than the one 
depicted in the diagram. With the package veto, any budget that is approved by 
the legislature but falls outside the circle will be vetoed, whilst any other budget is 
veto-proof. A sophisticated legislature with an ideal budget L would know that 
this proposal is not included in the set of budgets that are acceptable to the 
executive. If proposed, L would trigger a veto and reversion to R. To obtain a 
more favourable outcome, the legislature can move along the contract curve 
between L and E  and approve the closest possible budget, in this case L \ Since R 
and L ' are equidistant from E, this proposal is veto-proof.
26 Dearden and Husted (1990: 14) explore the impact of different override provisions.
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Ceteris paribus, a line item veto is more restrictive. The feasible set with a line 
item veto is the rectangle aRbc that fits exactly within the package veto circle. 
With a line item veto, the executive in effect makes separate veto decisions for 
each spending item. It will not veto any amount that is as close as or closer to its 
proposed spending level than the reversionary level for that particular item. A 
sophisticated legislature with an ideal budget L  would avoid the reversionary 
outcome L r by offering L ”, the veto-proof budget closest to its ideal point. In sum, 
the greater the distance between the reversionary budget and the proposed budget, 
the larger a legislature’s feasible set. Moreover, a line item veto constrains 
legislative choice more than a package veto as long as E ± R, as assumed here.
Figure 3: Executive vetoes
Spending on Y
L
0 Spending on X
The package and line item veto according to Carter and Schap (1990)
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What are the implications for fiscal performance? Despite common 
misperceptions, the impact of different vetoes on aggregate spending is not clear- 
cut. Proponents of the line item veto in the US have argued that it is an effective 
device to contain spending (Schick 2000: 94). However, the analysis here shows 
that with either type of veto, public spending may end up substantially higher than 
the executive’s ideal aggregate level. Moreover, as Carter and Schap (1990: 111) 
demonstrate, the line item veto in some cases may even result in higher total 
spending than the package veto. This counterintuitive result is illustrated in Figure 
3, where the outcome under the package veto scenario L' leads to lower total 
spending than the outcome with a line item veto L '\ as can been seen by 
comparing the budget lines through these two points. In sum, executive vetoes are 
at best blunt devices for containing public spending.27
There is an even more fundamental reason for the ineffectiveness of the line item 
veto in particular: its effect depends on where the authority of defining line items 
is located. The point seems technical but has powerful implications. In public 
budgeting the term Tine item’ refers to the lowest or most detailed level where a 
political sanction of spending is given in law. If the legislature retains the 
authority to define exactly what constitutes a line item, it can strategically merge 
different items into a single line in the budget. More specifically, it might
27 For further work on the effects of executive vetoes on fiscal policy, see in particular Byrd 
(1998), Carter and Schap (1990), Dearden and Husted (1990), Dearden and Schap (1994), Gabel 
and Hager (2000), and Holtz-Eakin (1988).
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combine spending that the executive cares about with spending that the legislature 
cares about into a single line in the budget. In this case, the effect of a line item 
veto starts resembling that of the package veto as represented in Figure 3. This 
would suggest that enhanced rescission powers, allowing the executive to target 
cuts in spending approved by the legislature, are potentially far more effective in 
containing spending than the line item veto. Rescission is a type of impoundment, 
which is discussed in detail below. This also highlights that there is a hidden 
assumption in the analysis by Carter and Schap (1990), viz. that line items are 
exogenously defined.28 This issue appears to be ignored throughout the literature 
that deals with the line item veto.
In sum, package vetoes and line item vetoes reduce a legislature’s feasible set of 
budgetary choices, but their exact impact depends on the nature of the 
reversionary budget. For instance, if spending reverts to zero the package veto 
circle will be large and contain many possible veto-proof budgets for a legislature 
to choose from, whereas the feasible set is reduced to a single point if spending 
reverts to the executive proposal. In most cases, reversion to last year’s budget 
would imply an intermediate restriction on legislative choice that falls in between 
these two extremes. The impact of different types of vetoes on fiscal policy is not 
clear-cut. The difference between line item and package vetoes is further blurred 
when the legislature retains authority to define what exactly constitutes a line item
281 am indebted to Barry Anderson, a former US senior budget official who experienced a short 
period when President Clinton enjoyed line item veto authority, for bringing this crucial point to 
my attention.
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for budgetary purposes. In terms of fiscal policy, this suggests that restrictions on 
amendment powers are more effective for containing aggregate expenditures.
3.4 Executive flexibility during execution
Once the budget has been approved, it has to be implemented. Because 
implementation is in the hands of the executive, it has an opportunity to reshape 
the approved budget and align it more closely with its preferred spending package. 
In other words, policy-making may continue during implementation. Therefore, a 
comprehensive analysis of legislative budgeting has to incorporate execution 
rules. National budget systems differ substantially in the degree to which they 
allow executive flexibility during the fiscal year (Hallerberg et al. 2001: 15-18). 
Alesina et a l (1999b: 259) note that when the approved budget can be easily 
revised during its implementation, ‘the entire budgetary process becomes less 
meaningful.’ Moreover, this section will demonstrate, execution rules have 
powerful implications for legislative choice. What is lacking is a comprehensive 
analysis of the implications of execution rules from a legislative perspective, 
which only few authors have partially explored (e.g. Pereira and Mueller 2004: 
797). Here, I systemtically analyse three basic ways to alter the budget during the 
execution stage, i.e. through virement, impoundment and what I call decree 
powers. I discuss each of these in turn.
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Virement allows the transfer or reallocation of funds between budgetary 
categories such as programmes. Figure 4(a) analyses the effect of unlimited 
virement authority. If a legislature prefers the same amount of aggregate 
expenditure as the executive, as for instance is the case with the budget package 
labelled Z,;, unlimited virement allows the executive to reallocate spending along 
the budget line until the budget outcome matches its preferred spending 
combination E. If a legislature prefers a different amount of total spending, as 
with L.2 for instance, then unlimited virement authority allows the executive to 
shift allocations along the budget line so as to get as close as possible to its 
preferred spending package within the total spending constraint set by the 
legislature, in this case resulting in Hence, there is exactly one outcome for 
each level of total expenditure approved by the legislature. This implies that any 
actual budget outcome would fall onto the line of (unfettered) virement associated 
outcomes that is depicted in Figure 4(a). This line is made up of all spending 
combinations that are closest to the executive ideal budget E  at any given level of 
total expenditure that the legislature approves.
The exact position of . the line of virement associated outcomes depends on the 
position of E. Note that this line does not go through the origin unless the 
executive desires exactly the same amount of expenditure on X  as on Y. In the 
case of the ideal executive budget E  as depicted in Figure 4(a), the executive 
prefers slightly more spending on X  than on Y. Hence, the line runs from the 
origin to Xv and beyond that point has a slope of 1, passing through E. The 
significance of Xv is that at this point the slope of the line of virement associated
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outcomes changes, since we exclude the possibility of negative spending. If the 
legislature approved a total amount of spending that is less or equal to the amount 
Xv, an executive with the preferred spending package E  would use unfettered 
virement authority to concentrate all spending exclusively on X. In sum, 
unfettered virement reduces a legislature’s feasible set to a line, i.e. the line of 
virement associated outcomes, which contains exactly one feasible budget for 
each possible total level of expenditure.
Given this powerful potential of unfettered virement to adjust policy, it is not 
surprising that many systems limit such reallocation to preserve legislative 
authority. For instance, section 43 of the South African Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999 allows an accounting officer to shift a ‘saving’ up to a 
limit of eight per cent of the amount appropriated under a main division to another 
main division within the same vote.29 The effect of such limitations is represented 
in Figure 4(b). I retain the line of (unfettered) virement associated outcomes as a 
reference point, while the two sets of dashed lines at the margins represent 
arbitrary examples of a virement limit. A rational executive will move the budget 
outcome as far as limited virement allows towards its ideal spending package.
29 A ‘vote’ typically comprises a departmental or agency budget.
Figure 4: Executive flexibility and reallocation
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a) Unlimited virement shifts spending onto the virement line
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To begin, assume an arbitrary limit on virement of v' percent. If a legislature 
wants an extreme budget L with all spending concentrated on Y and zero spending 
on X , the closest budget outcome that it can achieve is L'. If the virement limit is 
adjusted to v" per cent, where v' < v", then the executive can shift the budget 
further, to L". The legislature may anticipate executive action and act 
strategically. For instance, assuming an ideal budget of L" and a virement 
parameter of v" the legislature can propose L and obtain its ideal budget. On the 
other hand, if L is the legislature’s ideal budget, this falls outside the feasible set 
even with more limited virement authority and will not be achieved if the 
executive acts rationally and exploits the opportunity to shift spending closer to its 
ideal budget. As long as E  lies in between the relevant pair of dashed lines, which 
in the subscripts in Figure 4(b) are labelled according to their closest axis, all 
points on or between the lines constitute a legislature’s feasible set, whereas 
budgets in the margins between a line and the relevant axis cannot be achieved. 
The feasible set increases when the executive proposes a polarised allocation, so 
that E  falls inside one of the margins, by exactly the area by which the line of 
virement associated outcomes cuts into the relevant margin.
Figure 5 explores two further implementation rules, which allow the executive to 
alter the size of the budget during execution. First, when the executive impounds 
funds it refuses to spend all or part of an appropriated amount, thereby reducing 
the size of the budget. This also adjusts relative priorities, unless all items are cut 
by the same percentage (the Tawnmower method’). Impoundment is often a 
highly contentious device in budgetary politics. In the US, President Nixon in the
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early 1970s refused to spend large sums of congressional appropriations and 
claimed ‘an inherent power to impound’ (Schick 2000: 251). This prompted 
Congress to severely limit impoundment in the form of deferrals (delays) and 
rescissions (cancellations) by passing the Impoundment Control Act with the 
Congressional Budget Act in 1974. The power to withhold funds is common 
elsewhere, too. For instance, a recent study shows that most European Union 
member states allow the executive to carry over spending into the following fiscal 
year (Hallerberg et al. 2001: 15), which resembles impoundment in the form of 
deferral. Other countries impose cash availability limits on actual expenditures 
that give the executive substantial control over the disbursement of funds during 
the fiscal year (Stasavage and Moyo 2000), which amounts to rescission.
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Figure 5: Executive flexibility and the size of the budget
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Figure 5(a) illustrates the effect of unlimited impoundment power. A fiscally 
conservative legislature with an ideal budget Lj would get its ideal budget, since 
there is no incentive for the executive to achieve a budget outcome that is even 
further from its preferred spending level. If a legislature’s preferred spending 
package is L?, then impoundment allows the executive to align spending on Y 
perfectly with its preferred spending level by impounding all funds in excess of 
Ye. The executive will not impound funds appropriated for X  because the 
legislature’s spending level on this item is already below the executive’s preferred 
level Xe. The resulting spending package Z,/ represents the best possible budget a 
legislature can get under these circumstances. If a legislature wants budget L3 , 
where spending on both X  and Y exceeds the executive’s preferred level, then 
impoundment will allow the executive to withhold any spending that is in excess 
of its preferred levels and get exactly the budget it wants. More generally, this 
shows that with unfettered impoundment authority the executive will cut any 
spending that falls outside the area OYeEXe. Only legislative choices within this 
rectangle are protected from impoundment, as the executive would not cut 
spending even further below its preferred levels. Hence, a legislature’s feasible set 
with unfettered impoundment authority contains all budgets to the south-west of 
E. Put differently, unlimited impoundment powers are cuts only amendment 
powers in reverse. This time, it is the executive that has the power to cut and not 
the legislature, as in Figure 1, but the overall effect on legislative choice is 
identical. When impoundment powers are limited by some constraint, the 
executive will only be able to move the budget outcome some percentage towards 
the outcome it would have chosen without any constraint on impoundment.
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/Finally, there are decree powers, which allow the executive to augment the size of 
the budget during execution. With decree powers, I refer to a situation where the 
executive has the power to unilaterally disburse funds for expenditure over and 
above the amount authorised by the legislature. Figure 5(b) demonstrates the 
effect of unlimited decree powers. If a legislature’s approved budget is to the 
south-west of the executive’s preferred spending package E, such as Z,/, so that a 
legislature’s budget is lower on both items compared with the executive proposal, 
then the executive can use decree powers to top up spending on each item to 
exactly its preferred level. If only one spending item is below the executive’s 
preferred level, as with L2 for example, only this item will be topped up to the 
preferred level, resulting in L2 . On the other hand, any approved budgets to the 
north-east of E, such as L3 , will be completely unaffected, as there is no reason 
why the executive should push the budget outcome even further away from its 
preferred package. In short, with unlimited decree power all feasible budgets are 
to the north-east of the executive’s spending proposal. With constrained decree 
powers, the executive will only be able to move the budget outcome some 
percentage towards the outcome it would have chosen with unfettered power to 
decree expenditures. This may apply for instance when the source of executive 
discretion is a limited contingency or policy reserve.
This analysis demonstrates the powerful effects of budget execution rules on 
legislative choice. Executive flexibility during budget execution can be used to 
realign budget priorities away from those approved by the legislature (virement),
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or to reduce (impoundment) or augment (decree powers) the size of the approved 
budget. The use of impoundment and decree powers also is likely to affect the 
relative priorities of the approved budget. These rules in effect are executive 
amendment powers of the budget as passed by the legislature. Even with restricted 
executive flexibility, such powers reduce a legislature’s feasible set of budgets. In 
terms of fiscal performance, impoundment powers help to contain spending 
within the aggregate preferred by the executive, but they will not make a 
difference if the executive is profligate relative to the legislature. Conversely, 
decree powers undermine fiscal discipline if the executive is profligate, but they 
have no fiscal effect if it is fiscally conservative relative to the legislature.
3.5 Legislative organisation and the use of formal powers
Extensive formal powers alone are unlikely to be sufficient to ensure legislative 
influence in the budget process. In particular, up to now I assumed the absence of 
transaction costs in legislative decision-making. This assumption is convenient, 
but it is also unrealistic. There is a growing body of political science literature that 
investigates the implications of transaction costs on decision-making (Horn 1995, 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, Huber and Shipan 2002). In his groundbreaking 
contribution, Horn (1995: 13-22) identifies several sources of transaction costs, 
including the time and effort necessary to reach legislative agreement, and the fact 
that agency problems make it costly for the legislature to ensure executive 
compliance. Decision-making costs may prevent a legislature from fully
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exploiting formal powers to budget, and agency costs result in a gap between the 
approved budget and the actual outcome. However, formal powers can be 
complemented with organisational features that accommodate or reduce 
legislative transaction costs.
Sufficient time is an essential requirement for legislative decision-making (OECD 
2002a, Doling 1995b). Legislators have to invest time to acquire information and 
to co-ordinate their budgetary actions, but the timing of some budget processes 
does not fully accommodate these costs of decision-making. For instance, some 
systems subject budgetary debates to ‘guillotine’ procedures that enforce the 
closure of parliamentary deliberation after a limited time period. This procedure 
helps governments to ensure the timely supply of funds but at the same time 
curtails parliamentary capacity to debate estimates in detail (Reid 1966: 70). 
During the budget approval stage the timing of the process has to allow legislators 
to scrutinise the government’s proposal, formulate responses and to cut deals with 
colleagues, otherwise the ability of the legislature to process amendments to the 
budget may be restricted.
Information acquisition is also costly. In particular when the quality of budget 
documentation is poor, it is difficult to ascertain the government’s fiscal intentions 
and to exercise oversight (Von Hagen 1992: 35). To some extent a legislature can 
shift the cost of acquiring relevant information to the executive by requiring in 
statute the provision of budgetary information that is in line with international 
standards of transparency, as developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF
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1998, 2001 and 2007) and the OECD (2002a). A modem public financial 
management system in line with these standards generates information such as 
medium-term fiscal plans, a comprehensive budget covering all operations of the 
government, regular expenditure updates during the financial year, and a 
comprehensive and timely year-end report, amongst others. A legislature may also 
maintain an independent budget research office in order to gather required 
information and as a check on the quality of information supplied by the 
executive. Such bodies may also support a legislature in monitoring executive 
compliance and contain agency loss, shifting some of the burden of oversight 
away from individual legislators. In short, statutory measures and independent 
legislative budget offices facilitate legislative access to information.
However, the mere supply of information alone is unlikely to facilitate legislative 
control if the legislature lacks capacity to absorb it. Committee structures play a 
crucial role in ensuring that legislatures have access to relevant expertise and time 
in order to extract, interpret and process information. Notably, committees boost 
legislative productivity by enabling a division of labour (Mezey 1979). This can 
partly compensate for time constraints in the budget process. Moreover, the 
efficiency gain in legislative throughput that a committee system can achieve is 
particularly important since the budget competes for time with regular legislation. 
In other words, division of labour through committees limits the opportunity cost 
of budget scrutiny in terms of other legislative measures. Second, committees 
allow the collective legislative body to reap information gains as a result of 
specialisation, and hence reduce the cost of information acquisition (Krehbiel
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1991). Powerful legislatures such as the US Congress take great care to dispatch 
members to those committees where they act as conduits of information (Krehbiel 
1990). Committee expertise is not only crucial for scrutinising policy ex ante, but 
also to keep an eye on its execution (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Bawn 
(1997) finds that the costs of oversight of an agency are lower for members of a 
specialised committee with jurisdiction over that agency compared with non­
members. Hence, systems that enable specialisation through membership of 
committees should be better able to contain agency loss. In short, a well- 
developed committee system is ‘at least a necessary condition for effective 
parliamentary influence in the policy-making process’ (Mattson and Strom 1995: 
250, see also Longley and Davidson 1998).
I have argued here that transaction costs act as a barrier to the utilisation of the 
formal powers of a legislature. However, a legislature can organise itself so as to 
lower or accommodate transaction costs, through a generously timed budget 
process, institutionalised provision of relevant information, and a well-designed 
committee system that facilitates scrutiny and oversight.
Conclusions
This chapters demonstrates the impact of essential decision-making rules on the 
ability of a legislature to shape budget policy, and helps to assess their impact on 
the total level of public spending. The analysis shows that constraints on the
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power of the legislature to amend the budget proposed by the executive reduce the 
size of the feasible set. Second, the size of the feasible set also depends on the 
distance between the executive’s ideal budget and the reversionary outcome. In 
most realistic scenarios, reversion to zero spending will imply a larger feasible set 
than reversion to last year’s spending, and all incentive to accommodate 
legislative preferences is lost when the executive proposal is implemented in case 
of non-approval. Third, executive vetoes reduce the feasible set, arid a line item 
veto is more constraining than a package veto. Finally, executive powers to vire, 
impound, or initiate fresh spending without legislative approval also negatively 
affect the size of the feasible set.
However, the fact that these arrangements constrain the legislature does not mean 
that they contain public spending. Restrictions on amendment powers are very 
effective in constraining the legislature in such a way so as to safeguard fiscal 
discipline. On the other hand, the fiscal impact of reversionary arrangements is 
ambiguous, as it is conditional on the nature of the reversionary outcome and the 
exact constellation of preferences in relation to it. Contrary to the speculation by 
Alesina and colleagues (1996, 1999a and 1999b), a reversionary outcome that is 
unfavourable to the executive does not always induce it to propose budgets that 
are higher than it prefers. Rather, depending on the exact constellation of 
preferences, the possibility of reversion may even induce lower total spending 
than preferred by the executive. Similarly, both package and line item vetoes can 
be relatively blunt instruments for containing the overall level of public spending, 
in particular when the reversionary outcome is far from the executive’s preferred
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budget. Executive reallocation powers do not affect the overall level of public 
spending. Impoundment powers can be used to contain public spending, but 
decree powers undermine fiscal discipline when the executive is profligate. Some 
of these predictions are tested empirically in chapter six.
In short, this chapter demonstrates that a range of institutions affect the ability of a 
legislature to impact on budget policy, but few unambiguously contain the overall 
level of public spending. Moreover, the use of any formal budgetary powers is 
likely to involve transaction costs, which I have argued can be accommodated or 
lowered through effective legislative organisation. The analytical perspective 
developed here complements and contrasts with the historical account in the 
previous chapter. While the historical approach furthers detailed understanding of 
how and why a particular country’s set of institutions evolve over time, the 
analytical perspective enables a strong theoretical basis for cross-national research 
on legislative budgeting, which is the purpose of this research. The next challenge 
is to operationalise the institutional variables discussed in this chapter.
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4 A cross-national assessment of ‘the power of the purse’
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual 
weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, 
for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and 
salutary measure.
Publius, Federalist 58
The requirement for legislative approval of financial measures is a democratic 
foundation stone that is enshrined in constitutions around the world.30 Despite this 
widespread formal recognition, the actual budgetary role of national legislatures 
apparently differs sharply across countries. Members of the US Congress ‘have 
long seen themselves as the bulwark against [executive] oppression’ and their 
‘major weapon’ is the constitutional requirement for congressional approval of 
appropriations (Wildavsky and Caiden 2001: 10). Scholars and practitioners agree 
that the US Congress is a powerful actor that can have decisive influence on 
budget policy (Wildavsky 1964, Schick 2000, Meyers 2001). On the other hand, 
the budgetary influence of legislatures is said to be marginal in several other 
industrialised countries including France and the UK (Chinaud 1993, Schick
2002). Existing comparative work on legislative budgeting contributes selected 
country studies (Coombes 1976, LeLoup 2004), but lacks systematic analysis on 
the basis of a common framework. Moreover, while the literature on the US
30 Refer to the International Constitutional Law website, which includes references to the financial 
provisions of various constitutions: http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ [last accessed May 2005],
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Congress is extensive, legislative budgeting in parliamentary systems and 
developing countries in particular remains understudied (Oppenheimer 1983). As 
a basis for more systematic comparative work, this chapter proposes and applies 
an index of legislative budget institutions that can be used to assess and compare 
the budgetary power of national legislatures.
A number of authors refer to the cross-national distribution of legislative power 
over the purse (Coombes 1976, Meyers 2001, Schick 2002), but few have 
constructed quantitative measures. Although some previous studies present 
indices of budget institutions, these pay only limited attention to legislative 
variables. Fiscal institutionalists are concerned with explaining fiscal 
performance, typically public debt and deficits, with the design of the budget 
process (Kirchgassner 2001). Most of this literature does not exclusively focus on 
the role of the legislature, but a broader selection of variables that are said to 
promote fiscal discipline in budgetary decision-making. Von Hagen’s (1992: 70) 
pioneering index includes one composite item on the structure of the 
parliamentary process that considers notably the amendment powers of a 
legislature. Alesina et a l (1996, 1999a and 1999b) construct an index of 
budgetary procedures with two out of ten variables as indicators of the relative 
position of the government vis-a-vis the legislature, namely amendment powers 
and the nature of the reversionary budget (see also Hallerberg and Marier 2004). 
Other studies focus exclusively on the fiscal effect of specific legislative 
institutions (e.g. Crain and Muris 1995, Heller 1997 and 2001). Finally, from a 
legislative studies perspective, Fish (2006: 8) presents a parliamentary powers
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index, but only two out of 32 items relate explicitly to budgetary matters: one item 
on impoundment and another on legislative control of resources for the operation 
of the legislature itself.31 These contributions are important but of limited use for 
the present purpose.
Lienert (2005) offers a broader consideration of legislative budget institutions. His 
index of legislative budget powers covers five variables, namely parliament’s role 
in approving medium-term expenditure parameters, amendment powers, time 
available for the approval of the budget, technical support to the legislature, and 
restrictions on executive flexibility during budget execution. This provides a basis 
for more systematic comparative analysis of legislative budgeting, but also raises 
some methodological issues. For example, there is hardly any variation on the first 
variable, the legislature’s role in approving medium-term spending plans. Only 
one out of 28 legislatures in the sample formally passes a law on the medium-term 
strategy (Lienert 2005: 22). This lack of variation calls into question the 
usefulness of this item as a comparative indicator. In addition, the differential 
weighting of variables is not explicitly motivated. In short, what is missing so far 
is a broader measure of legislative budget institutions that is based on a thorough 
discussion of relevant indicators and methodological issues.
The aim of this chapter is to present a comparative framework to assess legislative 
budget capacity that can be applied, potentially, to any national legislature in a
31 In addition, but without specific reference to budgetary matters, the index also considers 
whether the executive has gatekeeping powers over some types of legislation.
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modem democracy. I suggest a series of variables that are combined into an index 
to measure cross-country variation in legislative budgeting and deliver an 
empirical application based on survey work by the OECD and the World Bank. 
More specifically, the chapter asks which institutional arrangements facilitate 
legislative control over budgets. A crucial assumption is thus that institutional 
arrangements reflect the budgetary power of a legislature. ‘Control’ is here 
defined as the power to scrutinise and influence budget policy and to ensure its 
implementation. As Wildavsky and Caiden (2001: 18) remind us: ‘Who has power 
over the budget does not tell us whether or not the budget is under control.’ The 
controversial question of whether legislative power over the budget is fiscally 
desirable is explicitly excluded from this chapter. I will return to this issue in 
chapters five and six, which consider in some depth the fiscal effects of legislative 
budget institutions. This chapter primarily aims at operationalising the theoretical 
framework in chapter three, but it also provides the empirical basis for engaging 
with the issue of fiscal performance later on. Moreover, the measurement carried 
out here directly engages with the hypothesis that a strong legislature, including in 
budgetary terms, is a necessary condition for democracy (Fish 2006).
I proceed as follows. In the first section I outline and explain the selection of the 
variables included in the index, and section two gives an overview of the data 
used. Section three discusses issues related to index construction and selects a 
method for use in this chapter. I conduct a number of experiments to check the 
robustness of the index. Section four presents an overview of the results in the 
form of a ranking of legislatures. I use two approaches to validate the index. The
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first is to compare the resulting ranking with findings from case study literature 
and the second is to test the association of the index with an indicator of 
legislative amendment activity. The conclusion summarises the main results and 
highlights implications.
4.1 Variables
The construction of an index for the purpose of cross-national comparison 
requires the identification of essential differences. Invariably, some of the richness 
of qualitative analysis has to be forfeited to gain a tractable tool for comparative 
research, which is necessary to venture beyond particular cases in order to 
discover broader patterns. No single variable can be considered sufficient on its 
own and I make no claim to cover every potentially relevant variable. Based on 
the analysis in the previous chapter, I adopt an approach based on assessing the 
institutional capacity for legislative control (Meyers 2001: 7). I argue that the 
presence of a critical number of institutional prerequisites, including formal 
authority and organisational characteristics, is necessary to facilitate budgetary 
control.
Amendment powers. As illustrated in Figure 1 the nature of formal powers to 
amend the budget determines the potential for legislative changes to the budget
99
\policy proposed by the executive (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1986: Table 38A).32 
Most constraining are arrangements that disallow any amendments to the 
executive’s proposal and merely give a legislature the choice between approval 
and rejection of the budget in its entirety. Also severely restrictive are ‘cuts only’ 
arrangements that only allow amendments that reduce existing items but not those 
that shift funds around, increase items, or introduce new ones. This precludes a 
creative budgetary role for the legislature. More permissive are powers that allow 
some amendments to the budget as long as the aggregate totals or the deficit in the 
draft budget are maintained. This enables engagement with budget priorities while 
protecting executive fiscal policy. Finally, most permissive are unfettered powers 
of amendment. Here, a legislature has full authority to cut, increase, and 
reallocate.
Reversionary budgets. The reversionary budget defines the cost of non-approval 
by spelling out what happens should legislative authorisation be delayed beyond 
the commencement of the fiscal year. Alesina et al. (1999b: 258) use the 
reversionary budget in conjunction with legislative amendment powers to assess 
the relative position of the government vis-a-vis the legislature (see also Cheibub 
2006). If the reversionary outcome is far from the executive’s preferred budget, 
and under certain conditions explored in Figure 2, the legislature may be able to
32 In virtually all countries the executive prepares a draft budget that is then submitted to the 
legislature for approval (Schick 2002). The US Congress held out longest compared with other 
legislatures before establishing an executive budget process, until in 1921 the Budget and 
Accounting Act required the President to co-ordinate the drafting of a budget proposal to be 
submitted to Congress (Webber and Wildavsky 1986: 411-416).
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extract concessions in return for approval. In the extreme case of reversion to zero 
spending, the executive is likely to prefer a compromise to the possibility of no 
supply and hence government shutdown. Conversely, when the executive budget 
proposal takes effect, the executive has no incentive to avert non-approval. 
Reversion to last year’s budget typically constitutes an intermediate case.
Executive flexibility during implementation. Chapter three also demonstrated how 
three types of flexibility during budget execution enable the executive to alter 
spending choices following the approval of the budget by the legislature. One 
mechanism is virement, i.e. the ability of the executive to reallocate or transfer 
funds between budget items during the execution of the budget (see Figure 4). 
Another is impoundment, which allows the withholding of particular funds that 
have been appropriated by the legislature (see Figure 5). Finally, some executives 
can introduce new spending without legislative approval (Carey and Shugart 
1998). If the executive can withhold funds, transfer between items, and initiate 
fresh funding without the consent of the legislature, it has significant leeway to 
unilaterally alter the approved budget, which diminishes legislative control over 
implementation. In effect, such powers constitute amendment authority in reverse, 
and in extreme cases allow the executive to undo legislative choices during 
implementation (Santiso 2004).
Time fo r scrutiny. Time is a precious resource given a typically tight and crowded 
legislative calendar (Doring 1995b). Budgets take many months to put together 
and a couple of weeks are insufficient to make sense of such complex sets of
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information. International experience suggests that the budget should be tabled at 
least three months in advance of the fiscal year to enable meaningful legislative 
scrutiny (OECD 2002a). The timing of scrutiny partly depends on how effectively 
a legislature can control its own timetable and the legislative agenda, but it may 
also reflect constitutional prescriptions.
Committee capacity. The importance of legislative committees is widely 
recognised, although their primary function is disputed between proponents of 
distributive, informational, and partisan explanations (Shepsle 1979, Krehbiel 
1990, Cox and McCubbins 1993). Chapter three highlighted several benefits of 
committee structures as crucial in the budgetary context. Committee structures 
establish a division of labour that facilitates specialisation and the development of 
‘legislative expertise’ (Mezey 1979: 64). Since committees allow parliaments to 
deal with various matters simultaneously, they increase productivity. Moreover, 
committees can play an important role in monitoring implementation. Legislative 
approval only matters when budgets are meaningful. Otherwise, budgetary drift 
allows the government to get what it wants irrespective of what the legislature 
approved. Committees with a monitoring function, such as audit committees, help 
to detect implementation failures and improve compliance (McGee 2002).
Access to budgetary information. Finally, budgetary decision-making requires 
access to comprehensive, accurate and timely information. Crucial for this is the 
breadth and depth of supporting documentation that accompanies the budget 
figures submitted to the legislature. In addition, in-year revenue and expenditure
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updates as well as high quality audit reports, including performance audits (Pollitt
2003), are crucial types of information for legislative oversight of budget 
implementation. Key standards for budget reporting are set out in the OECD Best 
Practices for Budget Transparency (OECD 2002a). Still, an executive monopoly 
on budgetary information can put the legislature at a severe disadvantage, as it is 
easy to manipulate budget figures and limit disclosure (Wildavsky and Caiden 
2001: 78). The benefits of an independent legislative budget office include that it 
can help to simplify complexity and make the budget accessible for legislators, 
enhance accountability through its scrutiny of executive information, and promote 
transparency by discouraging ‘budgetary legerdemain’ (Anderson 2005: 2; see 
also Engstrom and Kemell 1999).
There are, of course, other variables that might possibly be included. For instance, 
Von Hagen (1992) considers the confidence convention. Notwithstanding a 
legislature’s formal constitutional powers to amend the budget, in some 
parliamentary systems any change to the executive’s draft budget is by convention 
considered a vote of no confidence in the government (e.g. Blondal 2001: 53). In 
effect, the confidence convention reduces legislative authority to a stark choice 
between accepting the budget unchanged or forcing the resignation of the 
government and fresh elections. I exclude this variable on grounds of parsimony. 
The confidence convention is most common in Westminster type systems that in 
any case restrict legislative powers to amend the budget, such as Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the UK (OECD 2002b: 159). As amendment powers
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are already included in the index, this variable suffices to signal restrictions on 
legislative policy-making.
Also, some presidential systems counterbalance legislative powers over the 
budget with executive veto authority that typically can only be overridden with a 
heightened legislative majority. Package vetoes allow the executive to veto entire 
bills passed by the legislature, while a line item or partial veto allows the president 
to reject individual items in a bill. Some authors give great importance to veto 
authority in assessing executive power over policy (e.g. Shugart and Haggard 
2001: 75-77). However, the theoretical analysis revealed that the power a package 
veto gives to the executive critically depends on the nature of the reversionary 
budget (see Figure 3), which is already part of the index. For instance, if spending 
is discontinued without an approved budget in place, then to veto the budget 
would be a very extreme measure that the executive is likely to use only in 
extraordinary circumstances (Williams and Jubb 1996). Moreover, as pointed out 
in the second chapter, line item vetoes may be further limited in their 
effectiveness if the legislature retains authority to define what exactly constitutes a 
line in the budget, allowing it to strategically merge lines into packages that are 
less likely to be vetoed by the executive. This may explain the fact that empirical 
studies have found little support that a line item veto affects levels of public 
spending (Carter and Schap 1990, Holtz-Eakin 1988). In any case, line item 
vetoes are exceptionally rare at the national level. Shugart and Haggard (2001: 80) 
find that only two out of 23 countries with pure presidential systems use a version
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of the line item veto, namely Argentina and the Philippines.33 For these reasons, I 
exclude executive vetoes from the index.
4.2 Data
During 2003 the OECD in collaboration with the World Bank conducted the 
Survey on Budget Practices and Procedures, which was administered to specially 
identified budget officials in each participating country. The dataset for this 
chapter draws heavily on the results of this survey, which are available online. 
The survey covers 27 OECD members as well as 14 other countries. Some of the 
non-OECD countries have limited democratic credentials and are excluded from 
the scope of this chapter.34 In other words, I consider legislatures in non- 
democratic countries outside the ‘scope conditions’ (Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 
655). The data are unique in that a similarly comprehensive budget system survey 
had not been previously carried out for such a large number of countries. On the
33 The US also had a short-lived experiment with presidential line item veto authority. In 1996 
Congress passed legislation that gave the US President a form of item veto, the Line Item Veto 
Act. President Clinton claimed it would ‘prevent Congress from enacting special interest 
provisions under the cloak of a 500 or 1000-page bill’ (quoted from Schick 2000: 94-95). This 
veto was ruled unconstitutional in 1998, by which time Clinton had used it 82 times with 38 
overrides. Clinton claimed that his use of the veto had resulted in savings of $2 billion. This 
amounts to 0.12 per cent of federal outlays in the 1997 fiscal year ($1.6 trillion).
34 Several countries included in the survey have low scores on the 2003 Freedom House combined 
average ratings. I use 3.5 as a somewhat arbitrary cut-off point and exclude Cambodia, Colombia, 
Jordan, Kenya and Morocco (Freedom House 2006).
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other hand, responses were not always rigorously checked and in certain cases the 
quality of the data is questionable. I double-checked the data used here as 
extensively as possible against information from online sources, such as finance 
ministry and parliamentary websites, as well as previous survey results (OECD 
2002b). Where necessary, clarification was sought from country experts who are 
identified in the acknowledgements.35 In the following paragraphs, I discuss the 
specific data used for the construction of the index. The full dataset is reproduced 
in Table 3 at the end of this chapter. Table 4 details the construction of two 
composite variables. I also document any adjustments to the original OECD data 
in these two tables.
Following Alesina et al. (1999b: 257-258), all variables are coded on a range 
between zero (the least favourable from a legislative perspective) and ten (the
35 The dataset was published in Wehner (2006). Here, I make one correction to the published 
version. Slovakia indicated in the 2003 OECD and World Bank survey that the National Council 
has limited powers to amend the budget. However, Gleich (2003) and Ylaoutinen (2004) both 
present recent survey data indicating that the formal powers of the legislature in this case are not 
limited. I followed up this inconsistency with both the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Council o f the Slovak Republic. The latter confirmed that there are no restrictions, in the 
constitution or other legislation, on the powers of the National Council to amend the budget. 
However, Slovakia is preparing for the introduction of the Euro. The current Convergence 
Programme includes a medium-term fiscal target to reduce the general government deficit to 3 per 
cent of GDP in 2007 and to 0.9 per cent by 2010. Since the constitution or national legislation do 
not contain any formal restrictions, I recode the Slovakia score on the amendment powers variable 
from 6.7 to 10. In the remainder of the thesis, I work with this revised score for Slovakia. This 
does not affect the substantive results reported in chapters four and five.
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most favourable). The maximum figure is divided equally between the categories. 
Later on, in the next section, I conduct some robustness checks to see whether this 
coding procedure significantly affects the ranking of legislatures compared with 
alternative methods. In the following, I indicate the score I give for each response 
option in square brackets.
The OECD (questions 2.7.d and 2.7.e) asked respondents to indicate whether 
legislative powers of amendment are restricted, and if so, which form the 
restrictions take. I code the answers in four categories, i.e. the legislature may 
only accept or reject the budget as tabled [0], it may cut existing items only [3.3], 
it may shift funds as long as a specified aggregate constraint is met [6.7], or it has 
unfettered powers [10].
The survey (question 2.7.c) also asked about the consequences should the budget 
not be approved at the start of the fiscal year. I group the responses into four 
categories: the executive budget [0], vote on account [3.3], last year’s budget 
[6.7], or no spending [10]. The second category requires elaboration. Historically, 
the English Parliament devised the tactic of voting appropriations near the end of 
the session to force economies on the Crown and to extract concessions (Schick 
2002: 18). This historical rationale is now obsolete, but delayed approval 
nonetheless remains the norm. Formally, supply would cease without an approved 
budget in place. In practice, the parliaments of the OECD Commonwealth 
countries routinely approve interim spending, which is referred to as a ‘vote on
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account’ in the UK.36 Some might argue that this system preserves the threat of 
reversion to zero spending, but my judgment is that this practice is so standardised 
and predictable that it would be misleading to assign a score of ten.
Executive flexibility is tested by combining three items. The OECD asked 
whether there is scope for appropriations to be reallocated from one programme to 
another without parliamentary approval (question 3.2.a.4), whether the executive 
may withhold funds that are appropriated, but not available on a legal or 
entitlement basis, without legislative consent (question 3.1.c), and whether the 
annual budget includes any central reserve funds to meet unforeseen expenditures 
(question 3.2.C.1). I assign each answer a score of 3.3 if it is negative, as a positive 
answer implies executive flexibility to vire, impound, and authorise fresh funds 
respectively. The sum of the scores for each case can range between zero and ten 
and is interpreted as an indicator of executive flexibility during budget execution. 
Table 4 provides full details.
The OECD also asked (question 2.7.b): ‘How far in advance of the beginning of 
the fiscal year does the executive present its budget to the legislature?’ and 
provided four response options, i.e. up to two months [0], two to four months 
[3.3], four to six months [6.7], and more than six months [10].
36 This practice is referred to as ‘interim supply’ in Canada, ‘supply’ in Australia, and ‘imprest 
supply’ in New Zealand.
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Data on the role of parliamentary committees in budget approval are available in 
the OECD survey (question 2.10.a). The survey also asked whether audit results 
are circulated and discussed in Parliament (question 4.5.m), but the answer 
categories are ambiguous with regard to the nature of committee engagement with 
audit findings. Therefore, data on parliamentary audit committees were gathered 
in a separate survey of parliamentary websites that was conducted during January 
2004. I distinguish the involvement of three sets of specialised committees and 
give equal scores [3.3] to each category, i.e. a budget or finance committee, 
sectoral or departmental committees, and an ex post audit committee. For 
instance, if a parliament uses a finance committee and sectoral committees for 
budget approval, as well as an audit committee for ex post scrutiny of audit 
findings, it gets the highest possible score of ten, and without any committee 
involvement a score of zero. Involvement of sectoral committees gets a score of
3.3 only if they have actual authority over departmental budgets, but not if they 
are merely consulted or submit non-binding recommendations while a finance or 
budget committee retains full authority. Also, if a legislature uses an audit- 
subcommittee of the budget committee for the purpose of parliamentary audit, I 
assign half the available score for this item [1.7]. Refer to Table 4 for full details.
Legislative access to budgetary information is very difficult to assess. It was not 
possible to use the survey results to construct a reliable and fine-grained measure 
of the quality of budgetary information supplied by the executive. However, most 
of the countries included in this analysis are OECD members and hence subscribe 
to the Best Practices for Budget Transparency (OECD 2002a). In addition, studies
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confirm that several non-OECD countries in the sample provide high quality 
budgetary information, for instance Chile (Blondal and Curristine 2004), Slovenia 
(Kraan and Wehner, 2005) and South Africa (Folscher, 2002). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume adherence to a common minimum standard for budgetary 
documentation in most cases. However, one of the key differences between 
countries is the level of legislative budget research capacity (question 2.10.e). I 
distinguish legislatures without such research capacity [0] from those with a 
budget office of up to ten professional staff [2.5], 11 to 25 [5], 26 to 50 [7.5], and 
more than 50 [10]. The last category acknowledges the uniqueness of the US 
Congressional Budget Office, which has about 230 staff (Anderson 2005).
4.3 Constructing the index
The task of index construction raises in particular theoretical questions about the 
substitutability of components. In this section, I first discuss various possible 
methods for index construction and then compare the results in order to check the 
robustness of the index. The starting point for this discussion is the additive index. 
This frequently used method consists of summing up all scores for a given case in 
order to derive the index score for that case (e.g. Lienert 2005, Von Hagen 1992). 
The simple sum index can be represented as a special case of the following 
formula (Alesina et al. 1999b: 260):
h = ±d
i=1
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The term c/ captures the value of component i and j  is a power term that can be 
adjusted to reflect different assumptions about substitutability. If /  = 1, then we 
get the simple sum index. If 0 < j  < 1, this favours those with consistently 
intermediate scores over those with a mixture of high and low scores, i.e. this 
approach assumes a limited degree of substitutability. Conversely, with j  > 1, a 
greater degree of substitutability is assumed, since high scores are rewarded. In 
addition, it would be possible to allow differential weights for each of the 
components. However, this is not implied by the theoretical approach, so I do not 
pursue this possibility here.
To assume complete non-substitutability, the components can also be multiplied. 
This typically generates highly skewed distributions, because a single low score 
substantially drags down the index. Since the majority of legislatures included in 
this study have scores of zero on at least one of the components, this method does 
not yield useful results. Nor does it appear theoretically plausible to assume 
complete non-substitutability for all components. In addition, this method is 
highly sensitive to small mistakes in the data, which can lead to severe 
misrepresentation of the affected legislatures. These are strong reasons for 
rejecting the purely multiplicative approach for this analysis.
I propose a third method, which is based on sub-indices:
2 3 6
l =ri5* >where 5i=zx  ^ =2>,
*=i ;=i /=4
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Here, j* represents two sub-indices, each consisting of the sum of three different 
components, which are then multiplied. It is possible to again incorporate a power 
term into the formulas for the sub-indices, but most essential is the underlying 
approach. The rationale for this index is as follows. Variables one to three 
(amendment powers, reversionary budgets and executive flexibility) can be 
interpreted as formal legislative authority vis-a-vis the executive. Amendment 
powers and reversionary budgets are frequently stipulated in constitutions, and 
organic budget laws typically regulate flexibility during implementation (Lienert 
and Jung 2004). In contrast, variables four to six (time, committees and research 
capacity) are taken to represent the organisational capacity of the legislature. 
Assuming that both formal powers as well as organisational capacity are 
necessary for effective scrutiny, this calls for multiplication of the two sub­
indices. However, within each sub-index at least a degree of substitutability is 
plausible. For instance, if committees are weakly developed, then this lack in 
division of labour might be compensated by using a lot of time to scrutinise the 
budget or by delegating scrutiny to a well-resourced parliamentary budget office. 
Similarly, even when amendment powers are limited, the legislature may still be 
effective in extracting concessions from the executive if spending reverts to zero 
in the case of non-approval.
I proceed to check the robustness of results. Table 1 contains the Spearman rank 
correlations between four alternative indices, which are labelled according to their 
subscripts in the above formulas. I use the simple sum index with j  = 1 computed
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with the first formula and two other arbitrary numbers for the power term, i.e.y = 
0.5 (half the value of the simple sum version) and j  = 2 (double the value), to 
consider the impact of different substitutability assumptions. The fourth index 
labelled s is calculated using the second formula based on the two sub-indices. All 
of the correlations between these four versions of the index are positive and very 
strong. The lowest coefficient is .87 between the two indices that use extreme 
values for j ,  which is expected. Overall, the results are very robust. For this 
reason, I use the simple sum index in the remainder of the chapter.
Table 1; Spearman correlations between indices
j  = l j  = -5 j  = 2
j  = -5 .97
j  = 2 .95 .87
s .99 .97 .94
Note: N = 36.
4.4 Discussion and analysis
This section presents the index of legislative budget institutions and discusses 
main results. For presentational purposes, I rescale the index to range between 
zero and 100. The resulting ranking is presented in Figure 6. To evaluate the 
index, I pursue two approaches. First, I briefly consider whether the results are 
broadly in line with case study literature. Second, I check the validity of the index 
by testing its association with a simple indicator of legislative amendment 
activity.
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Figure 6: The index of legislative budget institutions
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The US Congress emerges as an outlier by a substantial margin. Its score is more 
than three times as great as those for the bottom nine legislatures, predominantly 
Westminster systems.. According to the index the US Congress is the only 
legislature with the institutional foundation to exercise very strong influence over 
public finances. The importance of Congress in the US budget process is widely 
acknowledged. Aaron Wildavsky’s seminal work on the politics of the budget 
process is, in essence, a study of congressional policy-making (Wildavsky 1964, 
Wildavsky and Caiden 2001). Although the US President submits a draft budget 
this does not bind Congress in any way (Schick 2000: 74-104). Oppenheimer 
(1983: 585) concludes a wide-ranging literature review with the observation that 
Congress is ‘the most influential legislature’ in policy-making. The index is in 
line with this judgment.
On the other extreme, the UK case is often said to epitomise the decline of 
parliaments (Einzig 1959, Reid 1966, Adonis 1993). In a recent paper, Allen 
Schick (2002: 27) goes as far as to claim: ‘Nowhere is the budgetary decline of 
parliament more noticeable than in Britain... [The] House of Commons, the 
cradle of budgetary democracy, [has] lost all formal influence over revenues and 
expenditures.’ In 1998-99 the Procedure Committee of the House of Commons 
bluntly referred to its power over expenditure as ‘if not a constitutional myth, very 
close to one’ (quoted in Walters and Rogers 2004: 257). While we have no time 
series data to test the decline thesis, the index confirms that current capacity in the 
UK Parliament is extremely limited. The rankings of other parliaments with a 
Westminster heritage are very similar, which again is supported by case study
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evidence. For instance, in Canada members characterise legislative scrutiny of the 
budget as a ‘cursory review’, ‘a total waste of time’, and ‘futile attempts to bring 
about change’ (quoted in Blondal 2001: 54). Another example is the paper by 
Krafchik and Wehner (1998), which highlights the great difficulty of the South 
African Parliament in transcending its Westminster heritage in the post-apartheid 
environment.
Few national legislatures have been as extensively studied as the US Congress and 
the UK Parliament, but nonetheless we can assess some other rankings against the 
literature. Notably, the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish parliaments achieve 
relatively high scores on the index. This corresponds with literature that has 
pointed out the distinctiveness and relative strength of these parliaments (Arter 
1984, Esaiasson and Heidar 2000, see also chapter seven) and confirms that there 
is substantial variation within parliamentary systems (Siaroff 2003a). In addition, 
a large number of legislatures fall in between the extremes of the US Congress 
and Westminster type parliaments. Notably, continental European parliaments 
make up much of the middle mass on the index. Qualitative studies show that in a 
number of these countries, parliaments retain a limited level of influence on 
budgets.37 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present a full literature review. 
Still, this brief comparison with some of the case study literature suggests that the 
index generates plausible scores.
37 For examples, refer to the work by Coombes (1976), Eickenboom (1989), Chinaud (1993) and 
Leston-Bandeira (1999).
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The validity of the index can also be tested statistically. Given that the index 
captures institutional preconditions for legislative control, it should be associated 
with a measure of policy influence. One such indicator is amendment activity. The 
OECD asked (question 2.7.i): ‘In practice, does the legislature generally approve 
the budget as presented by the executive?’ Eleven out of 36 respondents in this 
sample indicated that it ‘generally approves the budget with no changes.’ More 
finely grained measures of amendment activity would be preferable, such as the 
number of amendments and their magnitude, but comprehensive data are not 
available. Also, it is true that a legislature may not have to amend the budget to 
impact on policy. Hidden actions such as a short phone call from a powerful 
committee chair to an executive official can be important means of legislative 
influence (Meyers 2001: 7). Moreover, the executive may anticipate legislative 
reactions and fashion the draft budget accordingly, thereby reducing the likelihood 
of amendments. However, it would be naive to conclude that the absence of 
amendments indicates that the legislature is getting its way. An executive has no 
reason to be responsive to legislative preferences unless the absence of such 
consideration has consequences. For example, in the UK the last government
I Q
defeats over estimates date back more than 80 years. I argue that legislative 
actors need to maintain a modicum of amendment activity in order to signal to the
38 In 1919 the Commons, in what the Chancellor criticised as a ‘virtuous outburst o f economy’, 
denied the Lord Chancellor funding for a second bathroom and other amenities, and in response 
Lord Birkenhead refused to move into his official residence. The last government defeat over 
estimates was in 1921, when members’ travelling expenses were the objects of criticism (Einzig, 
1959, pp..274-5).
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executive their capacity for substantial revision should the draft budget not take 
sufficient account of their preferences.
Table 2: Budget-amending and non-amending legislatures
Amending Non-amending
Observations 25 11
Mean index score 45.2 31.8
Standard deviation 15.1 16.3
Accepting the above premise, one would expect budget-amending legislatures to 
have more developed institutional capacity. I use a f-test to assess whether index 
scores are higher for budget-amending legislatures compared with those that do 
not amend the budget (Bohmstedt and Knoke 1994: 139). Setting a = .05 for 34 
degrees of freedom gives a critical value of 1.7 for a one-tailed test to reject the 
null. Based on the data in Table 2 we obtain a value of 2.4, which falls within the 
rejection region. This supports the prediction that budget-amending legislatures
maintain higher levels of institutional capacity for financial scrutiny.
1
The evidence in this section is mutually reinforcing and confirms that the index is 
a useful summary indicator of legislative capacity to influence budget policy. The 
ranking is broadly in line with case study literature and the index is positively 
associated with a simple measure of legislative impact on public finances. Not too 
much should be read into small score differences between national legislatures, as 
the index makes no qualitative statements on the margin. Nonetheless, whether a 
legislature ranks towards the top, middle, or bottom of the index conveys an 
overall perspective on the state of legislative budgeting in a particular country. 
Indeed, if the power of the purse is a sine qua non for legislative control in
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general, then the results also reflect the overall status of the legislature in the 
political system of a country.
Conclusions
This chapter has expanded the methodological toolkit for cross-national research 
on the legislative power of the purse. Previous efforts to construct quantitative 
measures of legislative budget power were either extremely limited in their 
coverage of relevant variables or neglected detailed discussion of related 
methodological issues. The index constructed here is robust and delivers results 
that can be checked against case study evidence and using statistical tests. It 
provides a sound basis for further investigating cross-national patterns in 
legislative budgeting, in particular their causes and consequences, which I 
investigate in chapters four and five respectively. However, I do not suggest that 
quantitative analysis should be a substitute for the detailed study of particular 
cases. Rather, there is an emerging debate on comparative research methods that 
argues strongly in favour of a carefully designed combined use of statistical and 
small-N approaches (Lieberman 2005). For instance, large-N analysis can provide 
the basis for a more deliberate choice of case studies, which in turn may deepen 
understanding and add important contextual variables. I return to this important 
point in chapter seven of the thesis.
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The empirical results of this analysis raise questions about the prerequisites for 
democratic governance. Despite widespread constitutional recognition of the 
importance of legislative control over the purse, this chapter reveals substantial 
variation in the level of financial scrutiny of government by the legislature among 
contemporary liberal democracies. The US Congress has an index score that is 
more than three times as great as those for the bottom nine legislatures, 
predominantly Westminster systems. Even allowing for US exceptionalism, the 
top quartile legislatures score twice as high on this index as the bottom quartile. In 
between the extremes of Westminster and the US Congress, continental European 
parliaments make up much of the middle mass of the ranking. The ranking 
produced in this chapter suggests that for some countries the power of the purse is 
a key safeguard against executive overreach, while others maintain a 
constitutional myth. This finding contradicts the assertion that a strong legislature, 
at least in budgetary terms, is a necessary condition for democracy (Einzig 1959, 
Fish 2006). Given that the authorisation of taxes and public expenditures is a 
primary function of the legislature in any democratic system, such an amount of 
variation amongst modem liberal democracies is perplexing. This begs the 
question why some legislatures maintain elaborate institutional arrangements for 
financial scrutiny while others essentially leave budgeting to the executive.
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Table 3: Data for the index and amendment dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) L /.6 (7)
Legislature Powers Reversion Flexibility Time Committees Research Index Amendments
Argentina 6.7 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 0 50.0 1
Australia 3.3* 3.3* 0 0 6.7 0 22.2
Austria 10 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 0 55.6 1
Belgium 10 10 0 0 8.3 0 47.2
Bolivia 10 0 6.7 3.3 3.3 0 38.9 1
Canada 3.3 3.3* 0 0 6.7 2.5 26.4
Chile 3.3 0 0 3.3 3.3 2.5 20.8 1
Czech Republic 10 6.7 0 3.3 5 0 41.7 1
Denmark 10 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 0 55.6 1
Finland 10 0" 6.7 3.3 3.3 0 38.9 1
France 3.3b 0! 0 3.3 5 0 19.4 1
Germany 10 6.7j 3.3 6.7 5 0 52.8 1
Greece 0 6.7k 0 0 5 O' 19.4
Hungary 10 10 6.7 3.3 10 0 66.7 1
Iceland 10 o' 6.7 3.3 3.3 0 38.9 1
Indonesia 6.7 6.7 3.3 6.7 6.7 2.5 54.2 1
Ireland 0 0 3.3 0 6.7 0 16.7
Israel 0 6.7 0 3.3 6.7 0 27.8 1
Italy 10 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0 33.3 1
Japan 0 10 6.7 3.3 6.7 5 52.8
Mexico 6.7 10" 0 0 6.7 7.5 51.4 1
Netherlands 10 6.7 6.7 6.7 3.3 2.5 59.7 1
New Zealand 3.3' 3.3* 6.7 0 3.3 0 27.8
Norway 10 10" 6.7 3.3 6.7 0 61.1 1
Portugal 10 6.7 0 3.3 3.3 0 38.9 1
Slovakia 10d 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0 33.3 1
Slovenia 6.7 6.7 0 3.3 5 0 36.1 1
South Africa 0 0° 0 0 10 0 16.7
South Korea 3.3 6.7P 3.3 3.3 3.3 7.5 45.8 1
Spain 6.7 6.7 3.3 3.3 5 0 41.7 1
Suriname 10 0 0 3.3 6.7 0 33.3
Sweden 10 10 6.7 3.3 6.7 2.5 65.3
Turkey 6.7 10 0 3.3 3.3 0 38.9 1
United Kingdom 3.3' 3.3q 3.3 0 3.3 O' 22.2
United States 10 10 6.7 10 6.7 10* 88.9 1
Uruguay 6.7f 6.7 3.3 3.3q 3.3 0 38.9 1
Notes: Data from OECD and World Bank (2003) except certain committee data (see text and Table 4). Additional 
comments where responses were missing or ambiguous: a) Members of the House of Representatives may reduce 
existing items only. The Senate can only propose amendments to parts of the budget other than the ordinary annual 
services of government, b) Constitution article 40. c) Standing Orders 312-316 give the Crown a financial veto over 
amendments with more than a minor impact, d) Based on Gleich (2003), YlSoutinen (2004) and personal correspondence 
from the Chancellery of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, e) Standing Order 48 of the House of Commons 
allows only cuts to existing items, f) Constitution article 215. g) Vote on account or other regularised interim supply 
measure, h) Constitution section 83. i) Constitution article 47(3). j) Article 111 of the Basic Law. k) Constitution 
article 79. 1) The executive would resign and new elections would be held, m) There are no provisions, n) There are no 
clear formal rules describing the consequences, o) The executive budget takes effect subject to restrictions related to 
previous year’s expenditure limits, according to section 29 of the Public Finance Management Act. p) Constitution 
article 54(3). q) Based on Santiso (2004). r) Based on OECD (2002b). s) The Congressional Budget Office has about 
230 staff.
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Table 4: Construction of composite variables
Legislature
(1)
Withhold
(2)
Virement
(3)
Reserve
E
Flexibility
(4)
Budget
(5)
Sectoral
(6)
Audit
£
Committees
Argentina 3.3 0 3.3 6.7 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 3.3s 3.3 6.7
Austria 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Belgium 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 1.7k 8.3
Bolivia 3.3 0 3.3 6.7 3.3 0 0 3.3
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 6.7
Chile 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0 3.3
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 1.7k 5
Denmark 3.3 0C 0 3.3 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Finland 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 0 0 3.3
France 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 1.7' 5
Germany 0 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0 1.7k 5
Greece 0 0d 0 0 3.3 0 1.7m 5
Hungary 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 10
Iceland 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 0 0 3.3
Indonesia 0 3.3 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0 6.7
Ireland 0* 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Israel 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Italy 3.3 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 0 3.3
Japan 3.3b 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Mexico 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 3.3 6.7
Netherlands 3.3 0 3.3 6.7 0 3.3 0 3.3
New Zealand 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 0h 0" 3.3
Norway 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 3.3 0 6.7
Portugal 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0 3.3
Slovakia 0 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0 0 3.3
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 1.7° 5
South Africa 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 3.3 10
South Korea 3.3 0e 0 3.3 3.3 0 0 3.3
Spain 3.3 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 1.7P 5
Suriname 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 6.7
Sweden 3.3 3.3 0 6.7 3.3 3.3 0 6.7
Turkey 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0 3.3
United Kingdom 0 3.3 0 3.3 0 O' 3.3 3.3
United States 3.3 3.3f 0 6.7 3.3 3.3j 0 6.7
Uruguay 3.3 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 0 3.3
Notes-. Data from OECD and World Bank (2003) except data on audit committees, which were gathered through a survey 
of parliamentary websites in January 2004. Additional comments where responses were missing or ambiguous: a)
Provision in an estimate passed by the Dail does not convey authority to spend without sanction of the Minister for 
Finance, b) Author’s research, c) Reallocations between operating appropriations are allowed, d) Reallocations are 
allowed for the Public Investment Programme and with the approval of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, e) There 
can be transfers with the approval of the central budget authority or the legislature depending on budgetary classification. 
0  Most transfers require approval by the legislature, some only notification, g) Sectoral committees in the Senate examine 
and report on relevant areas of the budget, h) The Finance and Expenditure Committee scrutinises the Budget Policy 
Statement and Estimates. Other committees may debate the estimates and policy for specific departments, i) Based on 
Walters and Rogers (2004). j) The Appropriations Committees in both houses operate elaborate subcommittee structures, 
k) Budget committee with an audit subcommittee. 1) The Evaluation and Control Delegation of the Finance Commission in 
the National Assembly has tried to improve interaction with the Court of Audit, m) Standing Order 31A establishes a 
Special Standing Committee on Financial Statement and General Balance Sheet of the State, n) The Public Accounts 
Committee was abolished in 1962. o) The Commission for Budgetary and other Public Finance Control receives audit 
reports, but in the past it has dealt with very few of them (Kraan and Wehner 2005). p) There is a Commission for 
Relations with the Tribunal of Accounts, but its role is limited.
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5 The determinants of legislative budget institutions
Existing literature is a poor guide for understanding why the role of legislatures in 
budgeting differs so fundamentally across countries. A number of quantitative 
cross-national studies use institutions as explanatory variables, which is the topic 
of the following chapter. However, scant attention has been given to legislative 
arrangements as dependent variables. With regard to legislative budget institutions 
more specifically, there are some interesting historical accounts of the evolution 
of financial scrutiny in particular countries, but with at most weakly developed 
attempts to review broader patterns (e.g. Stourm 1917, Coombes 1976, Schick 
2002). Moreover, one danger with the case study approach is the temptation to use 
a small number of studies in order to derive general conclusions. For example, a 
comparison between the US Congress and the UK Parliament might be used to 
infer that the choice between presidential and parliamentary regime affects 
legislative control of budgets. For a long time, one serious obstacle to the study of 
cross-national differences in legislative budget institutions was the unavailability 
of comprehensive comparative data on this topic, but this is no longer the case. 
Hence, there is no excuse to neglect this issue any longer.
In this chapter I use the index of legislative budget institutions introduced in the 
previous chapter to explore why these arrangements differ substantially. This 
analysis is important in itself, but it also provides a useful background for the 
analysis of the effects of institutional arrangements, since it helps to identify other
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possibly relevant variables that have to be considered. The chapter proceeds in 
three main steps. Section one outlines four propositions about cross-national 
differences in financial scrutiny arrangements and defines the relevant variables. 
Section two tests these propositions using multiple regression and considers 
several models of legislative budget institutions. Finally, in the third section I 
consider broader implications for comparative research.
5.1 Explanatory variables
This section considers possible explanatory variables to explain the cross- 
sectional variation in institutional arrangements. The nature of this chapter is 
exploratory and somewhat more modest than that of the following chapters, which 
connect with the theory developed earlier. Hence, in the following paragraphs I 
speak of propositions rather than hypotheses. I consider four sets of possible 
explanations. These are based on very different assumptions about the durability 
of institutions and the power of individual political agents to shape political 
structures. The first is the institutional replication proposition, which emphasises 
the durability and path dependence of institutions once they are established. 
Second, the separation of powers proposition is that legislative arrangements are a 
function of broader systemic parameters, i.e. the horizontal and vertical division 
of powers. Both of these neglect the influence of contemporary political actors. In 
contrast, the partisan proposition assumes an ability of legislative actors to adjust 
institutional settings in their favour. Finally, I consider the proposition that
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legislative institutions evolve within the broader development context of a 
country, which implies institutional convergence of countries with similar levels 
of democratic and economic development. For each proposition, I also outline the 
construction of relevant variables for the regression analysis in section two.
The nature of institutions as ‘enduring entities’ has been widely observed by 
different approaches in political science (Rothstein 1996: 152). Given this 
potential for institutional durability, a look at history might reveal common 
homogenising factors among groups of countries. In particular, cross-national 
commonalities may be due to the transfer of institutional features from a colonial 
power to its colonies, and once in place this heritage may prove resistant to 
change (Acemoglu 2001). This applies not only to fundamental constitutional 
distinctions, such as the choice between parliamentary versus presidential 
government or the type of electoral system, but also the budgetary structures of a 
country. For example, Wehner (2002) surveys fiscal constitutions in African 
countries and finds that they are strongly influenced by colonial rule, and Lienert 
(2003) observes significant differences between public expenditure management 
systems in anglophone and francophone African countries. Hence, the replication 
proposition is that institutional arrangements in former colonies reflect those of 
the former colonial power.
To test this proposition I construct a dummy variable to indicate former colonies 
of the UK. Given the UK Parliament’s low score on the index of legislative 
budget institutions and its widely recognised marginalisation in financial matters
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(Schick 2002, Reid 1966, Einzig 1959) I predict a negative coefficient. I only 
include former colonies with independence in the past 150 years because 
important aspects of legislative arrangements for financial scrutiny in the UK 
were still evolving until at least the Gladstonian reforms in the 1860s (Einzig 
1959).39 The observations in the sample do not allow us to construct a similar 
variable to test the influence of French colonial rule. Also, the sample contains a 
number of former Spanish colonies, but Spain lost most of her colonies too long 
ago to suggest relevant replication effects.
The role of a legislature in policy-making might also be shaped by the separation 
of power in a political system. A core institutional debate in political science, and 
more recently economics (Persson and Tabellini 2003), relates to the choice 
between presidential and parliamentary regimes and its implications (Rothstein 
1996, Weaver and Rockman 1993, Lijphart 1992). A presidential system separates 
power horizontally. It is broadly characterised by ‘a single individual... popularly 
elected for a fixed term who plays the, or at least a, central role in the political 
system’ (Siaroff 2003b: 289). If legislative-executive relations are more conflict- 
prone under presidentialism, as Linz (1990) has argued, one would expect higher
39 Effectively, this excludes the US, which already during colonial times developed a distinct style 
of legislative financial control (Wildavsky and Caiden 2001: 26-30). Similarly, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003: 41) use indicators of colonial history that are weighted by ‘the amount of time 
that has elapsed since... independence as a fraction of the last 250 years, giving more weight to 
colonial history in young independent states.’ In short, they give a weight of zero to colonial 
history that dates back more than 250 years, as in the US case. Since the sample here is small, I 
stick to the simpler variable.
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levels of financial scrutiny (see also Lienert 2005). To test this proposition, I 
construct a dummy variable for pure presidential systems (based on Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001, also see Persson and Tabellini 2003), for which I predict a 
positive coefficient.
The vertical division of power between the centre and the regions, too, may affect 
legislative dynamics. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that federalism 
divides the loyalties of legislators between regions and the centre and provides 
incentives for them to extract benefits for regional constituencies (Morgenstem 
2002b: 425). In federal countries a bicameral legislature may therefore function as 
a forum for intergovernmental bargaining. It is important to note that federalism is 
closely linked to bicameralism (Patterson and Mughan 2001: 45). All parliaments 
in federal countries are bicameral, but only about one third of unitary states have 
bicameral parliaments. In other words, federalism is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for bicameralism. Bicameral legislatures require systems for 
the settlement of disputes between the chambers (Tsebelis and Money 1997). 
Hence, I expect federal countries to have more complex legislative structures. To 
test this proposition, I construct a federalism dummy to capture the vertical 
separation of power (based on Griffiths 2002), which is again expected to have a 
positive coefficient.
Both of the preceding propositions neglect the possibility that political actors may 
purposefully shape institutions (Goodin 1996, March and Olsen 1984: 740). 
However, there may be factors that motivate legislators to enhance financial
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scrutiny, notably party political dynamics. In the UK the emergence of organised 
political parties towards the end of the nineteenth century coincided with a decline 
in parliamentary influence (Adonis 1993, Norton 1993). The need to vote the 
party line constrains the independence of individual members, also with regard to 
budget policy (Schick 2002: 23). When party discipline is strong, an executive 
that commands a legislative majority is unlikely to face a fundamental challenge 
to its budgetary proposals during the parliamentary stage. However, under 
conditions of divided government disagreements over policy between the 
legislative majority and the executive are likely to be more pronounced than under 
unified government. Divided government can be defined as ‘the absence of 
simultaneous same-party majorities in the executive and legislative branches of 
government’ (Elgie 2001: 2).40 According to this definition, divided government 
in parliamentary regimes takes the form of minority government. Since legislative 
distrust of the executive is likely to be higher in the absence of a unifying partisan 
connection, I expect divided government to affect legislative financial scrutiny.
To test this proposition I construct a simple divided government index, which is 
the ratio of years in which the government did not command a legislative majority 
in the lower house of the legislature. It covers the ten-year period immediately 
before the OECD and World Bank data on budget systems were collected (1993-
2002). Until 2000 data are taken from Beck et al. (2001) and for the years
40 Elgie distinguishes this arithmetical definition from a behavioural definition where divided 
government refers to ‘divisiveness’ or ‘the situation where there is conflict between the executive 
and legislative branches of government whatever the support for the executive in the legislature’ 
(Elgie 2001: 7). I use the arithmetical definition.
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thereafter from Europa Publications (2002 and 2003).41 I considered whether 
legislators from the party or parties in government held more than 50 per cent of 
seats in a unicameral parliament or in the lower house of parliament in the case of 
bicameral systems. If so I gave a score of one for that year, otherwise z;ero, and 
compiled the index by summing across the ten years for each country and dividing 
by ten. Possible index values therefore range between zero (never minority 
government) and one (always minority government).. In systems that experience 
protracted spells of divided government, the legislative majority has an incentive 
to strengthen scrutiny capacity, so I expect this variable to have a positive 
coefficient.
I considered other possible indicators of partisan fragmentation. First, I compiled 
an alternative specification of the divided government index, which counts the 
years in which the government did not command a legislative majority in either 
the lower or upper house o f the legislature, i f  the latter is co-equal in budgetary 
matters. In other words, where the consent of the upper house is required to pass 
financial measures (e.g. Chile and Italy) unified budgetary government was 
counted when the executive had a majority in both houses simultaneously. Where
41 I used the margin of majority (MAJ) variable in the Database o f Political Institutions to score 
countries. This variable is not to be confused with the electoral system dummy by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003), which has the same name. Some years were not covered in the initial version of 
the World Bank dataset and I coded scores for these years by hand. Moreover, where I discovered 
inconsistencies between the World Bank data and that from the Europa World Yearbook, I gave 
preference to the latter. The Database o f Political Institutions has since been updated and can be 
accessed via the internet at http://econ.worldbank.org/ [last accessed August 2006].
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the consent of the upper house is not required (e.g. France and Belgium) I 
considered only the lower house majority. Both specifications of the divided 
government index yielded substantively similar results and in the following I use 
the first version. In addition, I include a measure of partisan fragmentation, the 
‘effective number of parties’ (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). I also experimented 
with one of its variants (Dunleavy and Boucek 2003), but the results were very 
similar and are not reported here. I conjecture that partisan fragmentation would 
engender a greater degree of scrutiny. Moreover, I also considered electoral 
systems as one possible factor affecting partisan fragmentation, using a dummy 
for plurality rule electoral systems (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Since plurality 
rule is correlated with less partisan fragmentation, I expect a negative sign for this 
coefficient.42
Finally, institutions are also embedded in the broader development context of a 
country and reflect an evolutionary process (Goodin 1996). This may suggest 
convergence between countries with similar levels of development. In political 
terms, for instance, the capacity of legislative bodies to act as a check on the 
executive is likely to be less developed where habits of executive authoritarianism 
still linger and democracy is not yet fully entrenched (O’Donnell 1998). To test 
whether democratic maturity affects legislative budget institutions I use the 1999 
to 2003 average of the combined ratings produced by Freedom House, an
42 New Zealand and Japan had electoral reforms in the mid-1990s. I experimented with two 
versions of the dummy variable for plurality rule electoral systems, one were these two countries 
are scored zero (version one) and another where they are Coded as one. Again, the results were 
very similar and I only report the results for version one in the following.
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organisation that monitors political rights and civil liberties (Karatnycky et al
2003). Because Freedom House gives low scores to ‘free’ countries, the 
coefficient is expected to be negative. Alternatively, financial scrutiny may be a 
function of the maturity of the economic system, with developed economies being 
more transparent and allowing greater scrutiny. Here, I use the 1999 to 2003 
average of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in constant 1995 US$ as an 
indicator of economic development (logged; data from World Bank 2005). This 
variable is expected to have a positive coefficient.
The overall statistical model can thus be summarised as follows:
Transformed index = pi (Former UK colony) ' + p2 (President)*
+ p 3 (Federalism)* + /?* (Dividedgovernment)*
+ ps (Plurality rule) ' + /?<* (Effective number o f parties)*
+ p 7 (Freedom) ' + Ps (Log o f GDP per capita)*
Table 5 reports the pairwise Pearson correlations between the independent 
variables. The correlation between Freedom House scores and the logarithm of 
GDP per capita is -.71, which indicates a degree of linear dependence. There is no 
quick fix for collinearity (Fox 1991: 21-31). The deletion of one of the variables 
would amount to model misspecification (Berry and Feldman 1985: 48). A more 
reasonable course is to acknowledge a degree of collinearity and to exercise 
caution in interpreting the results. Overall, with this single exception, the 
explanatory variables are not highly correlated.
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Table 5: Pearson correlations between the independent variables
Former UK colony President
President -.22
Federalism .22 .17
Divided government -.06 .12
Plurality rule .20 .16
Effective number of parties -.03 -.18
Freedom -.18 .23
Log of GDP per capita .10 -.31
Notes: Correlations are pairwise. Data for Suriname is missing for
„ . .. Divided ... , Effective nunFederalism . Plurality rule .  ..___________ government J_________ of parties
-.12
.22 -.22
-.16 -.03 -.28
oooi .04 -.19 .07
.12 .22 .22 .00
some variables.
Freedom
-.71
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5.2 Analysis
In this section, I test these propositions using simple (OLS) regression. However, 
before proceeding to the cross-sectional regression results, one methodological note 
and one caveat are in order. First, OLS regression assumes a quantitative, continuous 
and unbounded dependent variable (Berry 1993: 45-49). I treat the index like a 
continuous variable, but its boundedness is a problem because it may produce 
nonsensical predictions. For this reason, I use the logistic transformation to convert 
the dependent variable into an unbounded one (for an example of this approach in a 
different context, see Demsetz and Lehn 1985: 1163):43
indexIn:--------------
100-index
Second, a number of 36 observations is relatively small in statistical terms, although 
the sample represents a sizeable proportion of national legislatures in contemporary 
liberal democracies. One of the dangers of small samples is that outliers skew the 
results. In this case, the US Congress is an upper outlier, and the robustness of the 
results has to be considered. I will consider whether and in what way the exclusion of 
certain observations affects the results.
43 The results are substantively similar with the untransformed scores.
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Table 6: OLS estimates of the transformed index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Former UK colony -1.09 -1.08 -1.11 -1.00 -1.15
(0.27)*** (0.26)*** (0.23)*** (0.19)*** (0.34)***
President 0.16 -0.11
(0.32) (0.46)
Federalism 0.56 0.46 0.56 0.34 0.94
(0.25)** (0.24)* (0.27)** (0.16)** (0.39)**
Divided government 0.81 0.70 0.88 0.70 1.28
(0.34)** (0.34)* (0.30)*** (0.25)*** (0.42)***
Plurality rule -0.17 -0.13
(0.43) (0.44)
Effective number of parties 0.06 0.08
(0.06) (0.06)
Freedom -0.10 -0.18
(0.16) (0.22)
Log of GDP per capita 0.04 -0.02
(0.16) (0.20)
President*divided government 0.80
(1.18)
Constant -1.00 -0.32 -0.61 -0.56 -0.82
(1.64) (2.10) (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.28)***
Observations 35a 35“ 36 35b 21c
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.40 0.52
Notes: * p < . l  ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. a Data for Suriname 
are not available for some variables. b Excluding the US Congress. c Sample restricted to OECD 
members before 1993 except Turkey.
The results are reported in Table 6, which contains three different statistical models. 
The first model contains all of the explanatory variables discussed in the previous 
section (column 1). All of the coefficients have the predicted sign, but only three of 
them are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level or higher, i.e. the coefficients 
for the former UK colony and federalism dummies and for the divided government 
index. To check for collinearity problems, I calculate the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for each, of the explanatory variables (see Table 7). The VIF indicate the extent 
to which collinearity inflates the variance of an estimator. None of the VIF reported in 
Table 7 come close to exceeding 10, which would indicate a highly collinear variable 
and is often used as an arbitrary rule of thumb (Gujarati 2003: 362). Similarly, none of 
the tolerance values, which are computed simply as the inverse of the VIF, approach
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zero. The mean VIF is low. Hence, by reasonable standards we can conclude that 
collinearity is not a problematic issue in this analysis.
Table 7: Variance inflation factors
Variable VIF 1 / VIF
Log of GDP per capita 3.12 0.32
Freedom 2.41 0.41
President 1.50 0.67
Divided government 1.49 0.67
Plurality rule 1.49 0.67
Former UK colony 1.24 0.81
Federalism 1.23 0.81
Effective number of parties 1.16 0.86
Mean VIF 1.70
Note: Calculated on the basis of model one in Table 6.
The following model in Table 6 expands the baseline model and adds an interaction 
term (column 2). Haggard and McCubbins (2001) argue that the impact of the 
separation of powers depends on the ‘separation of purpose’, and to account for this 
possibility I introduce an interaction term between presidentialism and divided 
government. The coefficients for the federalism and UK colony dummies are not 
substantively affected, but the multiplicative term and its components have to be 
reinterpreted (Friedrich 1982, Brambor et a l 2006). The coefficient for divided 
government in the interaction model now captures the effect of switching from no 
divided government to always divided government in non-presidential systems; the 
effect is positive and significant. Similarly, the coefficient for presidentialism captures 
the effect of switching from a non-presidential to a presidential system in the absence 
o f divided government; the effect is negative and far from significant.
However, it is possible that presidentialism has a significant effect for some range of 
values on the divided government index (Brambor et a l 2006: 73-77). To investigate 
this possibility requires calculating the conditional effect and standard errors. Figure 7
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plots the effect of presidentialism for each level of the conditioning variable, i.e. 
divided government. In this dataset, there is at least one case for each value of divided 
government, and all values are substantively meaningful, so the entire range of this 
variable is relevant. I treat the conditioning variable as continuous, which is 
theoretically plausible and would be empirically feasible with more fine-grained data. 
Figure 7 shows that for most values of divided government, presidentialism has a 
positive effect. However, using a 90 per cent confidence interval, the effect of 
presidentialism is not significant at any value of divided government. In sum, there is 
no evidence that presidentialism has a systematic effect on legislative institutional 
arrangements for financial scrutiny.
Figure 7: The effect of presidentialism as divided government increases
to<\i
Conditional effect of presidentialism 
90 per cent confidence interval
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to
o
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Note: Calculations based on the results in column (2) of Table 6 using an adapted 
version o f the Stata code provided by Brambor et al. (2006).
I experimented with various combinations of the explanatory variables and used a 
manual backward selection procedure to derive a more parsimonious model. The
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resulting model contains three variables, i.e. the former UK colony and federalism 
dummies as well as the divided government index (column 3). All of the coefficients 
in model three have the predicted sign. Overall, this model accounts for more than one 
third of the variation on the transformed index. Given the relatively small number of 
observations, the results might be distorted by outliers. To see if US exceptionalism 
affects the results, I drop this case (column 4). The inclusion of a country dummy 
would have the same effect on the coefficients and standard errors as dropping the 
relevant case, but in contrast to the dropping procedure the inclusion of such dummies 
also inflates the adjusted R-squared. When the US Congress is dropped from the 
dataset, all of the coefficients weaken somewhat. The size of the coefficient for the 
federalism dummy is most affected by the exclusion of the US case. As another 
check, I restrict the sample to the advanced industrialised countries, i.e. members of 
the OECD prior to 1993 but excluding Turkey (column 5). Compared with the full 
sample, this increases the size of the coefficients for the federalism dummy and the 
divided government index. The size of the coefficient for the former UK colony 
dummy remains stable. Moreover, with this restricted sample of the core group of 
OECD members, these three explanatory variables account for more than half of the 
variation on the dependent variable. Overall, this suggests that the results are robust, 
but also that the model is most applicable to the advanced industrialised democracies.
In order make the results interpretable, the predicted logits have to be translated back 
into values measured on the index of legislative budget institutions by calculating:
I apply this to all logits predicted by model three, using the full sample. Table 8 
compares the actual scores on the index of legislative budget institutions against the 
index scores predicted by the model. The shading divides the sample into quartiles. 
The first column contains the predicted logit based on model three, using the full 
sample of 36 legislatures. Based on the above formula, the second column translates 
these predicted logits into predicted index scores, which can be compared against the 
actual index scores in column three. The final column contains the difference between 
predicted and actual scores, which shows that the index scores for the legislatures of 
Hungary, the Netherlands and the US are under-predicted by 24 points or more 
compared against their actual values. Over-prediction is somewhat less of a problem, 
although the predicted scores for the legislatures of Greece, Argentina and France 
exceed their actual scores by more than 15 points, and the scores for four other 
legislatures are over-predicted by more than 10 points. Still, most predictions are 
reasonably accurate.
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Table 8: Predicted and actual index scores sorted by difference
Legislature Predictedlogit
Predicted 
index score
Actual 
index score Difference
Hungary -.61 35.26 66.67 -31.40
United States .48 61.86 88.89 -27.02
Netherlands -.61 35.26 59.72 -24.46
Indonesia -.43 39.40 54.17 -14.76
N ew  Zealand -1.54 17.59 27.78 -10.19
Sweden .28 56.89 65.28 -8.39
Japan -.17 45.88 52.78 -6.89
Austria -.05 48.82 55.56 -6.73
Israel -1.28 21.77 27.78 -6.00
Norway .28 56.89 61.11 -4.22
Germany -.05 48.82 52.78 -3.96
Bolivia -.61 35.26 38.89 -3.62
Finland -.61 35.26 38.89 -3.62
Iceland -.61 35.26 38.89 -3.62
Uruguay -.61 35.26 38.89 -3.62
Canada -1.16 23.85 26.39 -2.54
Slovenia -.61 35.26 36.11 -.85
Denmark .19 54.71 55.56 -.85
Belgium -.05 48.82 47.22 1.60
Australia -1.16 23.85 22.22 1.63
Suriname -.61 35.26 33.33 1.93
South Korea -.08 48.09 45.83 2.25
Turkey -.25 43.70 38.89 4.81
Slovakia -.43 39.40 33.33 6.07
Czech Republic -.08 48.09 41.67 6.42
South Africa -1.16 23.85 16.67 7.18
Ireland -1.10 24.94 16.67 8.27
Mexico .40 59.76 51.39 8.37
Portugal -.08 48.09 38.89 9.20
Italy -.25 43.70 33.33 10.36
United Kingdom -.61 35.26 22.22 13.04
Spain .22 55.44 41.67 13.77
Chile -.61 35.26 20.83 14.43
Greece -.61 35.26 19.44 15.82
Argentina .66 65.94 50.00 15.94
France -.52 37.31 19.44 17.87
N o t e :  Based on model three in Table 6 and the full sample (N =  36).
139
To explore the impact of the explanatory variables on different components of the 
index of legislative budget institutions, and as a further check on the robustness of the 
results, I also regressed transformed versions of the two sub-indices developed in the 
previous chapter on the explanatory variables in model three. For this purpose, I first 
rescaled the two sub-indices to range between zero and 100 and again applied the 
logistic transformation to meet the unboundedness assumption of OLS regression with 
regard to the dependent variable. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the ‘powers’ 
sub-index contains the amendment powers, reversionary budget and executive 
flexibility variables and is taken to represent the formal authority of the legislature. 
The logistic transformation is not defined for the South African case, which has a 
score of zero on the powers sub-index, so this case is omitted in this instance. The 
second sub-index sums the scores for the time, committee and research capacity 
variables and is interpreted as a measure of the organisational capacity of the 
legislature for financial scrutiny. Here, all transformations are defined.
The OLS results for the sub-indices are presented in Table 9. All coefficients retain 
their predicted signs and are significant predictors of the two transformed sub-indices. 
Overall, these results confirm those obtained with the transformed overall index, but 
there is one noteworthy distinction: the size of the coefficient for the former UK 
colony dummy is substantially larger for the transformed powers sub-index (column 
I) than for the transformed organisation sub-index (column 2). This result suggests 
that the impact of colonial heritage on the legal framework for legislative budgeting is 
about three times greater than its impact on legislative organisation.
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Table 9: OLS estimates of the transformed sub-indices
(1) (2)
Former UK colony -1.59 -0.53
(0.42)*** (0.24)**
Federalism 0.65 0.63
(0.31)** (0.33)*
Divided government 1.12 0.78
(0.52)** (0.32)**
Constant -0.20 -1.10
(0.29) (0.15)***
Dependent variable Powers Organisation
Observations 35* 36
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.23
Notes: * p < . l  ** p < .05 *** p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* The logistic transformation of the South African score is not defined.
Table 10 summarises the results. Substantively, this analysis confirms the institutional 
replication proposition for former UK colonies. This is strong evidence of the 
durability of legislative budget institutions for this group of countries. On the other 
hand, the results also confirm the partisan proposition, which suggests that political 
actors can to some extent shape legislative arrangements in a purposeful fashion in 
order to increase parliamentary control. This seemingly contradictory conclusion that 
institutional arrangements are both durable and malleable is discussed in more detail 
in the following section. The divided government index is probably the most 
straightforward indicator of legislative-executive partisan divisions (Edin and Ohlsson 
1991). The federalism dummy is also statistically significant, although this result is 
sensitive to the inclusion of the US case. Further theoretical and empirical work is 
needed to investigate the impact of federalism on legislative financial scrutiny. On the 
other hand, this analysis finds no evidence for either the development or the 
horizontal separation of powers proposition. Plurality rule and the effective number of 
parties also appear to have no impact on institutional arrangements for legislative 
financial scrutiny. Perhaps most surprising is the non-impact of presidentialism on 
legislative budget institutions across all models, and I expand on this finding in the
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following section. While the models presented here account for a substantial 
proportion of cross-national institutional variation, it is to be expected that part of the 
differences be due to country specific factors that are difficult to quantify, such as 
historical contingencies and differences in political culture.
Table 10: Summary of findings
Proposition Variable Expected sign Confirmed?
Institutional replication Former UK colony - Yes
Separation o f  powers: horizontal President + No
Separation o f  powers: vertical Federalism + Yes
Partisan dynamics Divided government + Yes
Partisan dynamics Effective number o f  parties + No
Partisan dynamics Plurality rule - No
Development context: political Freedom - No
Development context: economic Log o f  GDP per capita + No
N o t e :  In the last column, ‘yes’ implies that the coefficient has the expected sign and is significant 
at least at the 10 per cent level (p < .1). Here, only statistically significant variables are indicated 
with grey shading.
5.3 Some implications
This section elaborates two important implications that flow from the above analysis 
and which warrant further discussion. First, the fact that presidentialism is not a 
significant explanatory variable serves as a reminder that the experience of the US 
Congress cannot be generalised across all presidential systems. Admittedly, only 
seven out of 36 legislatures in the sample are from presidential systems as defined in 
section two (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, South Korea, the US and Uruguay). A 
larger sample is desirable to draw firmer conclusions. Nonetheless, this finding 
represents a challenge to the view that institutions in presidential and parliamentary 
systems are inherently different. Rather, the results of this analysis support the 
argument that it is more fruitful to focus attention on the specific differences in the
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design of institutional aspects as well as their cumulative effect. Cheibub and Limongi 
(2002: 152-153) make this point succinctly:44
Parliamentary and presidential regimes are indeed founded on different constitutional 
principles, and this is a central choice in any democratic constitution. However, the operation 
of the political system cannot be entirely derived from the mode of government formation. 
Other provisions, constitutional and otherwise, also affect the way parliamentary and 
presidential democracies operate, and these provisions may counteract some of the tendencies 
that we would expect to observe if we derived the regime’s entire performance from its basic 
constitutional principles.
There are at least two reasons why it is easy for the casual observer to misjudge the 
effect of presidentialism. One is the combination of US exceptionalism with the fact 
that the US Congress for a long time received massively disproportionate attention in 
the legislative studies literature (Oppenheimer 1983). Until fairly recently, far less 
was known about legislative dynamics in other presidential systems. The emerging 
comparative literature on legislative bodies in contemporary presidential systems has 
revealed substantial variation in legislative influence among this group of countries 
(Morgenstem and Nacif 2002, Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Still, there are many 
examples where researchers generalise the experience of the US Congress across 
presidential systems. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2006: 92) claim:
[M]any presidential regimes have a strong separation of powers -  between the president and 
Congress but also between congressional committees holding important proposal powers in 
different spheres of policy. In parliamentary regimes, instead, the government concentrates all 
the executive prerogatives as well as important powers of initiating legislation. Checks and 
balances are thus stronger under presidential government.
44 On more recent work, Cheibub (2006) expands on this point in his consideration of the effect of 
presidentialism on central government financial balances. Here, he argues that the effect depends on the 
ability of the president to control the budget process.
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When the US Congress is compared with the UK Parliament, where incidentally the 
decline in parliamentary influence is said to have been extreme compared to other 
parliamentary systems (Schick 2002), it may indeed seem as if there is a systemic 
difference between presidential and parliamentary systems. However, a comparison 
beyond these two usual suspects reveals that the importance of the presidential- 
parliamentary divide for explaining differences in legislative influence may not 
always be as fundamental as is sometimes assumed.
A second reason why presidentialism is possibly overrated as a causal factor is that it 
is easy to misinterpret political dynamics as effects of the system of government when 
comparative analysis focuses on only a handful of countries. For a long time, the 
study of divided government was largely confined to the US (Elgie 2001: 1). Here, 
shifting majorities among the branches of government and the different houses of 
Congress have given rise to instances of severe gridlock over policy and budgets 
(Williams and Jubb 1996). Again it is tempting to extrapolate this experience to other 
presidential systems. However, more recent and thorough comparative work has 
revealed that the ‘separation of purpose’ is far less pronounced in a number of other 
presidential regimes than in the US (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Moreover, some 
authors have argued strongly that divided government is a noteworthy feature of a 
number of non-presidential systems (Elgie 2001, Laver and Shepsle 1991). Several 
studies with different samples of parliamentary regimes have found that minority 
administrations account for about one third of governments (Strom 1990: 8). This 
suggests that divided government may be more important for explaining legislative
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influence than the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems of 
government.
In addition, although this analysis is of a cross-sectional nature, the causal variables 
raise interesting issues relating to institutional change over time. Some of the 
institutional arrangements can typically be adjusted more easily than others. For 
instance, constitutional features, several of which are captured in the powers sub­
index, usually cannot be amended without supermajority support in the legislature. 
Because this requires a high degree of consensus that would be unusual in many 
contexts, fundamental constitutional reforms are extremely rare (Persson and 
Tabellini 2003: 219). Other institutional features are perhaps more variable in the 
short-run. For instance, some aspects of legislative organisation are often an internal 
question that is for the legislature to decide, and most standing orders can usually be 
amended with more ease than constitutional provisions.45 This makes variable features 
potentially more responsive to shifting political dynamics such as diverging party 
majorities across the legislative and executive branches of government.
Some anecdotal evidence illustrates that legislatures seeking to strengthen their 
budgetary role may attempt to do so by adjusting variable institutional features in their 
favour. The perhaps best-known example is the overhaul of the US budget process 
with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Among other 
changes, the reform created CBO in order to end the executive’s monopoly on 
budgetary information, reformed the legislative committee structure to facilitate fiscal 
decision-making, severely curtailed executive impoundment authority by regulating
45 One exception is the Swedish case, which I discuss in a later chapter.
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rescissions and deferrals, and shifted the beginning of the fiscal year from July to 
October to give Congress an extra three months to decide the budget (Wildavsky and 
Caiden 2001: 77-82). The acrimonious nature of legislative-executive relations during 
the Nixon administration, a period of divided government, gave impetus to the 
reforms, which also sought to counter a longer term shift towards executive 
dominance since the introduction of the executive budget process with the Budget and 
Accounting Act in 1921 (Schick 2000: 8-22).
There are other attempts of legislative reorganisation that perhaps illustrate the point. 
In Mexico, for many years commentators regarded Congress as ‘the epitome of 
weakness’ (Morgenstem 2002a: 9) despite comparatively strong constitutional powers 
(Haggard and McCubbins 2001: 81). Since the re-emergence of competitive party 
politics and divided government in the 1990s the Mexican Congress has started to 
make amendments to the presidential budget proposal.46 In the wake of these political 
changes Congress has also made certain institutional adjustments with the aim to 
increase legislative control. For instance, the 2000 Federal Audit Law47 established a 
new congressional audit committee 48 Congress also put in place the Centre for the 
Study of Public Finance,49 modelled along the lines of CBO, to supply it with 
independent analyses of taxation and spending issues. As Santiso (2006: 85) remarks, 
‘the surge of legislative activism in the budget process in Mexico is partly the result of 
the emergence of an assertive opposition since the long-time ruling party, the
46 The Economist recently reported on ‘Mexico’s Budget Wrangles’ (11 December 2004: 54).
47 Refer to article 67 of the Ley de Fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion.
48 Comision de Vigilancia de la Auditoria Superior de la Federacion.
49 Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Publicas.
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Institutional Revolutionary Party, lost its parliamentary majority in 1997. It is 
probably not a coincidence that the Mexican legislative budget office emerged in 
1998.’ In this case, too, changes in the political environment prompted a redesign of 
variable institutional features.
Not all such institutional adjustments are necessarily successful in that they 
unambiguously strengthen legislative control (Wildavsky and Caiden 2001: 81-82). 
Rather, the essential point in the context of this discussion is that a distinction 
between fixed and variable institutional features provides a useful framework for 
understanding the scope for institutional adjustments in response to changes in the 
political environment, such as the emergence of divided government. This helps to 
shed light on the extent to which legislative actors have scope to act as agents that can 
purposefully shape institutional arrangements. Whether specific institutional features 
are fixed or variable in the short-run does of course differ between countries, but 
features relating to legislative organisation are frequently variable and hence may 
respond to the prevalence of divided government. The distinction between fixed and 
variable institutions reconciles the seemingly contradictory assumptions of the 
institutional replication and partisan propositions in terms of the durability versus 
malleability of institutions.
In sum, this analysis challenges the proposition that the presidential-parliamentary 
distinction is of fundamental importance for explaining cross-national differences in 
legislative scrutiny of the budget. Presidentialism should not be confounded with 
divided government, which does appear to affect legislative scrutiny, nor should the 
US experience be generalised across presidential regimes elsewhere. Furthermore, the
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distinction between fixed and variable institutional features helps to explain why some 
causal variables suggest that legislative institutions are highly durable whilst others 
imply that they adapt to shifting political dynamics.
Conclusions
There are a number of plausible explanations of why legislative scrutiny arrangements 
might differ between countries. This chapter considered four sets of propositions, 
relating respectively to institutional replication, the separation of powers, partisan 
dynamics and the development context of a country. I investigated these using a 
transformed version of the index of legislative budget institutions as the dependent 
variable, as well as transformed versions of the powers and organisation sub-indices. 
The results suggest that colonial heritage and divided government affect legislative 
institutions, as might federalism. While the latter is an interesting finding, further 
theoretical and empirical work is necessary before drawing firmer conclusions about 
the impact of federalism on legislative budgeting.
More specifically, former UK colonies have lower index scores, whereas countries 
with a high incidence of divided government achieve higher scores. The impact of the 
UK colonial heritage is strongest on the component of the index that capture the 
formal powers of the legislature in budgetary matters, some of which may have a 
constitutional basis that is typically very durable over time. Federalism is also 
associated with higher scores on the index. However, there is no evidence that levels 
of political or economic development, the type of electoral system or the effective
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number of parties have any systematic effect on legislative budget structures. Perhaps 
most surprising might be the absence of evidence that presidentialism is associated 
with higher levels of financial scrutiny as measured by the index. The fact that 
colonial heritage and divided government respectively imply very long term and more 
immediate effects suggests that it is useful to make a distinction between institutional 
arrangements that are variable in the short-term and those that are not, such as 
constitutionally prescribed powers.
149
6 The effect of legislative institutions on fiscal policy
If the legislative budget process has a pro-spending bias, what is the empirical 
evidence that carefully designed institutional arrangements can help to contain this 
tendency? Since the 1990s, a number of studies, using different variables and datasets, 
have claimed that certain institutional features are conducive to maintaining fiscal 
discipline during the budget approval process in the legislature. This chapter provides 
an overview and assessment of two quantitative measures of the power of parliaments 
in budgetary matters, taken from arguably the two most influential studies of budget 
institutions and fiscal performance (Von Hagen 1992, Alesina et ol. 1996). I also 
include other variables that some authors claim to be institutional determinants of 
fiscal outcomes. The comparison and assessment of alternative measures is 
complicated by the fact that empirical studies typically use different datasets that may 
not always allow the reconstruction of other existing measures. This chapter assesses 
alternative measures of parliamentary power over budgets on the basis of a single 
dataset, with emphasis on the importance for quantitative cross-national research of 
carefully constructing the variables of interest. Moreover, the cross-sectional analysis 
in this chapter is complemented with results using a new method for estimating
I
coefficients of time-invariant variables in panel data, which addresses a frequent 
methodological problem in the empirical literature.
From the start, it is important to acknowledge that perfect measures do not exist in 
comparative politics. Nonetheless, there is much to learn from how multiple measures 
purportedly of the same underlying concept relate to one another. Political scientists
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and economists increasingly invest in the development of comparative tools for the 
cross-national study of political institutions and their performance (Congleton and 
Swedenborg 2006), which is also the purpose of this thesis. Rigorously constructed 
quantitative measures are useful for testing theories with larger samples of countries 
than the case study approach allows, and to broaden our perspective beyond a handful 
of frequently studied countries. However, the development of such comparative tools 
also entails pitfalls. New measures may quickly gain widespread acceptance despite 
possible refinements or alternatives. Moreover, aggregate indices can sometimes 
obfuscate the impact of individual component variables. In short, while the 
development of quantitative measures is crucial for advancing the comparative study 
of institutional effects on policy, careful and continuous reassessment must ensure the 
quality of measures in use. Replication is increasingly acknowledged as essential for 
the credibility of research in political science (King 1995) and economics (Dewald et 
al. 1986).50 It provides a check whether results ‘travel’ through time and space, and 
supports the search for underlying general results. At the same time, replication is 
badly neglected and in a ‘sad state’ (Hamermesh 2007: 15). The results in this chapter 
demonstrate its value and contribution.
The chapter is organised in three parts. The first provides a brief review of the 
institutionalist hypotheses in the literature. The second part discusses data and
50 Conceptual distinctions vary. Hermson (1995: 452) refers to reanalysis as the broader category, 
which entails a study of the same problem investigated by the initial investigator, using either the same 
database (verification) or independently collected data (replication). In contrast, Hamermesh (2007: 1) 
distinguishes pure replication, which involves checking the results in published papers using their data 
and models, from scientific replication, using a ‘different sample, different population and perhaps 
similar, but not identical model.’
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methodological issues. In the third part I present empirical results on the impact of 
legislative institutions on fiscal policy outcomes, using cross-sectional and panel data. 
The conclusion considers the implications of these findings for further research.
6.1 Institutionalist hypotheses
As discussed in the introduction, the literature on the fiscal effect of budget 
institutions builds on the basic insight that spending will be higher when decision­
makers do not internalise the full costs of their actions (Weingast et a l 1981, Von 
Hagen and Harden 1995). This suggests that the spending bias in a legislative setting 
is potentially very substantial. The fiscal institutionalist response to this problem is to 
design the budget process so as to centralise budgetary decision-making. In the 
following, I review the hypotheses about the fiscal impact of legislative institutions 
put forward in the literature.
In a groundbreaking and widely cited paper prepared for the European Commission, 
Von Hagen (1992) argues that institutions that weaken the role of special interests in 
the budget process affect fiscal stability. He develops three different versions of a 
‘structural index’ that consist of up to four different items (pp. 43-44). Based on fiscal 
data for European Community countries in the 1980s, his empirical analysis finds 
support for the ‘structural hypothesis’ that a budget process with a dominating role of 
the finance minister vis-a-vis spending ministers, restricted powers of amendment for 
parliament, and limiting adjustments to the budget during implementation is strongly 
conducive to fiscal discipline (p. 53).
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Item two of the structural index combines several components to assess the ‘structure 
of the parliamentary process’ (p. 70). In the discussion below, the respective scores 
assigned by Von Hagen are indicated in square brackets. Components one and two 
relate to the amendment powers of the legislature. They indicate whether amendment 
powers are limited [4] or unlimited [0] and whether changes are required to be 
offsetting [4] or not [0].51 The third considers whether amendments can cause the fall 
of the government [4] or not [0]. Component four indicates whether all expenditures 
are passed in one vote [0] or chapter-by-chapter [4], with an intermediate score [2] for 
what Von Hagen classifies as ‘mixed’ cases. The fifth component looks at whether the 
process commences with a global vote on the size of the total budget [4] or whether 
totals are voted only at the conclusion of the process [0]. The individual scores are 
summed to derive the total score for item two. Accordingly, the scores on this item 
can range between zero and a maximum of 20, with the latter indicating a more 
centralised parliamentary budget process that, according to Von Hagen, should be 
more conducive to fiscal discipline.
51 It is not entirely clear how Von Hagen scored this item in his 1992 paper when legislatures can only 
accept or reject the budget. Notably, his Table A6 reports that the Irish Parliament has no powers to 
amend expenditure proposals. Scoring Ireland on his item two, he gives four points because 
amendments are limited, but zero points for the offsetting component. In the 2001 update (Hallerberg et 
al. 2001: Table 2b) the authors count the offsetting item as not relevant for Ireland and accordingly 
assign a score of zero, which is more consistent. In reconstructing Von Hagen’s item two, I assigned a 
score of four for the offsetting component when a legislature can either (i) only accept or reject the 
budget, or (ii) when amendment powers impose an aggregate constraint.
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The effect of some of the components of item two is contested. Notably, Von Hagen 
(1992: 36) argues that a global vote on the budget prior to allocative decisions 
contains total spending. However, Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) demonstrate that 
such a two-step process may result in relatively large budgets. Empirically, Alesina 
and colleagues (1999b: 270) find evidence that such a process imposes an effective 
constraint, but Helland (1999: 130-132) does not. Von Hagen later revised his initial 
view (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1997, Ehrhart et a l 2001). Moreover, Von Hagen 
(1992: 36) merely offers a ‘conjecture’ that voting the budget chapter-by-chapter is 
more constraining than authorisation in a single vote. The findings presented in the 
following section add to the empirical debate about the effect of these institutional 
features.
The paper by Alesina and colleagues (1996) extends the geographical application of 
this approach. It establishes a parsimonious measure of the budgetary power of the 
legislature vis-a-vis the government as part of a ten-item index of budget institutions 
that the authors use to classify budget systems as ‘hierarchical’ or ‘collegial.’ Using a 
sample of 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries, they present evidence that 
more hierarchical budget institutions were associated with greater fiscal discipline in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. They sum components five and six to construct their 
subindex three, which they argue measures the relative position of the government 
vis-a-vis the legislature in the approval stage, and find that it is a significant 
determinant of fiscal performance (p. 23). In later versions of their paper they use a 
different disaggregation of their main index (Alesina et a l 1999a and 1999b). 
However, only the 1996 subindex three focuses exclusively on the legislature and it is 
this original measure that I refer to in the following. Hallerberg and Marier (2004:
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578-579) use a rescaled version of this subindex for their analysis of the interaction of 
budget institutions and electoral incentives. Cheibub (2006: 364) also draws heavily 
on these variables and finds evidence that the effect of presidentialism on budget 
balances is conditional upon the powers of the president in the budget process.
Subindex three combines variables on amendment powers and the reversionary 
budget (Alesina et a l 1999a: 34-35). With regard to amendment powers, it 
distinguishes countries where amendments cannot increase the size of the budget or 
its size and the deficit [10], from those where the legislature can do so only with 
government approval [7.5], where it can only propose changes that may not increase 
the deficit [5], and where there are no constraints [0]. With regard to the reversionary 
budget, the extreme case is that the government proposal is implemented even if the 
legislature explicitly rejects or fails to approve it [10]. In some instances a distinction 
is made according to which the lack of timely approval results in the enactment of the 
government proposal, while rejection triggers reversion to last year’s budget [8]. 
Alesina and colleagues argue that reversion to the previous budget is more favourable 
for the government than a requirement for tabling a new budget as long as it can 
redistribute spending between items [6], but not when this is disallowed [2]. Where a 
new budget has to be presented, they give higher scores where the government has 
discretion to reallocate until the adoption of the new budget [4] than to those where 
there is no reallocation [2] or where the legislature reallocates expenditures [0].
A few scores are not covered in this account, but can be deduced from Table A6 in 
Alesina et al. (1999a) or the 1996 version of their paper. First, they assign the middle 
possible score [5] to cases where the government resigns in case of non-approval,
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arguing that ‘this drastic possibility could go either way’ since on the one hand the 
legislature may want to avoid a situation that is costly to the country while the 
government may be induced to present a ‘more palatable’ budget in order to avoid 
loss of office (Alesina et al. 1996: 13). This intermediate score is only assigned once 
in their dataset; this was to the Bahamas. Second, when no funds may be expended in 
case of non-approval, Alesina and colleagues (1999a: Table A6) give eight points, 
which according to their dataset is the case only in Mexico. They add the scores for 
these two variables, so that a maximum of 20 on subindex three indicates a high 
degree of executive control of the parliamentary agenda, which they predict to have a 
positive effect on fiscal discipline. This is confirmed in their empirical analysis, which 
finds a negative association of subindex three with primary deficits in Latin American 
countries in the 1980s and early 1990s (Alesina et al. 1996: Table 6).
There are legislative features other than those covered in the above indices that might 
impact on fiscal aggregates. Heller (1997: 486) argues that the existence of second 
chambers with budgetary powers increases the number of actors who can veto or 
modify legislation and this ‘forces the government to include more spending in the 
budget than it would need to if the budget had to pass in only one legislative 
chamber.’ Using a sample of 17 industrialised countries, he finds that deficits are 
higher in parliamentary systems with bicameral than those with unicameral 
legislatures. However, with budget deficits rather than expenditures as the dependent 
variable, it is impossible to distinguish his proposition that budgetary bicameralism 
leads to higher spending from the rival hypothesis that bicameralism can increase 
gridlock (e.g. Alt and Lowry 1994). There are also problems with the empirical 
analysis. The results are to a substantial extent driven by the Italian case (Heller 1997:
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502-503), and the classification of countries can be challenged.52 Moreover, the use of 
pooled time-series cross-section regression is problematic, since the time-invariant 
nature of the variable of interest calls for cross-sectional analysis (Kittel 1999). 
Bicameralism is also discussed by Gleich (2003: 18), who argues on the basis of the 
common pool perspective that it adds to the fragmentation of the legislature, and 
hence contributes to a spending and deficit bias. Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001: 79) 
test the ‘law of 1/n’ with subnational government data from the US and find that the 
size of the upper house, but not of the lower house, has a consistent effect on fiscal 
policy (see also Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2002). On the other hand, Bradbury and Crain 
(2001: 322) conclude that ‘splitting the legislative branch into two chambers mitigates 
the fiscal commons problem.’ In short, the impact of bicameralism remains unclear.
Other authors have explored how the fragmentation of spending authority across 
different legislative committees affects fiscal policy. Crain and Muris (1995) consider 
the impact of committee structures on fiscal policy at the subnational level in the US. 
Cogan (1994) provides an interesting historical account of the evolution of committee 
spending authority in the US Congress, while Dharmapala (2003 and 2004) develops 
a formalised treatment of this topic. One proposition is that the consolidation of 
financial decision-making in a single committee is an institutional remedy for the 
common pool resource problem and helps to contain spending pressures. In a 
balkanised committee setting partial spending decisions are distributed across 
different committees and no single committee is responsible for the overall level of 
expenditure, which encourages free-riding. Using state-level data from the US, Crain 
and Muris (1995) find that the centralisation of spending decisions in a single
52 For instance, Canada is classified as budgetary bicameral.
157
committee indeed restrains expenditures compared with balkanised systems. The 
empirical work on the fiscal effects of committee structures focuses almost 
exclusively on US legislatures; this chapter adds cross-national results.
6.2 Data and methods
One of the major drawbacks of the institutionalist literature on fiscal policy is that its 
empirical work uses different datasets and variable definitions. To enable a more 
systematic review I use data from a 2003 survey of budget practices by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Bank to reconstruct the measures discussed above. The survey asked more than 370 
questions and was administered to senior budget officials in each participating 
country.531 use data from this survey to reconstruct Von Hagen’s (1992) item two and 
subindex three by Alesina and colleagues (1996), as documented in Table 11. It is 
convenient to standardise the various indices by rescaling them so that a maximum 
score of one can be interpreted as most constrained from a legislative perspective and 
a score of zero as least constrained. This rescaling is also helpful for the multiple 
regression analysis in the third section. In the following, I work with the rescaled 
indices. Moreover, any components from these indices are also standardised for the 
regression analysis, so that all institutional variables of interest are either dummy
53 The survey was completed by 41 countries, including most OECD countries. I focus on the latter 
group, since these data are more reliable. Moreover, as noted in chapter four, several other countries 
included in the survey, such as Cambodia and Jordan, are not democracies.
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variables or range between zero and one, with the latter always indicating an 
institutional feature that is predicted to reduce the level of public spending.
In addition, I reconsider whether bicameralism affects public spending, as Heller’s 
(1997) original hypothesis suggests. I use a simple dummy to indicate budgetary 
unicameralism, where 1 = the second chamber has lesser budgetary powers than the 
lower chamber or parliament is unicameral and 0 = otherwise. To explore the fiscal 
impact of committee structure I use another dummy variable, where 1 = a budget or 
finance committee plays a central role in the approval process and 0 = otherwise. 
Unfortunately, cross-national data for OECD countries are not very useful for testing 
these two hypotheses, due to lack of variation. Most OECD countries are either 
unicameral or have second chambers with lesser budgetary powers, and most involve 
a finance or budget committee in decisions on public expenditures (OECD 2002b, 
OECD and World Bank 2003). Hence, the results for these variables should be treated 
with caution.
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Table 11: Reconstruction of the Alesina and Von Hagen indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) £ (6) (7) £
Legislature Amendments Amendments Amendments One vote on Global Von Hagen
Amendment Reversionary Alesina
limited offsetting cause fall expenditure vote item two8 restrictions budget sub index threeb
Argentina 4 4 0 0 0 8 5 6 11
Australia 4 0 0 2 0 6 10 8 18
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Belgium 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 8 8
Bolivia 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 10 10
Canada 4 0 4 2 0 10 10 8 18
Chile 4 0 0 0 0 4 10 10 20
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 6 6
Denmark 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 6 6
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
France 4 0 0 2 4 10 10 10 20
Germany 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 6 6
Greece 4 4 4 0 0 12 10 6 16
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
Indonesia 4 4 0 0 0 8 5 2 7
Ireland 4 4 0 0 0 8 10 10 20
Israel 4 4 0 0 0 8 10 6 16
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
Japan 4 4 0 0 0 8 10 8 18
Mexico 4 4 0 0 0 8 5 8 13
Netherlands 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 6 6
New Zealand 4 0 4 2 0 10 10 8 18
Norway 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 8 8
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Portugal 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 6 6
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
Slovenia 4 4 0 0 0 8 5 6 11
South Africa 4 4 0 2 0 10 10 10 20
South Korea 4 0 0 0 0 4 10 6 16
Spain 4 4 0 0 4 12 5 6 11
Suriname 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 10 10
Sweden 0 0 0 4 4 8 0 8 8
Turkey 4 4 0 0 0 8 5 8 13
United Kingdom 4 0 4 0 0 8 10 8 18
United States 0 0 0 4 4 8 0 8 8
Uruguay 4 4 0 0 0 8 7.5 6 13.5
N o t e s :  Where the OECD data were inconsistent with those reported by Wehner (2006a) the latter are preferred. In addition, Slovakia is scored as having 
unfettered amendment powers during the sample period (see Gleich 2003: 25, Ylaoutinen 2004: 71), since there are no constitutional limitations, although the 
EU convergence programme contains deficit targets (personal correspondence received from the Chancellery o f the National Council o f  the Slovak Republic). 
a Reconstruction based on responses to questions 2.7.d (amendments limited), 2.7.e (amendments offsetting), 2.7.h (amendments cause fall), 2.8.a (one vote on 
expenditure), and 2.7.j (global vote) in OECD (2003). b Reconstruction based on responses to questions 2.7.e (amendment restrictions), as well as 2.7.c and 
3.2.a.4 (reversionary budget) in OECD (2003).
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An assessment of the impact of legislative institutions on the size of government 
requires appropriate left hand side fiscal variables and data. One important choice 
relates to coverage, i.e. whether to use data for central or general government. 
Moreover, databases differ in their inclusion of extra-budgetary entities, for 
instance social security funds (see also Hogwood 1992: 34-37). Of the studies 
reviewed above, Von Hagen (1992) uses general government data, whilst Alesina 
and colleagues (1999b) use central government data. Elsewhere, Woo (2003: 390- 
391) points out that central government data can be misleading when other parts 
of the public sector contribute substantially to fiscal outcomes. Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002: 196) also note that central government data do not capture 
spending at the subnational level that is mandated by the centre, which can distort 
the analysis. To the contrary, Volkerink and De Haan (2001: 222) prefer central 
government data, arguing that most theories relate to central government. Persson 
and Tabellini (2003: 38) add data availability as a practical reason in favour of 
central government data, and further claim that these data are more reliable. 
Evidently, many justifications are plausible, but there is no consensus on this 
issue.
A range of sources for fiscal data are available. The OECD (2005a and 2005b) 
publishes comprehensive central and general government figures for (most) 
member countries. The Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) include central and general government data for a large 
number of countries (IMF 2005a). However, while countries increasingly report 
GFS data on an accrual basis, cash based reporting is still common. These two
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types of data are not strictly comparable, which restricts sample size and 
introduces analytical breaks into time series. The IMF also publishes the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) that include some central government 
fiscal data (IMF 2005b). For European Union (EU) members and accession 
candidates, Eurostat (2006) publishes fiscal data based on the 1995 European 
System of National and Regional Accounts. Hence, the choice of data source has 
implications for sample characteristics and the exact nature of fiscal variables.
To fully appreciate the implications, it is useful to consider the variation in central 
government data in particular. A detailed look at the data for each country, 
contained in Table 12, reveals some striking variations. For instance, the 1999 to 
2003 average for central government spending in Belgium is 29.7 per cent of GDP 
according to the OECD National Accounts, while GFS indicate a share of 43 per 
cent and IFS a mere 17.7 per cent. These are massive differences in public finance 
terms that would suggest fundamentally different roles of central government in 
the economy, and which will impact on results from cross-sectional analysis. 
Hence, central government data can be highly problematic, since different 
classifications and reporting bases are in use to define the central government 
sector and to underpin fiscal reporting. Without an explicit theoretical basis as to 
why a certain definition of central government should be preferred this raises the 
prospect that an arbitrary or poorly informed choice of data source affects 
empirical results.
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Table 12; The available expenditure data by country
Source Eurostat OECD GFS IFS OECD GFS
Coverage GG GG GG CG CG CG
Argentina - - 29.0 16.5 - 19.8
Australia - 36.3 34.4 22.8 - 25.2
Austria 51.3 51.3 51.2 - 29.4 40.3
Belgium 50.0 49.1 49.1 17.7 29.7 43.0
Bolivia - - 28.5 30.9 - 28.4
Canada - 41.6 - 19.9 17.1 -
Chile - - 21.5 22.0 - 19.8
Czech Republic 46.0 46.1 40.3 30.1 36.7 36.4
Denmark 55.8 54.9 55.1 35.8 35.7 35.6
Finland 50.0 50.0 49.4 26.5 26.3 36.0
France 52.9 52.4 51.8 - 24.1 46.6
Germany 47.2 47.4 48.0 - 14.0 31.9
Greece 50.4 50.3 - 35.2 41.2 -
Hungary 49.8 49.6 45.5 43.5 34.4 40.9
Iceland 43.2 44.6 41.7 30.9 35.5 31.9
Indonesia - - - 18.6 - -
Ireland 33.6 33.1 - 26.6 28.0 -
Israel - - 52.9 45.7 - 50.1
Italy 48.5 48.6 47.2 30.1 28.7 39.9
Japan - 38.0 35.2 - - -
Mexico - - - 15.7 - -
Netherlands 47.1 45.4 45.5 27.7 27.6 40.6
New Zealand 38.3 35.4 30.6 34.8 32.7
Norway 46.2 46.3 44.9 34.8 35.4 35.8
Portugal 46.1 44.6 43.9 - 32.7 41.2
Slovakia 51.7 45.1 39.3 37.9 32.9 36.8
Slovenia 48.1 - - 39.0 - -
South Africa - - 32.0 25.3 - 27.8
South Korea - 25.7 - - -
Spain 38.9 38.7 36.7 17.6 18.4 29.2
Suriname - - - C v -
Sweden 58.4 58.3 57.2 30.4 34.0 36.9
Turkey - - - 42.4 - -
United Kingdom 41.0 40.6 40.5 35.8 38.7 37.5
United States - 35.4 34.5 19.0 20.7 20.4
Uruguay - - - 31.6 - -
N o t e s :  A dash indicates that data are not available for that particular case. The 
abbreviations CG and GG indicate central and general government data respectively. 
Figures are average available expenditure to GDP for the years 1999-2003 multiplied by 
100. OECD data for the central government sector are from the national accounts 
(OECD 2005a) and were downloaded in March 2006. OECD data on general 
government total outlays are from the Economic Outlook database (OECD 2005b) and 
were downloaded in February 2006. IMF IFS data use item 82 and are for the budgetary 
central government or the consolidated central government and were downloaded in 
February 2006. IMF GFS data are for consolidated central government and consolidated 
general government respectively, reported on an accrual basis, and were downloaded in 
April 2006. Eurostat data are for total general government and were downloaded from 
the New Cronos database in April 2006. See data appendix for further details.
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Moreover, the quality of data can vary greatly between different sources. For 
instance, there are some erratic movements in the IFS data due to breaks in 
analytic comparability. Again using Belgium, the expenditure to GDP figure 
calculated from IFS data is 45.7 per cent for 1998, which drops to 18.2 per cent in 
the following year. The notes for the IFS government finance items acknowledge 
that these data are not consistently reported.54 While this data source is very 
popular with some researchers (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003, Alt and Lassen 
2006) because it contains data for a relatively large number of countries, the 
extent of inconsistency is highly problematic.
Table 13: Pearson correlations between different expenditure data
GG Eurostat GG OECD GG GFS CG IFS CG OECD
GG OECD .96
GG GFS .85 .97
CG IFS .31 .43 .47
CG OECD .18 .27 .04 .79
CG GFS .43 .67 .80 .67 .32
Notes: Based on data in Table 12.
In contrast to data on central government, general government data from different 
sources are highly correlated. Table 13 indicates correlation coefficients of around 
.9 for available general government spending data in this sample. The impact of 
different reporting standards is by far not as substantial compared with central 
government data, which makes it less likely that the choice of data source will
54 For some countries, the IFS data cover the budgetary central government and for others the 
consolidated central government, but the latter ‘may not necessarily include all existing 
extrabudgetary units.’ Moreover, while some countries report specifically for IFS, data for others 
are as reported for GFS or from ‘unpublished worksheets and are therefore not attributed to a 
specific source’ (IMF 2005b: XX).
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affect empirical results. Moreover, there is a theoretical reason for preferring 
general to central government data. Because revenue raising powers tend to be 
more centralised than expenditure responsibilities, decentralised systems to 
varying degrees suffer from a vertical fiscal imbalance or ‘fiscal gap’ that has to 
be filled with intergovernmental transfers and grants, usually from the central 
government (Ter-Minassian 1997, Shah 1994). Therefore, even when spending is 
accounted for at the subnational level, it is likely that at least a share of it flows 
via the central government budget and is voted by the national parliament (Perotti 
and Kontopoulos 2002: 211). As a result, central and subnational budgets cannot 
be neatly separated, and they are intimately connected in producing fiscal 
outcomes (Quigley and Rubinfeld 1996, Gilligan and Matsusaka 2001: 78). It is 
questionable to what extent a simple federalism dummy can account for the 
complexities of intergovernmental fiscal relations when using central government 
data (Pierson 1995: 473).
I dwell on this seemingly simple issue, because it is so fundamentally neglected in 
most of the literature in the common pool tradition. The choice of data coverage is 
often brushed aside in a sentence or two, and few empirical analyses explicitly test 
whether their results hold with both central and general government data. One 
noteworthy and laudable exception is the work by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002: 
211) on the effects of political fragmentation on fiscal policy, in which the authors 
succinctly summarise the case for general government data:
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[S]everal types of spending, like certain transfers to households or certain purchases of 
goods and services, are often mandated by the central government although they are 
formally recorded as local government spending. In addition, what is formally recorded 
as local revenues is often really only shared central government revenues. Finally, grants 
and revenues transferred from the central government can determine the level of local 
spending if local governments cannot run high fiscal imbalances.
Overall, this discussion provides strong reasons for using general government 
data, even if this means a loss in degrees of freedom due to lower data availability.
A related issue is the choice of appropriate indicators of ‘fiscal discipline’ or 
‘fiscal performance.’ As with the choice of data coverage, the literature offers a 
variety of possibilities. Von Hagen (1992) considers gross debt, net lending (i.e. 
the negative of the conventional deficit) and net lending excluding interest 
payments (i.e. the negative of the primary deficit). Alesina and colleagues (1999b: 
263) use only the primary deficit as the dependent variable, arguing that it is less 
sensitive to inflation-induced increases in interest payments than the conventional 
deficit, and that it is a better indicator of the fiscal stance of the current 
government, whose interest payments are largely determined by previously 
accumulated debt. Stein et al. (1998: 129-131) use the institutional data from 
Alesina and colleagues (1999b), but test the effect on several variables. 
Interestingly, they find no association between budget institutions and government 
size, but report the quantitatively strongest and most significant impact when 
using the primary balance. Of the other papers reviewed in the first section, Heller
(1997) uses conventional deficits, while Crain and Muris (1995) use the logarithm
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of state revenues and expenditures per capita. Apparently, there is no agreement 
on what constitutes the most appropriate indicator of fiscal discipline.
The disagreement about appropriate fiscal variables for empirical testing cannot 
be explained with reference to differences in the underlying theoretical 
approaches. Formal models in the common pool tradition generate in the first 
instance predictions about relative levels of public spending (e.g. Von Hagen and 
Harden 1995, Hallerberg 2004: 22-28), whilst much of the empirical testing uses 
different fiscal indicators. Von Hagen (1992: 32) justifies the use of the deficit as 
the dependent variable by assuming at least partly non-Ricardian tax payers who 
shift some of the cost of today’s consumption to future generations. Still, the most 
direct test of the model presented by Von Hagen and Harden (1995) is to consider 
the impact of institutional arrangements on levels of public spending. Similarly 
inconsistent, Heller’s (1997) model makes predictions about spending levels, yet 
he uses deficits as the dependent variable for his empirical test. The study by 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002: 193) again represents a rare exception by pointing 
out that ‘often there is no theoretically compelling reason why political and 
procedural variables should affect the deficit, but certainly there are always 
reasons to expect them to affect expenditure.’ To align the empirical analysis with 
the underlying theory, the common pool resource problem, this chapter 
investigates the effect of institutional arrangements on general government 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP (multiplied by 100).
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In terms of control variables, I draw on Persson and Tabellini (2003: 39), who 
review a range of country characteristics that on the basis of theoretical or 
empirical work can be expected to influence the size of the public sector. 
Following Wagner’s Law, which suggests that the demand for government 
services is income elastic, I control for levels of economic development with the 
natural log of per capita income (in constant 2000 US$). The demographic 
structure of the population has implications for public spending and is accounted 
for with two variables: the share of the population between age 15 and 64, and the 
share of the population age 65 or above (multiplied by 100). Finally, Rodrik
(1998) argues that demand for social protection increases with trade openness, 
which is measured as the share of GDP of imports plus exports of goods and 
services (multiplied by 100).55 These data are from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2005).
551 omit several controls that Persson and Tabellini (2003) include in their basic model. First, they 
use central government data and control for fiscal decentralisation with a federalism dummy. Here, 
the dependent variable relates to general government. Second, they include a dummy to indicate 
OECD membership prior to 1993, excluding Turkey. I drop this dummy, since all except four 
countries in this sample (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and South Korea) are traditional 
OECD members. Its inclusion does not substantively affect the results. Finally, there is no need to 
control for the quality of democracy, as fiscal data for Turkey and Mexico are not available and 
the Freedom House scores for the remaining countries in this sample are very similar. Other 
control variables are possible, of course. For instance, Mueller and Stratmann (2003) explore the 
effect of electoral participation on the size of government. However, the work by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) has established a new baseline standard against which further work on the fiscal 
effects of institutions has to be measured (Acemoglu 2005).
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The question of how legislative institutions affect public spending levels calls for 
cross-sectional analysis. However, the small sample size restricts degrees of 
freedom. Moreover, it is possible that a relationship between variables is not 
stable across time. In the empirical analysis that follows, I rely mainly on cross- 
sectional data, but complement this with time-series cross-section analysis. Since 
institutional data are often time-invariant or rarely changing, such variables raise 
methodological issues in the context of fixed effects panel models. Unit fixed 
effects are collinear with time-invariant variables and ‘soak up most of the 
explanatory power’ of rarely changing variables (Beck 2001: 285). Random 
effects models on the other hand assume that unobserved effects are a random 
sample drawn from a large population (Baltagi 2005: 35). This is not tenable in 
macro-comparative research. Faced with this issue, one option is to discard unit 
fixed effects when investigating the impact of time-invariant institutional 
variables (e.g. Hallerberg and Marier 2004, Cheibub 2006). However, this 
introduces substantial omitted variable bias and forfeits the advantage of 
accounting for unit heterogeneity.
Plumper and Troeger (2007) suggest a three-step process that they call ‘fixed 
effects vector decomposition’ (FEVD) to estimate time-invariant as well as rarely 
changing variables in models with unit fixed effects, which performs better than 
other alternatives (Hausman-Taylor model, pooled OLS, and the random effects 
model).56 The first stage is to estimate the unit fixed effects with a model
56 For examples of applications, see Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007), Buckley and Schneider 
(2006), Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006), as well as Hansen and Hansen (2006).
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excluding the completely time-invariant explanatory variables. The second stage 
decomposes the unit fixed effect by regressing them onto the time-invariant 
variables excluded from stage one plus any rarely changing variables included in 
stage one, using OLS. The third stage estimates a pooled model with all 
explanatory variables as well as the unexplained part of the unit fixed effects, and 
calculates standard errors with adjusted degrees of freedom that account for the 
number of estimated unit effects in the first stage. This represents a refinement on 
previous two-step regression approaches to this problem, involving a panel 
regression of the fiscal indicator on the time-varying control variables plus 
country fixed effects as the first stage, and a second stage using cross-section 
regression in which the estimated country dummies are regressed onto the time- 
invariant explanatory variables of interest (e.g. Alesina et a l 1999b: 266, Perotti 
and Kontopoulos 2002: 215). The following section turns to the empirical analysis 
and reports results using these approaches.
6.3 Cross-sectional analysis
In this part, I systematically test subindex three by Alesina et a l (1996) and Von 
Hagen’s (1992) item two. My approach is index decomposition, as used for 
instance by Edin and Ohlsson (1991) to qualify Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) study 
of the effect of partisan variables on fiscal adjustment. This entails taking apart 
the indices to test the impact of each component separately. I start with a basic 
model for the 25 OECD countries for which there are data on both general
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government spending as well as the institutional variables of interest. This 
includes the controls for demographic structure, level of economic development, 
and trade openness. I use averages of the data over the 1999 to 2003 period.57 
Together, the socio-economic variables account for about half of the variation in 
general government expenditures in this sample (see column 1 in Table 14).
Table 14 reports the results with Von Hagen’s legislative variables. The 
coefficient for the standardised version of item two is large and significant at the 5 
per cent level (column 2). I proceed to test the effect of each component. The 
coefficients for the two variables associated with limitations on amendment 
powers are significant at the 5 per cent level or higher (columns 3 and 4), but not 
those of any other component variable (columns 5 to 7). Moreover, the 
coefficients for the last two components have the wrong sign. Component four 
(column 6) considers whether all expenditures are passed chapter-by-chapter, and 
the fifth component (column 7) looks at whether the process commences with a 
global vote on the size of the total budget. When each separate component is 
included simultaneously, none of them is significant (column 8). However, the 
amendment limits and offsetting dummies are jointly significant (F = 7.70, p = 
.005). This provides evidence that the results for item two are driven by one 
particular institutional feature, namely differences in the legislative powers to 
amend the budget proposed by the executive.
57 I also used alternative 1994 to 2003 averages, which did not affect the substantive results.
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Table 14: OLS estimates of Von Hagen’s variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Von Hagen item two -12.20
(5.13)**
Amendments limited -5.79
(2.33)**
-3.91
(4.74)
Amendments offsetting -8.17
(2.17)***
-4.82
(4.73)
Amendments cause fall -0.48
(3.01)
0.90
(3.75)
One vote on expenditure 2.38
(2.90)
1.30
(2.87)
Global vote 0.27
(2.11)
-1.06
(1.79)
Log of GDP per capita -2.63 -2.75 -2.62 -1.76 -2.65 -2.74 -2.59 -2.29
(2.21) (1.91) (1.68) (1.68) (2.30) (2.27) (2.20) (1.68)
Working age population share -1.56 -1.81 -1.44 -0.99 -1.59 -1.39 -1.55 -1.04
(0.75)** (0.72)** (0.63)** (0.58) (0.77)* (0.74)* (0.76)* (0.62)
Old age population share 1.72 1.72 1.48 2.11 1.73 1.82 1.72 1.87
(0.36)*** (0.29)*** (0.33)*** (0.30)*** (0.36)*** (0.40)*** (0.37)*** (0.53)***
Trade as share of GDP 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0,02)** (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 145.99 168.79 145.84 94.88 148.57 133.48 144.65 109.18
(67.32)** (63.84)** (56.24)** (53.86)* (70.05)** (65.00)* (67.82)** (53.79)*
Observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.59 0.64 0.67 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.63
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for all models is general 
government total outlays as a percentage of GDP multiplied by 100 (OECD 2005b). The dependent variable and all economic 
control variables are averaged over the 1999 to 2003 period. All institutional variables are standardised to range between zero and 
one. See text and data appendix for further details.
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Table 15 repeats this exercise with the standardised version of Alesina et al.'s 
(1996) subindex three. The coefficient for subindex three is large and significant 
at the 5 per cent level, and it has the predicted sign (column 1). Tested separately, 
the coefficient for the amendment powers variable has the predicted sign and is 
significant at the 5 per cent level (column 2). In contrast, the coefficient for the 
reversionary budget variable is not significant, although it has the predicted sign 
(column 3). When both components are included simultaneously, only the 
coefficient for amendment powers achieves statistical significance at the 10 per 
cent level (column 4). Here again, there is evidence that one particular component 
drives the results. Moreover, as in the reanalysis of Von Hagen’s item two, it is 
the variable associated with the amendment powers of the legislature that is 
significant, and the coefficient also has a similar size. This provides reassurance 
that the result that this variable affects levels of public spending is not due simply 
to a particular operationalisation. This finding is of interest in the light of recent 
contributions that attribute significant importance to both variables, but fail to 
distinguish their impact in empirical analyses (Hallerberg and Marier 2004, 
Cheibub 2006).
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Table 15: OLS estimates of Alesina’s variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alesina subindex three -9.29
(4.03)**
Amendment restrictions -5.38 -5.03
(2.44)** (2.42)*
Reversionary budget -6.41 -3.15
(5.40) (4.45)
Log o f GDP per capita -2.87 -2.56 -3.04 -2.77
(1.67) (1.73) (2.21) (1.75)
Working age population share -1.72 -1.51 -1.84 -1.65
(0.64)** (0.65)** (0.73)** (0.63)**
Old age population share 1.45 1.44 1.67 1.44
(0.31)*** (0.35)*** (0.32)*** (0.34)***
Trade as share of GDP 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 169.86 150.12 174.04 163.63
(56.08)*** (56.82)** (67.81)** (55.60)***
Observations 
Adjusted R-squared
25
0.62
25
0.61
25
0.51
25
0.60
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable for all models is general government total outlays as a percentage 
of GDP multiplied by 100 (OECD 2005b). The dependent variable and all economic 
control variables are averaged over the 1999 to 2003 period. All institutional variables 
are standardised to range between zero and one. See text and data appendix for further 
details.
I proceed to assess specific components of the standardised index of legislative 
budget institutions. The results are reported in Table 16. I only test the variables 
where I have a theoretical reason to predict an effect, or for which other authors 
predict an effect. More specifically, I test the powers and reversion variables. I 
also use components of the two composite items measuring executive flexibility 
and committee structure, which are predicted to affect the level of public 
spending: a dummy indicating that the executive can withhold non-entitlement 
funds as well as a dummy indicating that a legislature uses a budget committee to 
scrutinise spending.
The overall index has no significant effect, but this is hardly surprising, given that 
only a few of its variables are predicted to affect public spending (column 1).
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Disaggregation again confirms the findings from the previous two sets of 
regressions. The results indicate a negative effect of restrictions on the powers of 
the legislature to amend the budget proposed by the executive (column 2), but 
none of the other institutional hypotheses are confirmed (columns 3 to 5). Of 
particular interest is the reversionary budget, which is included in the index by 
Alesina and colleagues (1996) and has recently been discussed in several 
important contributions to the field (Hallerberg and Marier 2004, Cheibub 2006). 
I find that this variable has no significant effect on public spending, as my theory 
suggests (column 3). Moreover, this finding does not appear to be an artefact of a 
particular coding scheme, since the different operationalisation proposed by 
Alesina et al. (1996) yielded a similar result.
Table 16 also reports results for the committee hypothesis by Crain and Muris 
(1995) and Heller’s (1997) claim about the fiscal effect of bicameralism. The 
coefficient for the budget committee dummy has the wrong sign and is not 
significant (column 5). However, only four legislatures in this sample (Australia, 
Canada, Netherlands, and the UK) do not use a specialised budget committee 
during the approval stage of the budget, and all of these except in the Netherlands 
have severely restricted powers of amendment. Hence, these data provide a poor 
test for the committee hypothesis, and the result should not be over-interpreted. 
With regard to the budgetary unicameralism dummy, the coefficient has the 
wrong sign and is far from significant (column 6). I also used a more permissive 
version of this variable, where systems with second chambers that have powers 
over taxation but not expenditure (Germany) are also counted as bicameral, but
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this did not substantively affect the result. There is no evidence in these data to 
support Heller’s (1997) theory about the pro-spending bias of bicameralism. 
However, the limited occurrence of budgetary bicameralism in the sample 
(Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and the US) again cautions against reading too 
much into this finding.
Finally, Table 16 estimates the effect of all of the five separate institutional 
features at the same time (column 7). The coefficient for the powers variable 
becomes even larger and is highly significant. Interestingly, the reversion and 
budgetary unicameralism variables come relatively close to significance at the 10 
per cent level, but with the wrong sign, although the caveat above applies here, 
too. The coefficient for the withhold dummy retains the correct sign, but it is far 
from significant. Overall, these results provide further evidence that what really 
matters for fiscal performance are the amendment powers of the legislature.
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Table 16: OLS estimates of other variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wehner index -7.24
(6.67)
Powers -6.84
(2.60)**
-8.31
(2.77)***
Reversion 0.76
(2.72)
2.77
(1.93)
Withhold -2.27
(2.16)
-0.85
(2.07)
Budget committee 1.43
(2.80)
-1.85
(3.61)
Budgetary unicameralism 1.11
(1.85)
4.26
(2.72)
Log of GDP per capita -3.27 -2.28 -2.54 -3.13 -2.41 -2.50 -1.87
(2.22) (1.67) (2.37) (2.34) (2.52) (2.38) (1.81)
Working age population share -1.72 -1.42 -1.51 -1.62 -1.53 -1.53 -1.17
(0.76)** (0.61)** (0.76)* (0.80)* (0.78)* (0.78)* (0.66)*
Old age population share 1.67 1.55 1.76 1.76 1.69 1.71 1.65
(0.37)*** (0.32)*** (0.32)*** (0.40)*** (0.38)*** (0.36)*** (0.36)***
Trade as share of GDP 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)* (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Constant 168.05 138.84 141.18 154.82 141.14 142.32 115.36
(70.91)** (53.20)** (70.45)* (72.77)** (73.02)* (71.94)* (56.51)*
Observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.63 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.59
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for all models is general government 
total outlays as a percentage of GDP multiplied by 100 (OECD 2005b). The dependent variable and all economic control variables are 
averaged over the 1999 to 2003 period. All institutional variables are standardised to range between zero and one. See text and data appendix 
for further details.
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The results so far consistently indicate that variously defined indicators of 
legislative powers of amendment are the only legislative variable with a 
significant impact on public spending. I conduct some robustness checks with the 
simplest indicator, Von Hagen’s (1992) dummy for limits on amendment powers. 
Table 17 confirms that the results are very robust. In the first column I add two 
additional institutional variables identified by Persson and Tabellini (2003) as 
significant determinants of the size of government, i.e. presidentialism and a 
plurality rule electoral system.58 I then make the sample more homogenous, first 
by excluding the two presidential systems, i.e. the US and South Korea (column 
2), and second by restricting the sample to OECD members that joined the 
organisation prior to 1993, which means dropping the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and South Korea (column 3). The results in column 4 are for an 
alternative indicator of the size of government, i.e. total revenues as a percentage 
of GDP (multiplied by 100). The coefficient for the amendment powers dummy 
remains significant throughout.
One of the most serious criticisms levelled at institutionalist research relates to the 
possibility of reverse causality. In other words, fiscal policy outcomes might 
affect a country’s choice of budget institutions. While this problem is 
acknowledged in the literature, Fabrizio and Mody (2006: 14) highlight that the 
econometric challenge of ‘identifying the exogenous component of fiscal
58 Japan and New Zealand carried out reforms in 1994 and 1996 respectively that entailed a move 
from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system (Persson and Tabellini 2003: 83) and are coded as 
majoritarian to account for the long term effect of the previous electoral system. Changing the 
coding for these two countries to reflect the new system does not substantively affect the results.
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institutions is hard’ and ‘a hurdle that no one has yet crossed.’ As an additional 
robustness check, I draw on the analysis in chapter five and use a dummy variable 
indicating former UK colonies (with independence in the past 150 years; see 
footnote 39) as an instrument, which assumes that this variable does not influence 
fiscal policy except through its effect on institutional arrangements.59 With 
instrumental-variables estimation, the significance of the coefficient for limits on 
amendment powers is exactly at the 10 per cent level (column 5).
In the final three columns of Table 17, I use alternative data sources for the 
dependent variable, which also affects the sample characteristics (see Table 12). 
With Eurostat data, the sample is reduced to 20 cases, all of them parliamentary 
systems. With these data, the size of the coefficient for limits on amendment 
powers is very similar to the previous estimates, and it is significant at the 10 per 
cent level (column 6). When switching to GFS data supplied by the IMF, the 
coefficient retains the correct sign, but its size drops and it is no longer significant 
(column 7). This reflects the increasing heterogeneity of the sample, which now 
includes several Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia and Chile) as well 
as Israel, but excludes several cases for which the OECD supplies data (Canada, 
Greece, Ireland and South Korea). Once I account for increased sample 
heterogeneity by controlling for different levels of democracy with the Freedom 
House scores and by reintroducing the presidentialism dummy, the coefficient of 
interest is again very similar to the previous estimates and significant at the 5 per
59 See Acemoglu (2005) for a detailed discussion of problems associated with instrumental 
variables in the comparative political economy literature.
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cent level. These results provide assurance that the significance of amendment 
powers for fiscal policy is not dependent on a particular data source.
Overall, these cross-sectional results are very robust and suggest that, in the 
advanced industrialised democracies, restrictions on parliamentary powers to 
amend budgets constrain the size of the overall public sector relative to GDP by 
about 5 percentage points compared with systems that do not limit these powers.
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Table 17: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Amendments limited -6.96 -7.24 -5.63 -6.13 -5.53 -5.72 -2.53 -5.91
(2.20)*** (2.20)*** (2.53)** (3.02)* (3.20) (2.99)* (3.05) (2.78)**
President -6.76
(4.51)
-12.45
(3.75)***
Plurality rule 1.51
(2.84)
Freedom 4.10
(4.82)
Log of GDP per capita -2.15 -2.38 -2.08 0.56 -2.62 -3.00 3.85 4.15
(1.79) (1.82) (2.94) (2.27) (1.69) (2.43) (1.83)** (2.40)
Working age population share -1.02 -1.56 -1.65 -2.08 -1.44 -0.96 -1.45 -1.36
(0.73) (0.87)* (0.98) (0.93)** (0.60)** (1.20) (0.67)** (0.58)**
Old age population share 1.12 1.18 1.61 0.82 1.49 1.07 1.27 0.69
(0.37)*** (0.37)*** (0.47)*** (0.55) (0.33)*** (0.54)* (0.54)** (0.61)
Trade as share of GDP 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)* (0.04)
Constant 120.64 158.84 152.15 166.21 145.84 127.25 76.52 77.11
(59.67)* (70.76)** (75.02)* (82.93)* (56.20)** (100.28) (33.20)** (44.45)*
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Exp. Exp. Exp. Rev. Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp.
Source of fiscal data OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD Eurostat GFS GFS
Observations 25 23“ 21b 25 25 20 26 26
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.64 0.18 0.61 0.71
Notes: * p < . 1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is general government expenditure (Exp.) as a percentage 
of GDP multiplied by 100, except in column 4, where it is revenues (Rev.). See Table 12 for full details on the sources of fiscal data and the countries for which 
these are available. The dependent variable and all economic control variables are averaged over the 1999 to 2003 period. All institutional variables are 
dummies. See text and data appendix for further details. The instrumented variable in column 5 is Von Hagen’s amendment limits dummy; in addition to the 
four standard controls for the second stage the first stage also includes the UK colony dummy. * Sample restricted to countries with parliamentary systems of 
government. b Sample restricted to OECD members before 1993.
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6.4 Time-series cross-section analysis
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive dataset that documents how all of the 
legislative institutions of interest have evolved over a longer period of time. On 
the other hand, parliamentary powers of amendment over the budget are highly 
time-invariant. Some countries did reform provisions governing amendment 
powers, such as France in 2001 (Chabert 2001) and New Zealand in 1996 (Lienert 
and Jung 2005: 330), but a fundamental switch from restricted to unrestricted 
powers of amendment or vice versa is very rare.60 I do not address the possibility 
of reverse causality here. However, since constitutional provisions on amendment 
powers are costly to change, it is reasonable to argue that they can be treated as 
‘exogenous’ in the short to medium run (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 4). In the 
following chapter, I use a case study approach to investigate the dynamics of 
reform and reconsider the endogeneity challenge.
To exploit the variation of the non-institutional variables in the time dimension, I 
construct a panel dataset covering the period 1970 to 2003, for which the OECD 
publishes fiscal data (OECD 2005b). As in the cross-sectional analysis, there are
60 In their comprehensive survey of budget reform in Latin American countries, File and 
Scartascini.(2006: 14) find that legislative powers ‘are practically unchanged since the return of 
democracy.’ However, fundamental changes to parliamentary powers have occurred in some 
countries outside the sample used in this thesis. For instance, there were no restrictions in Poland 
until 1998, but article 220(1) of the constitution now prohibits amendments that result in a higher 
deficit than in the executive draft budget. Romania introduced similar restrictions with article 
17(3) of the 2002 Law on Public Finance (Ylaoutinen 2004).
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no data for Mexico or Turkey, and a further three countries are omitted because 
they did not respond to the 2003 survey of budget procedures (Luxembourg, 
Poland and Switzerland). I thus maintain the sample of 25 cases used for the 
cross-sectional analysis. The resulting panel is unbalanced. Fiscal data for New 
Zealand are only available as from 1985. I exclude years prior to democratisation 
for countries that made a transition from authoritarian rule during the sample 
period, i.e. South Korea (1988), Portugal (1977), Greece (1975), and Spain 
(1978). The data series for the transition countries in the sample start later, i.e. for 
Hungary in 1991 and for the successor states of Czechoslovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, in 1993 and 1994 respectively. The socio-economic data 
are readily available for the entire period (World Bank 2005). The variable of 
interest is the time-invariant dummy indicating limits on amendment powers. 
Several other institutional variables may affect spending levels and are either 
time-invariant or rarely changing. The sample contains no case that switched from 
pure presidentialism to other forms of government or vice versa. Only three 
countries implemented relevant reforms of their electoral systems during the 
sample period. Japan (1994) and New Zealand (1996) moved away from plurality 
rule and introduced mixed systems, while France briefly abandoned plurality rule 
during 1985 and 1986 (Persson and Tabellini 2003: 83-88).61
61 There were, o f course, other reforms of electoral systems. For instance, Italy used proportional 
representation in the post-war period until changes triggered by a 1993 referendum introduced a 
mixed system combining proportionality and plurality. Proportional representation was 
reintroduced in 2005. The plurality rule dummy is not sensitive to such changes.
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Figure 8: Public spending in 25 OECD countries, 1970 to 2003
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Figure 9: Public spending in 25 OECD countries, 1970 to 2003, by country
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Figure 8 provides a first impression of the overall shape of the data. It depicts the 
trend in general government spending against GDP over the sample period. Figure 
8 includes separate means for countries with and without restrictions on legislative 
powers to amend the budget, which show that countries with restrictions have 
lower spending ratios throughout the sample period.62 Until the mid-1980s, there 
is an overall upward trend in spending, but from the mid-1980s, there is more 
erratic movement in these data. Figure 9 plots the development of the expenditure 
to GDP ratio over the sample period for each country separately. The country 
plots confirm the impression from the pooled scatter plot. Most countries’ 
expenditure ratios increase in the first half of the sample period, but then the 
patterns become more diverse. For instance, between 1982 and 2000 Ireland 
drastically cut its expenditure ratio from almost 58 to less than 32 per cent of 
GDP. Iceland, on the other hand, added 5 percentage points over the same period, 
increasing its ratio from about 37 to 42 per cent of GDP. Other countries 
stabilised their ratios from the 1980s onwards, for instance Austria.
I first estimate the effect of limiting parliamentary amendment powers with a 
model that excludes unit fixed effects.63 To mitigate omitted variable bias, I
62 The dip in mean spending in the late 1980s for countries with restrictions is emphasised by the 
inclusion of South Korea, which has a very low expenditure ratio, but not entirely attributable to it.
63 The Hausman specification test can be used to test the null hypothesis that the fixed and random 
effects estimators do not differ substantially (Gujarati 2003: 651, Baltagi 2005: 19). Using the 
basic model, i.e. including only the four socio-economic controls and the lagged dependent 
variable, this yields a test statistic of 54.53 with p < .0001, so I reject the null hypothesis. Random 
effects are not appropriate.
187
include various time-invariant or hardly changing variables, in particular the 
dummies for OECD membership prior to 1993, former UK colonies, 
presidentialism and plurality rule. I also control for a possible Maastricht effect in 
the run-up and during monetary union by including a dummy variable (coded 1 = 
1992 or later, 0 = otherwise) for the twelve members of the Euro area, the so- 
called EU12.64 Since the prospect of EU membership in Eastern Europe may have 
induced fiscal tightening to meet convergence criteria, I also include a dummy to 
indicate former communist countries or their successor entities. Here, I adopt the 
Beck and Katz (1995) standard, viz. a lagged dependent variable on the right hand 
side to mitigate autocorrelation and panel corrected standard errors. In substantive 
terms, the lagged dependent variable accounts for the stickiness of spending by 
capturing the influence of past expenditures on annual levels (Davis et al. 1966).
Table 18 presents the results. I start with estimates for the entire sample period 
(1971 to 2003) using OLS with year dummies and a lagged dependent variable 
(column 1). The coefficient for the amendment dummy has the predicted sign and 
is significant at the 5 per cent level. I then estimate the same model using only the
64 The EU12 are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (since 2001), Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. I experimented with different versions of this 
variable. First, I used a dummy for the EU15, i.e. the EU12 plus Denmark, Sweden and the UK. 
Second, following Volkerink and De Haan (2001: 236), I used different years from which onwards 
the EU12 dummy is set equal to one. Only with a start date of 1997 or 1998 is the coefficient both 
negative and significant. However, since this did not substantively affect the coefficients for the 
variable of interest, I do not report these results here.
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data for the second half of the sample period (1988 to 2003).65 The coefficient of 
interest is large, has the predicted sign, and is significant at the 1 per cent level 
(column 2). The FEVD specification suggests that limitations on amendment 
powers account for a difference in general government expenditure of about 3 per 
cent of GDP over the entire sample period (column 3). In the final column, I again 
restrict the sample period to the second half of the sample. The effect on general 
government expenditure is estimated to represent more than 5 per cent of GDP 
(column 4), which is similar to the results obtained in the cross-sectional analysis. 
The evidence is mutually reinforcing.
65 Restricting the time period to the first half of the full sample (1971-1987) results in the loss of 
four cases. Moreover, three of the explanatory variables turn into constants, i.e. the dummies for 
the EU12, former communist countries, and OECD members prior to 1993. This limits 
comparability, so these estimates are not reported.
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Table 18: Time-series cross-section analysis, 1971 to 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amendments limited -0.39 -0.84 -2.96 -5.62
(0.19)** (0.30)*** (0.19)*** (0.24)***
EU12 -0.10 0.08 0.19 -0.02
(0.15) (0.16) (0.79) (0.30)
President -0.83 -1.59 -3.65 -6.15
(0.24)*** (0.37)*** (0.75)*** (0.29)***
Plurality rule -0.24 -0.03 -0.07 0.37
(0.18) (0.21) (0.71) (0.30)
Former UK colony -0.01 -0.25 1.16 3.09
(0.25) (0.42) (0.69)* (0.30)***
Former communist country -1.61 -1.82 -3.64 -5.35
(1.01) (1.13) (0.67)*** (0.29)***
OECD member before 1993 -1.13 -1.78 -0.59 -1.82
(0.85) (1.21) (0.57) (0.31)***
Log of GDP per capita -0.02 0.07 -2.53 -3.32
(0.21) (0.31) (1.06)** (1.37)**
Working age population share -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.39
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)***
Old age population share 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.60
(0.05)*** (0.08)* (0.07)** (0.13)***
Trade as share of GDP -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07
(0.00)* (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Lagged dependent variable 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.63
(0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Constant 4.38 9.57 33.85 23.67
(2.59)* (4.25)** (0.74)*** (0.86)***
Method OLS OLS FEVD FEVD
Country dummies No No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 25 25 25 25
Years 1971-2003 1988-2003 1971-2003 1988-2003
Observations 703 382 703 382
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP multiplied by 
100 (OECD 2005b). The second stage of FEVD includes the dummies for amendment limits, 
presidentialism, plurality rule, former UK colony, former communist country and OECD 
membership prior to 1993.
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Conclusions
There is a growing interest in the fiscal effects of institutional variables. Several 
findings in this chapter add to this research. In terms of variables and data, the 
chapter serves as a reminder that this research agenda would benefit from paying 
more careful attention to the dependent variable. The choice of fiscal indicator 
should be closely linked to theoretical work. Similarly, the choice of data source 
should consider the implications of different classifications and reporting 
standards. In terms of methods, fixed effects vector decomposition appears to be a 
useful complement to standard cross-section and panel analysis in a context where 
the variables of interest are rarely changing or time-invariant, which is common in 
institutionalist research.
In substantive terms, this analysis suggests that we should not rush to accept the 
superiority of complex composite indices over more simple and transparent 
variables when investigating institutional determinants of fiscal policy. This 
chapter is the first to directly compare different indices of legislative budget 
power on the basis of a common dataset. The conclusion is that the empirical 
performance of composite measures of legislative power is driven by one 
particular variable, i.e. the power of the legislature to amend the budget (see Table 
19). Other budget institutions that are often combined into indices in the fiscal 
institutionalist literature do not appear to significantly affect the size of the public 
sector. A larger sample of countries would allow for more fine-grained assessment
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of the fiscal impact of various institutional features. However, the finding that 
amendment powers have the most explanatory power amongst a range of 
legislative institutions discussed in the literature is very robust and unlikely to be 
affected. These findings confirm the analysis in chapter three with regard to the 
impact of amendment powers on fiscal policy. The withholding variable has the 
expected sign, but the coefficient falls short of conventional levels of statistical 
significance. This could be due to the crudeness of this variable, in the sense that 
it does not measure the extent to which impoundment is allowed, or the quality of 
the data. This deserves further attention in follow-up research, and highlights the 
desirability of more fine-grained and high quality data. The overall conclusion of 
chapter three is confirmed that many variables affect the budgetary power of the 
legislature, but only very few have a clear-cut impact on fiscal policy. It is, 
however, important not to prematurely reject the possibility that institutional 
features other than amendment limits can enhance fiscal discipline in legislative 
decision-making, which is one reason why chapter seven revisits several of the 
mechanisms discussed here and presents a more detailed assessment of them.
Finally, these results offer some intriguing possibilities for further research, for 
example in connection with work on constitutional economics. The design of the 
power of the purse is a basic constitutional choice that fundamentally affects the 
role of the legislature in public finance. Data for this variable can be collected 
relatively easily for a large number of countries from existing surveys and 
constitutional documents, thus making it a strong candidate for inclusion in 
further work on the economic effects of constitutions. Recent work by Cheibub
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(2006) goes into this direction, and qualifies regime effects of public spending 
with a more fine-grained understanding of executive control over fiscal policy. 
Another possibility for taking this research forward is to consider possible 
interactions of amendment powers with time-varying measures of political 
fragmentation in the legislature, which other research suggests impacts on fiscal 
policy outcomes (e.g. Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002, Volkerink and De Haan 
2001). Follow-up research should explore these interactions more 
comprehensively, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Table 19: Summary of findings relating to institutional hypotheses
Variable Expected sign Actual sign Significant
Von Hagen index - - Yes
Amendments limited ■ , - Yes
Amendments offsetting - - Yes
Amendments cause fall - +/- No
One vote on expenditure 7 + No
Global vote 7 +/- No
Alesina index - - Yes
Amendment powers - - Yes
Reversionary budget 7 - No
Wehner index ? - No
Powers - - Yes
Reversion ? + No
Withhold - - No
Budget committee - +/- No
Budgetary unicameralism - + No
N o t e s :  Expected signs for the Wehner index and its components refer to standardised versions. 
See text and Data Appendix for further details. Here, only statistically significant variables are 
indicated with grey shading.
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7 Budget reform and legislative control in Sweden
As highlighted at several points in this thesis, legislatures have a poor reputation 
in much of the literature on public finance. In Niskanen’s (1971) classic public 
choice model the legislative sponsor is too powerless to act as an effective check 
on budget-maximising bureaucrats, while the literature on budget institutions 
regards constitutionally unfettered legislatures as fiscally dangerous (Kirchgassner 
2001). In the case of Sweden prior to its budget reforms in the mid-1990s the 
Riksdag, the country’s unicameral Parliament, was widely blamed for contributing 
to poor fiscal performance. Commentators describe the role of the Riksdag in the 
old system as ‘undisciplined’ (Blondal 2001: 37). At the time, the need for change 
was strongly felt among parliamentarians and executive officials. Ensuing reform 
efforts culminated in the introduction of a new budget process in 1996 that also 
fundamentally reorganised the way the Riksdag deals with the state budget 
(Molander 1999 and 2001).
The Swedish budget reforms are now approaching a ten-year anniversary and 
hence can be subject to an interim assessment. While there are good overviews of 
the Swedish reforms (Molander 1999, Blondal 2001, Hallerberg 2004: 153-168), 
this study is the first to provide a more detailed assessment of the impact of the 
reforms on the budgetary role of the Riksdag. It focuses in particular on whether 
there is a trade-off between legislative control and fiscal discipline, i.e. the ability 
to contain public spending within affordable totals. This chapter further makes a
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contribution to a neglected area of inquiry, namely the impact of legislative 
organisation on fiscal policy. Fiscal institutionalists typically consider the effects 
of only a limited set of legislative variables, notably powers to amend the budget. 
They argue that restrictions on parliamentary amendment powers are conducive to 
fiscal discipline (Von Hagen 1992, Alesina et al. 1999). On the other hand, the 
effect of legislative organisation has not been widely studied. An exception is the 
work of Crain and Muris (1995) on committee structures and fiscal policy. The 
Swedish reforms did not alter Parliament’s formal powers over the budget, which 
remain unconstrained, but they reengineered the process by which the Riksdag 
makes budgetary choices. This allows us to study the impact of a change in 
institutional arrangements on legislative budgeting while holding constant a 
number of other factors, including the main institutional determinant of fiscal 
performance identified in the previous chapter.
The case study approach has advantages and disadvantages. Cross-national
quantitative research is often better suited to produce results that can be
generalised.66 However, in this context the case study approach has several strong
advantages. First, Sweden stands out among Western European countries in the
extent to which it has reengineered the budget process and improved its public
finances in the past decade (Hallerberg 2004). The reforms resemble a natural
experiment ‘where a single unit undergoes unmanipulated change through time
66 I deliberately eschew referring to ‘the case study method’, since it is possible to distinguish 
several distinct methods using case studies. Notably, Gerring (2005: 343) distinguishes three case 
study methods, each combining temporal and spatial variation in a distinct way to assess 
covariational evidence.
195
that approximates a true experiment’ (Gerring 2004: 350, see also Gerring 2007: 
245). This makes Sweden a particularly suitable country for studying how 
institutional engineering may improve fiscal performance. Second, the empirical 
efforts of fiscal institutionalists focus on quantitative comparative research, where 
institutions are largely treated as exogenous (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 4). This 
applies more broadly to the empirical research on the policy effect of political 
institutions (Congleton and Swedenborg 2006b: 17, Acemoglu 2005: 1033, March 
and Olsen 1984: 740). Case studies are better suited to explore exact causal 
mechanisms and to tackle the problem of institutional endogeneity that bedevils 
the fiscal institutionalist research programme (Poterba 1996: 10). Third, case 
studies can complement quantitative comparative research when they use more 
precise data than are available for larger samples of countries (Lieberman 2005: 
440-441), as in part three of this chapter. Moreover, in this chapter we reconsider 
the issues of sequencing and committee centralisation during the legislative stage, 
which could not be fully investigated with the quantitative data available for the 
analysis in the previous chapter. Finally, the case study method is far better suited 
for exploring the tension between fiscal discipline and legislative control, since an 
assessment of the latter requires a more fine-grained, qualitative approach. Hence, 
this chapter complements the cross-national and quantitative analysis carried out 
thus far with an in-depth study of a particularly relevant case.
It is worth expanding on the issue of case selection, beyond the point that the 
extent of reform makes Sweden a prime candidate. The key here is how case 
studies in conjunction with cross-case evidence can yield a superior research
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design than either stand-alone case studies, which are open to accusations of
sample bias, and large-N evidence, which often insufficiently elucidates exact
causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007). To reap the benefits of combining methods,
Lieberman (2005) outlines a ‘nested analysis’ approach in which small-N analysis
follows large-N, typically but not necessarily quantitative, analysis. In this
framework, small-N analysis in the form of case study research can help to
confirm theory through additional evidence, or to build new theory through an
inductive process. The theory-building approach is suitable when model-testing
with large-N analysis yielded unconvincing results, whereas the model-testing
approach is used when the large-N analysis yielded results that are deemed
satisfactory. Lieberman posits that this distinction should inform case selection.
Lieberman recommends ‘on-the-line’ selection for model-testing, which entails
picking cases based on different scores on the central hypothesised explanatory
variables. In contrast, theory-building small-N analysis should use a sample of
‘off-the-line’ cases, with different initial scores on the dependent variable.67 This
study of the Swedish reforms and their impact can be thought of as a version of
the latter. The previous chapter identified a single legislative variable as a central
determinant of fiscal performance, i.e. parliamentary powers to amend the budget,
while failing to reject the null hypothesis for a range of other variables. Sweden’s
fiscal performance improved markedly following its institutional reforms, whilst
the formal powers of its Parliament to increase, decrease or otherwise change the
67 The concept of ‘on’ and ‘off-the-line’ cases makes reference to a graph that plots predicted 
against actual scores of the dependent variables. On-the-line cases are those that fall onto or are 
close to the 45-degree line, which represents perfect prediction, whereas off-the-line cases are 
those that stray more substantively from the line (see Lieberman 2005: 445).
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budget were not affected. Holding this central variable constant, we can explore 
whether, which and how exactly institutional changes might have contributed 
towards Sweden’s fiscal turnaround.
Because case studies are both extensively used in social science research and at 
the same time often poorly defined, this concept has multiple meanings depending 
on author and approach. Gerring (2004: 342) defines a case study as ‘an intensive 
study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
units.’ With this definition, the study of a ‘unit’ at discrete points in time yields 
different ‘cases.’ This goes against the grain of the typical casual interpretation, 
which may refer to this chapter as presenting a single case study. However, 
Gerring (2004: 344) correctly points out that the N = 1 research design is ‘not 
logically feasible’, since it offers no covariation whatsoever with which to study 
causal relationships. In the absence of both spatial and temporal variation, causal 
inferences are impossible. More accurately, the before-and-after design in this 
chapter couples temporal variation with spatial non-variation to further explore 
the effects of legislative institutions on fiscal policy. The unit here is ‘Sweden’ 
and there are two cases that might be labelled ‘pre-reform’ and ‘post-reform.’
In terms of data, this analysis draws on official documents and a set of interviews 
conducted with senior budget officials in Stockholm during May 2005, who are 
cited under condition of anonymity. In addition, the chapter evaluates primary 
data on legislative amendment activity and its impact on public spending prior to 
and after the reforms, covering the period 1985 to 2005. I proceed as follows. In
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section one I consider sources of a legislative pro-spending bias in budgeting. 
Section two reviews Sweden’s pre-reform setting and the main elements of the 
reforms. The impact of the reforms on the budgetary role of the Riksdag is 
assessed in the third part. In the final section, I briefly discuss whether the reforms 
have been accompanied by a broader shift in parliamentary emphasis from ex ante 
influence to ex post scrutiny and accountability for performance. While this is to 
some extent a separate discussion, a comprehensive assessment of the state of 
legislative control of public finance has to go beyond the approval stage. The 
conclusion draws together broader implications.
7.1 Sources of a legislative pro-spending bias
This section considers sources of a pro-spending bias in legislative decision­
making and looks at suggested institutional solutions. The debate on the common 
pool resource problem in budgeting draws on the collective action literature 
(Olson 1965). Ostrom (1990) uses the term ‘common pool resources’ to refer to 
natural resources that are jointly used by a number of individuals. Such shared 
resources are threatened by overuse that would lead to their eventual destruction 
(Hardin 1968). The common pool resource problem can be understood as an n- 
person prisoners’ dilemma game. Although each individual acts rationally, the 
outcome is sub-optimal in social terms. This result can be improved by co­
operation that may emerge if the game is repeated.
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This basic idea has also been applied to budgetary decision-making (e.g. Strauch 
and Von Hagen 1999, Poterba and Von Hagen 1999). Here, public revenues 
constitute the common pool of resources. When the benefits of spending can be 
targeted at particular constituencies and costs distributed across a broader 
spectrum of taxpayers, this creates a bias away from economically efficient 
outcomes (Weingast et a l 1981). As a result, public spending is likely to be 
higher than when decision-makers internalise the full cost of their actions. The 
literature suggests that centralised or hierarchical procedures can mitigate 
tendencies to increase public spending (Von Hagen and Harden 1995). Notably, 
several studies conclude that limitations on legislative powers to amend the 
budget help to safeguard fiscal discipline (e.g. Von Hagen 1992, Alesina et al 
1999). As will be discussed in section two, the Swedish reforms did not affect the 
formal powers of the Riksdag to amend the budget, but they included a number of 
other institutional adjustments. Some of these are also discussed in the literature.
Another institutionalist hypothesis is that the size of budgets is influenced by the 
way the voting process is sequenced. Von Hagen (1992) initially suggested that 
fiscal discipline is enhanced when a vote on aggregate spending precedes 
allocational decisions. However, this is contradicted by the work of Ferejohn and 
Krehbiel (1987) who show that such a process may sometimes result in relatively 
large budgets. They assume, however, that the same group of legislators makes 
both the aggregate as well as allocational decisions. Subsequently, Von Hagen 
revised his initial claim and argued that it is not a reordering of the voting 
sequence that is decisive, as it has no impact on the share of the tax burden that
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actors consider, but rather the centralisation of decision-making (Hallerberg and 
Von Hagen 1997). Thus, the benefit of the two-step process depends crucially on 
who makes the first decision on aggregates. If this decision is delegated to a group 
of actors who are more likely to consider total costs than the legislature as a 
whole, fiscal discipline will be strengthened. However, Perotti and Kontopoulos 
(2002: 196) summarise, ‘if the same agents decide at both stages, by backward 
induction they will take into account the likely allocations in the second stage 
when setting the total budget first.’ Hence, delegation of the aggregate decision to 
a finance or budget committee, which can impose a hard budget constraint on 
various sectoral committees, should help to contain overall spending.
Despite Ferejohn and Krehbiel’s (1987) challenge to the conventional wisdom, 
many practitioners strongly believe in the effectiveness of a ‘top-down’ process, 
arguing that it forces politicians to acknowledge the implications of their decisions 
by making trade-offs more explicit (Molander 2001: 42). The empirical evidence 
is mixed. Helland (1999) presents tentative results for European countries that 
challenge Von Hagen’s initial intuition. However, based on data for Latin 
American countries, Alesina and colleagues (1999: 270) conclude that ‘a voting 
procedure in which the level of deficits and in some cases the size of spending 
come first leads to more fiscal discipline than the alternative procedure in which 
the budget balance is determined at the same time or after the discussion on 
composition.’ This debate is set to continue. What is often missing from empirical 
investigations into this issue, including the analysis in the preceding chapter, is a 
consideration of whether the two-step process is combined with a delegation of
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the aggregate decision to a group of actors with strong incentives to consider 
overall costs. In this chapter particular attention is paid to this issue.
Less well-known work has investigated the impact of legislative committee 
structures on fiscal policy. Crain and Muris (1995: 319) argue that ‘consolidating 
control within one committee is an institutional means to overcome the common 
pool problem; it establishes a mechanism to contain spending pressures.’ With a 
balkanised committee setting, where partial spending decisions are distributed 
across a number of different committees, no one committee is responsible for the 
overall level of expenditure, which encourages free-riding. Using state-level data 
from the US they present empirical evidence that the centralisation of spending 
decisions in a single committee restrains expenditures compared with systems 
where decisions are balkanised across different committees.
Figure 10: Committee structures for budgetary decision-making
To illustrate the argument put forward by Crain and Muris, Figure 10 presents 
stylised versions of the three main types of committee structures that parliaments 
in the industrialised democracies use for the budget approval process (see
a) Dispersed b) Hierarchical c) Exclusive
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2002: 164). 
In what I call the ‘dispersed’ model, depicted on the left hand side of Figure 10, 
the different sectoral committees (labelled SC) make separate spending decisions 
over the parts of the budget that fall under their jurisdiction. With sectoral 
committees I refer to legislative committees that have responsibility for a specific 
sector of government activity, such as health, education or defence. This is in 
contrast to some types of committees that have a government-wide remit, such as 
budget committees. In the absence of binding constraints, such as hard 
expenditure ceilings imposed by law or limitations on parliamentary amendment 
powers, the work by Crain and Muris suggests that the dispersed committee 
structure encourages spending increases.
Figure 10 also illustrates two possible institutional fixes for the common pool 
resource problem in the form of centralisation. The ‘hierarchical! model imposes a 
finance committee (labelled FC) at the centre of decision-making that has the 
power to determine a total expenditure ceiling as well as sectoral ceilings, which 
are binding for the sectoral committees. The latter still play a role in legislative 
budgeting, but in considering allocations within each sector they are forced to 
adhere to the ceilings established by the finance committee. A second solution is 
the ‘exclusive’ model, in which a finance committee is the sole budgetary 
decision-maker, and sectoral committees are excluded from the process. 
Following Crain and Muris, the latter two models introduce centralisation and 
therefore would be expected to contain the common pool resource problem in the 
legislative arena.
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The main alternative to the fiscal institutionalist approach emphasises partisan 
dynamics. Notably, several studies present evidence that minority government 
impacts on fiscal performance by delaying adjustment to economic shocks 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989, Edin and Ohlsson 1991, Alt and Lowry 1994). Other 
authors find that the design of the electoral system influences fiscal outcomes 
(Milesi-Ferretti et a l 2002, Persson and Tabellini 2003, Hallerberg and Marier 
2004). These contributions are important, but they are not particularly relevant for 
the present study, since these variables can essentially be treated as constants over 
the period under investigation, i.e. 1985 to 2005. Governments consisted of Social 
Democratic minority administrations, with the exception of the interval between 
1991 and 1994, when the party briefly lost power to a centre-right minority 
coalition. Similarly, the electoral system has been based on proportional 
representation, although there were some modifications (Bergman 2004: 205- 
206). Therefore, the focus of this study is firmly on the effect of the redesign of 
the budget process.
To conclude, the common pool resource problem in legislatures is potentially 
large and gives rise to a pro-spending bias in decision-making. The literature on 
budget institutions suggests that institutional devices can help to protect fiscal 
discipline, notably limitations on legislative powers to amend the budget. Another 
suggested solution is to sequence the legislative voting process so that a vote on 
aggregates precedes allocational decisions, but the effectiveness of this device for 
containing public spending is disputed. A third suggested solution is to centralise
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the committee structure for budget approval. In practice, as will be shown, the 
latter two may go hand in hand, which makes their separate effects impossible to 
disentangle. These last two mechanisms were important ingredients of the 
Swedish reforms, to which we now turn.
7.2 Reforming the Swedish budget process
This section reviews the institutional arrangements for legislative approval of the 
budget both prior to and after the reforms in the mid-1990s. The pre-reform 
arrangements were highly fragmented and lacked co-ordinating mechanisms. The 
government introduced parts of the budget in January. Over the following months, 
it would introduce further appropriations, sometimes comprising about a third of 
the overall budget, as they were being finalised. Appropriations were parcelled out 
to various sectoral committees of the Riksdag for consideration. The government 
typically tabled a supplementary budget to update its budget proposal at the end of 
April, based on revised macroeconomic forecasts. This kicked off a second round 
of scrutiny that again involved various sectoral committees with no overall co­
ordination. Parliamentary approval proceeded on an item-by-item basis and was 
typically concluded in June, before the beginning of the fiscal year in July. As a 
result, aggregate spending and the deficit were unpredictable until the very end of 
this process.
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The piecemeal structure of the pre-reform process was also reflected in balkanised 
committee authority. The various committees of the Riksdag have responsibility 
for both legislation as well as appropriations relating to their particular 
jurisdiction. A Finance Committee existed under the old system, but it had no 
special responsibility apart from scrutinising broad guidelines for budget policy. 
However, these did not contain any detailed expenditure targets. No single 
committee had responsibility for fiscal aggregates. Rather, sectoral committees 
deliberated without a hard budget constraint and consistently generated proposals 
to increase appropriations under their jurisdiction. As one official interviewed for 
this study put it, under the old system members of sectoral committees felt a 
‘loyalty’ towards their spending areas. Moreover, expenditure decisions were 
poorly co-ordinated with revenue measures that were mainly introduced in the 
autumn and dealt with in a separate Committee on Taxation. In short, prior to the 
reforms the committee process in the Riksdag was highly balkanised and 
resembled the ‘dispersed’ model in Figure 10.
The Secretariat of the Riksdag Finance Committee illustrates the outcome of 
budgetary decision-making under the old system with the hypothetical example 
that is reproduced in Table 20. For simplicity, it is assumed that the legislature 
consists of three parties with none of them having an outright majority of seats. 
Moreover, any two of them can form a coalition that commands a majority of 
seats. Table 20 details hypothetical proposals of the three parties and their net 
effect. Items that increase the deficit are given a negative sign, and vice versa. In 
this case, all parties have deficit-neutral preferences, i.e. the net effect of their
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proposed changes is zero. However, because each party represents different 
constituencies, they disagree about allocational decisions.
Table 20: Hypothetical budgetary outcomes with item-by-item voting
Government Party A Party B Outcome
Seat share 40% 35% 25%
Expenditure increase -1000 -1000 -500 -1000
Revenue increase 400 0 200 200
Saving one 300 300 300 300
Saving two 300 0 0 0
Saving three 0 700 0 0
Net change 0 0 0 -500
Source: Riksdag Finance Committee.
Given the preference constellation in Table 20, we can derive the outcome of a 
voting process that proceeds on an item-by-item basis. The first result is that the 
governing party and party A agree to increase expenditures. However, party B 
only consents to half the increase in revenues that the government proposes; the 
median wins. Third, all parties agree on the desirability of a saving on item one, 
but there is no majority for any further savings elsewhere in the budget. The 
overall outcome of the item-by-item voting process is given in the final column. 
Additional revenues and the saving on item one cover only half of the new 
expenditures. The net effect is an increase in overall spending and a higher deficit, 
even though all parties agree on the desirability of fiscal discipline.
Efforts to reform the budget system took several years and were propelled forward 
by economic crisis. In October 1990 the Riksdag established a commission to 
review parliamentary procedures. Soon after, the country was hit by a pronounced 
macroeconomic crisis. Figure 11 shows the dramatic deterioration of the general 
government financial balance. Against this background, the investigation greatly
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gained in urgency. In its deliberations, the commission also considered the 
unflattering findings of a study prepared by a Finance Ministry official (Molander 
1992). It assessed Sweden’s budget institutions on the basis of a framework 
developed in Von Hagen’s (1992) work on budgeting in the European 
Community, and found that Sweden had the second worst institutions among 
thirteen countries, only slightly ahead of Italy (see also Molander 1999: 202-208). 
The commission produced recommendations in June 1993.
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Figure 11: General government finances in Sweden, 1985 to 2005
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The process for adopting the recommendations was cumbersome. The proposed 
reforms to the budget process required adjustments to the Riksdag Act, which 
meant that they also had to be considered by the Committee on the Constitution. 
In Sweden, parliamentary procedures have special importance and are more 
entrenched than in many other countries. Provisions fall into two categories, main 
and supplementary. Changes to the former require approval twice to become 
effective; before an election and thereafter. The reforms entailed adjustments to 
several main provisions in chapters three and five of the Riksdag Act. The 
changes were submitted to Parliament in December 1993 and received approval. 
Following elections in September 1994, in which the Social Democrats regained 
power from the centre-right coalition, Parliament approved the amendments for 
the second time, thus paving the way for the implementation of the new process. 
The fact that approval was forthcoming despite a change of government 
underlines the broad consensus in favour of the reforms.
A range of reform measures were carried forward in the mid-1990s that are more 
fully discussed elsewhere (Molander 1999, Hallerberg 2004: 160-166). The 
budget was reorganised into 27 ‘expenditure areas’ that greatly systematised the 
presentation of appropriations (Blondal 2001: 57). Sweden also moved from a 
‘broken’ fiscal year, running from the beginning of July to the end of the 
following June, to the calendar year model (Tarschys 2002: 79). For transition 
purposes, the 1995/96 fiscal year was extended to cover 18 months. The reform of 
the budget process was further combined with an extension of the electoral term 
from three to four years. Moreover, Sweden got its first organic budget law
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(Government Commission on Budget Law 1996). The law greatly improved legal 
clarity and transparency, for instance by limiting off-budget expenditures and 
introducing gross budgeting. Open-ended appropriations used in particular for 
social benefit programmes were abolished. Finally, the restructuring of the budget 
process introduced top-down decision-making, involving the determination of 
aggregate limits prior to allocational decisions.
The move to top-down budgeting changed the sequence of the parliamentary 
process. Parliament would from now on vote first on budget totals before deciding 
individual appropriations. The first step was for a Spring Fiscal Policy Bill to 
propose aggregate expenditure ceilings for the upcoming budget plus two further 
years, as well as indicative ceilings or ‘frames’ for the allocations across the 27 
expenditure areas. This bill was tabled for the first time in April 1996, preceding 
the presentation of the draft budget by five months. The Finance Committee 
received responsibility for scrutiny of the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill. Following 
parliamentary approval of the bill in June the executive would proceed to finalise 
a draft budget to be presented to Parliament in September, more than three months 
before the beginning of the new fiscal year. In short, the reforms changed the 
parliamentary voting order by requiring an aggregate decision prior to allocational 
choices.68
It should be noted that the role of the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill has since been 
adjusted. Many parliamentarians apparently felt that the process in the second half
68 The relevant formal rules are contained in article 12 of chapter five of the Riksdag Act.
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of the 1990s was too cumbersome and amounted to making budgetary decisions 
twice a year (Finansdepartement 2000). In its report, the Parliamentary Review 
Commission (2001: 9) recommended a refocusing of parliamentary deliberations 
on the draft budget to the autumn. The Spring Fiscal Policy Bill now contains 
general guidelines for budget policy, but it no longer serves the purposes of fixing 
expenditure ceilings and indicating frames for the expenditure areas. The 
government now uses the Budget Bill in September to propose aggregate 
expenditure ceilings for the medium-term. The ceilings are approved in nominal 
terms and cover all state expenditure and public pensions, excluding interest 
payments. While ceilings were initially approved three years in advance, in recent 
years the setting of medium-term ceilings has been delayed, officially due to a 
pending evaluation of economic growth potential and possibly also to retain 
flexibility for the period following elections.
In conjunction with the two-step decision-making procedure, the reforms 
centralised the committee process along the lines of the ‘hierarchical’ model in 
Figure 10. The Finance Committee has responsibility for the aggregate spending 
total as well as frames for each of the 27 expenditure areas. Based on the work of 
the Finance Committee, the first parliamentary decision in the autumn is now on 
the expenditure frames for the upcoming budget. Fifteen sectoral committees then 
have responsibility for between one and four expenditure areas and make 
allocational proposals within the approved ceilings. Sectoral committees may 
propose to shift funds between items within an expenditure area, but they may not 
breach the total set for that area. In effect, a hard budget constraint has been
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imposed on sectoral committees. Members on the sectoral committees initially 
resisted this change, but against the backdrop of fiscal crisis, the reformers 
assembled enough support for the new process to be accepted.
The specific voting procedure is crucial. The report of the Finance Committee 
contains a proposal as well as reservations from the opposition parties that cover 
total spending, the allocation of expenditure across the different areas as well as 
revenue changes. These are treated as packages, unlike in the previous system 
where shifting majorities could form on individual items. Under the new system, 
opposition proposals are eliminated until one main alternative remains (Molander 
2001: 36). Opposition parties are ideologically fragmented and typically do not 
unite against the government, but only support their own proposal. Under these 
conditions even a minority government can obtain the support of more than half of 
the members voting.69 In practice, pre-budget consultations between the Social 
Democrats and their legislative allies, the Left Party and the Green Party, have so 
far ensured broader support.
This overview shows that the reforms fundamentally reorganised legislative 
decision-making in a way that appears conducive to containing the common pool 
resource problem. A central change was to institute a vote on aggregates prior to 
allocational decisions. At the same time, the committee structure for budget 
scrutiny was centralised by giving the Finance Committee an overall co­
ordination function, thus ending the balkanisation of the previous system. The
69 Articles 5 and 6 of chapter five of the Riksdag Act deal with the voting procedure.
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budget proposals of different parties are now considered as packages, which 
enables an overall perspective on fiscal policy and strengthens the agenda setting 
power of a minority government. In the following section, I consider the impact of 
the reforms on the budgetary role of Parliament.
7.3 Assessing the impact on legislative budgeting
By any standards, Sweden managed an impressive fiscal turnaround in the second 
half of the 1990s. Figure 11 shows the widening gap between general government 
revenues and expenditures at the beginning of the decade, with the deficit 
exceeding 11 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993. By the end of 
the decade, macroeconomic conditions had stabilised and the government was 
back in surplus. Previous studies suggest that the new budget process should be 
more conducive to the maintenance of fiscal discipline (Molander 1999: 207-208) 
and present tentative conclusions regarding its impact on the role of Parliament 
(Blondal 2001: 42). At the time of writing, nine budgets had been passed using the 
new process outlined in the previous section. This provides a critical mass of 
evidence to allow an initial assessment of the impact of the reforms on legislative 
budgeting. I first consider whether and what kind of changes can be observed, 
before discussing in greater detail to what extent any changes may be attributed to 
the new budget process.
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Most studies on the effect of budget institutions use broad indicators of fiscal 
performance as the dependent variable, typically public debt or deficit measures. 
This makes sense for studies that consider the overall effect of budget institutions 
and use indices that combine a number of structural variables (e.g. Von Hagen 
1992, Alesina et a l 1999). However, such broad indicators of fiscal performance 
make it difficult to isolate the effect of parliamentary institutions. With case 
studies it is possible to use much more fine-grained data than are typically 
available for quantitative cross-national research (Lieberman 2005: 440-441). 
Here, I use dependent variables that are very specific to the legislative budget 
process and allow a comparison of the budgetary role of the Riksdag prior to and 
after the budget reforms of the mid-1990s, namely the number of legislative 
amendments to the government’s proposals as well as the net effect of 
parliamentary amendment activity on spending.70
One indicator of the budgetary role of a legislature is the number of amendments 
made to executive proposals (Lienert 2005). While governments may anticipate 
legislative reactions and incorporate many of them into the budget prior to 
introduction, in particular in parliamentary systems where the executive relies on 
legislative support, the persistent absence of any amendments typically indicates a 
rubberstamp legislature (see chapter four, Wehner 2006a). Figure 12 reveals that 
the number of amendments to the government’s proposals for 11 budgets passed
70 Changes made by the Riksdag to the government proposal are documented in the Finance 
Committee report on the budget (FiUlO) that is handed to the Speaker and forwarded to the 
government. Recent reports are available on the parliamentary website at http://www.riksdagen.se.
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prior to the reforms (1985/86 to 1995/96) is substantially different from the 
following nine budgets (1997 to 2005). Prior to the reforms the Riksdag made on 
average 33 amendments, ranging between 63 in 1991/92 and 15 in 1995/96. 
Under the new process the mean is six, ranging between 17 in 2003 and none in 
four other instances including the two most recent budgets included in the 
analysis. This indicates a substantial decrease in amendment activity following the 
reforms.
When considering the difference in the number of amendments, some adjustments 
have to be bome in mind. On the one hand, the number of appropriations has been 
halved from a previous total of roughly a thousand to about 500 (Hjalmarsson and 
Jonsson 2003: 2). The reduction in part preceded the reform of the budget process. 
The smaller number of appropriations reduces the scope for parliamentary 
amendments to budgetary details. Nonetheless, even when post-reform 
amendments are double-weighted to compensate for the halving in the number of 
appropriations, the adjusted level of amendment activity is still two-thirds below 
the pre-reform average. Moreover, pre and post-reform amendments are not fully 
comparable. Prior to the reforms almost all changes resulted in increased 
appropriations. Since any increases now have to be balanced by cuts elsewhere, 
this augments the number of amendments that are necessary for adjusting the 
budget. In short, the decrease in amendments is striking even when the reduction 
in the number of appropriations is taken into consideration.
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Figure 12: Riksdag amendments to budget proposals, 1985/86 to 2005
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Figure 13: Net change due to Riksdag amendments, 1985/86 to 2005
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To assess the fiscal impact of the parliamentary process, Figure 13 indicates the 
net effect of amendments over the same period. Amendments to all of the budgets 
passed prior to the reforms resulted in net increases. The sums involved are 
relatively small compared to the overall budget, typically not exceeding 
approximately one per cent of the total. However, the government in many 
instances had already anticipated Parliament’s reactions and incorporated relevant 
demands into its proposals. The true net cost of parliamentary consent in the pre­
reform period is therefore hard to determine but it is almost certainly not fully 
reflected in these data. Even without this caveat it is clear that the Riksdag was 
unable to maintain fiscal discipline prior to the reforms, as its amendments 
regularly increased spending. However, there are no net increases in all bar one of 
the years following the reforms. The exception is the 2003 budget, which was 
passed after an election and had to be adjusted to reflect the co-operation 
agreement between the Social Democrats and their legislative allies.71 In general, 
the parliamentary process following the reforms is characterised by greater fiscal 
discipline.
To what extent can these changes be attributed to the new budget process? The 
package voting procedure makes amendments more difficult. It compels
71 When the budget proposal was submitted to Parliament in early October the Social Democrats 
had only reached an agreement with the Left Party. Negotiations continued and a few weeks later 
the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Green Party presented a joint motion (2002/03 :Fi230) 
suggesting a number of financially neutral changes. However, when the Finance Committee 
scrutinised these proposals it emerged that some of the indirect effects of an income tax change on 
local communities had been omitted, which amounted to 443 million Kronor.
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opposition parties to be explicit about trade-offs by developing comprehensive 
alternatives to the government budget proposal. The impact can be illustrated with 
recourse to Table 20. In effect the new process proceeds column-by-column rather 
than row-by-row. Unless opposition parties unite and support a single alternative, 
the executive proposal emerges unaltered if it is pitched against any less popular 
opposition proposal. An evaluation of the new budget process by the 
Parliamentary Review Commission (2001: 8) confirms: ‘The framework model 
has made it easier for a minority government to get its budget proposal through 
parliament, since it has made it more difficult for varying majorities to increase 
expenditures without financing the expenditures at the same time.’ Moreover, 
although the effects of the two-step voting procedure and the associated redesign 
of the committee process are difficult to disentangle, the centralisation of 
aggregate decision-making in the Finance Committee allows the imposition of a 
hard budget constraint on sectoral committees, which previously generated regular 
expenditure increases.
In addition, the extension of the electoral period that occurred at the same time as 
the reforms to the budget process may also have contributed to greater fiscal 
restraint. Empirical work on electoral budget cycles points to a negative 
relationship between the length of the electoral term and levels of public debt, 
suggesting that an extended time horizon induces politicians to pay more attention 
to the medium-term implications of their fiscal policies (Franzese 1999). In 
Sweden, the budget reforms coincided with an extension of the electoral term 
from three to four years. It is not clear whether this was done deliberately on the
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basis of an assumption that a longer electoral term makes politicians more fiscally 
responsible. However, one official interviewed for this study highlighted that 
although this connection was not made explicit, ‘those involved understood it 
perfectly well.’ The data considered above cannot be used to conclusively 
pinpoint the separate effects of these simultaneous institutional adjustments, but 
on balance the evidence suggests a cumulative effect in favour of fiscal discipline.
However, while the reformed institutional arrangements support the maintenance 
of fiscal discipline, they cannot be regarded as its ‘ultimate’ or ‘fundamental’ 
cause (see Gerring 2005: 175-176). Rather, the reforms were initiated by 
politicians with strong preferences for more prudent fiscal policy. The new 
arrangements were deliberately chosen to achieve this objective in a process that 
included consideration of fiscal institutionalist evidence (Molander 1992). 
Because no party or group of parties controlled the required majority to reform the 
system on its own, institutional change would never have been possible without 
strong cross-partisan consensus about the aims of reform, which was forged in a 
context of economic crisis. As one senior budget official cautioned, it is 
problematic to relate the improvement of public finances to any specific 
instrument, but rather ‘underlying attitudes and values that changed, and that 
influenced the result... and the methods chosen.’ In other words, budget 
institutions are endogenous; the current arrangements were shaped by the 
preferences of politicians across the partisan spectrum in favour of greater fiscal 
discipline.
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This is reflected in consistently strong support for fiscal sustainability at the 
highest political level. The reform was designed at a time when the then Finance 
Minister, Goran Persson, used pre-budget consultations with opposition parties to 
stabilise the budget process, an approach that has been sustained thus far 
(Hallerberg 2004: 165-166). After becoming Prime Minister in 1996, Persson 
(1997) published a book that made a personal commitment to fiscal prudence. His 
government’s objective is that public finances, comprising central and local 
governments plus the pension system, show a surplus of two percent of GDP over 
the economic cycle (Ministry of Finance 2005: 4). It remains to be seen whether 
the relative tranquillity of the new budget process is dependent on continuity of 
political leadership or whether the institutional changes have sufficiently 
embedded fiscal discipline so that a different government would find it hard to 
depart from that course.
Lastly, the focus of this chapter is not meant to suggest that the improvement in 
overall public finances should be entirely attributed to the revised legislative 
process. Several other factors played a role as well. Favourable macroeconomic 
conditions in the second half of the 1990s certainly aided fiscal recovery. 
Moreover, the reforms also strengthened the role of the Finance Ministry during 
executive negotiations. Notably, since the introduction of expenditure ceilings 
they have always been adhered to. Compared with the pre-reform process the 
Finance Ministry is in a stronger position to contain demands from spending 
ministries. On the other hand, although the reforms coincided with Sweden’s 
entry into the European Union, this played ‘at best a secondary role’ in spurring
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the reforms, which were ‘a direct response’ to economic crisis (Hallerberg 2004: 
167). These and possibly other factors are all important for a wider discussion of 
public finances in Sweden, but they do not affect the conclusions reached here 
about the impact of the institutional adjustments on legislative budgeting.
Overall, the data show that the role of the Swedish Parliament in the budget 
approval process has become more predictable after the reforms. Parliamentary 
amendments have decreased sharply, and the approval process no longer produces 
regular increases in spending. The new process was deliberately designed by 
politicians with strong preferences for greater fiscal discipline, and the data 
support the conclusion that it facilitates more prudent decision-making.
7.4 The challenge of a new accountability
The more predictable role of Parliament in budget approval does not necessarily 
imply a loss of parliamentary control; it may also mark a transition to a 
qualitatively different type of control. One quid pro quo for less ex ante influence 
over budget policy could be greater accountability for results, by enhancing the 
provision of performance information in the budget as well as ex post 
accountability arrangements. While reforms in these areas were debated and 
carried out separately from the adjustments to the budget process reviewed above, 
they also affect the nature and quality of parliamentary control, and hence should 
be part of a comprehensive assessment of financial scrutiny. In this final section, I
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briefly consider separate developments relating to performance budgeting and ex
post scrutiny to assess whether the Swedish Parliament has made a transition to a
v
new kind of accountability, one focused on performance.
Efforts to move towards performance budgeting preceded the reform of the budget 
process in the 1990s. Already in the 1970s there were experiments with 
programme budgeting involving a small share of the central government 
administration. Since 1988 there have been renewed efforts by the government to 
improve the performance orientation of the public sector (Hjalmarsson 2005). 
Performance reporting at present is largely focused on outputs.72 Agency 
objectives are specified ex ante in letters of instruction (.Regleringsbrev) that are 
issued to agencies following parliamentary approval of the budget. After the end 
of the fiscal year, agency performance information is presented in annual reports 
that cover financial as well as non-financial results. However, it appears that 
parliamentary interest in performance budgeting has been ‘lukewarm’, as one 
former official put it. Blondal (2001: 41) also observed ‘dissatisfaction’ in 
Parliament with the quality of performance information, although the Ministry of 
Finance is working to streamline the process. This suggests that these 
developments have thus far not had a profound effect on parliamentary scrutiny 
and accountability.
72 Refer to Kristensen et al. (2002) for an overview of performance based management and 
budgeting.
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The move towards greater performance orientation has gone hand in hand with a 
relaxation of input controls (Hjalmarsson 2005: 2, Schick 1988a: 530). For 
example, agencies now receive a single appropriation for operating expenditures 
(Blondal 2001: 45). Apart from solid performance information, strong ex post 
scrutiny is required in order to maintain parliamentary oversight under such 
circumstances. Until 2003, Sweden had two audit bodies that operated parallel to 
each other. The Parliamentary Auditors (Riksdagens Revisorer) were directly 
attached to the Parliament, but only had a small number of staff of about 30. The 
main audit body with about 300 staff was the Swedish National Audit Office 
(.Riksrevisionsverket), which was part of the government. This gave Parliament 
very limited capacity for ex post scrutiny, and the need for strengthened 
parliamentary control was widely recognised (Parliamentary Review Commission 
2001:4).
In 2003 the two old audit institutions were merged into a single entity. The new 
Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisioneri) is independent from the 
government and headed by three Auditor Generals, who are appointed by 
Parliament. Its mandate covers both financial and performance audits, and the 
latter takes up an increasing share of audit activity. Riksrevisioneri also has a 
board that is appointed by Parliament and consists of eleven representatives of all 
parties in the Riksdag. The board monitors audit activities and may make
*7 <5
recommendations to Parliament on actions to be taken on particular reports. Up
73 Further details are contained in the 2002 Riksrevisionen Terms of Reference Act and the 
Auditing of State Activities etc. Act.
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to May 2005, the board had received 36 reports, out of which 19 were passed on 
to Parliament with proposals. No measures were taken in six cases, and five 
reports were passed on for information purposes only. There is no specialised 
parliamentary audit committee, such as the Public Accounts Committee in the UK 
House of Commons. Instead, audit findings are considered by any committee they 
are referred to.
As the institutional arrangements for ex post scrutiny are still very new, it will 
take some time before their effectiveness can be properly evaluated. On the one 
hand, the creation of a well-resourced audit body that is independent from the 
government is a definite improvement over the previous situation. The move is 
also in line with international standards that demand the independence of external 
audit (International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 1998). The 
previous Swedish National Audit Office did not report to Parliament, which had 
to rely on its Parliamentary Auditors. The Riksdag should be a main beneficiary of 
the reform of external audit.
However, this requires sufficient capacity and interest in the legislature to absorb 
the flow of audit information. It is widely recognised that the interaction between 
supreme audit institutions and legislatures benefits from specialised audit 
committees (SIGMA 2002). Audit committees allow legislators to develop 
expertise for ex post scrutiny and to pay greater attention to audit findings than is 
possible in sectoral committees that are also concerned with a number of other 
pressing matters, in particular draft legislation. In Sweden, the transmission of
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audit findings to Parliament has not been fully effective. The audit board meets on 
average only about once a month and lacks capacity to engage with reports in 
detail. This results in delays in the referral of reports to the Riksdag. Moreover, 
instead of substantive proposals, in a number of cases the board generated only a 
general recommendation that Parliament look into a certain matter. Audit reports 
still receive little attention in Parliament, apart from the annual report, which is 
subject to a debate in the plenary.
The Swedish Parliament has not made a transition to a new kind of accountability 
following the redesign of the budget approval process. In some countries, in 
particular the UK and other Westminster systems, parliaments have largely 
withdrawn from influencing budget policy, but maintain substantial ex post 
scrutiny capacity in a Public Accounts Committee that focuses on value for 
money delivered by government departments and agencies (McGee 2002). The 
Riksdag may not want to follow this perhaps extreme example. Nonetheless, 
accountability for results through effective ex post scrutiny can still be improved 
substantially, for instance by setting up a dedicated audit committee or by greatly 
enhancing the capacity of the current board.
Conclusions
Sweden’s budget reforms have contributed to a containment of the common pool 
resource problem in Parliament, by instating a top-down voting process in
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conjunction with a revised committee structure that centralises control of 
aggregates in the Finance Committee. In addition, the package voting procedure 
gives the government greater agenda setting power. Overall, the new institutional 
arrangements make it more difficult for legislative deliberations to produce net 
spending increases and hence contribute to the maintenance of fiscal discipline. 
The study also shows that, in addition to the formal powers of the legislature to 
amend the budget, a range of legislative institutions deserve attention in efforts to 
redesign the budget process in order to improve fiscal performance. This is 
encouraging, because the proposition that amendment powers have to be curtailed 
for the sake of fiscal sustainability are normatively problematic for those who 
regard the legislative power of the purse as a democratic fundamental, and in any 
case, it may not always be possible to adjust constitutional provisions on 
amendment powers. Moreover, this analysis cautions against a simplistic reading 
of the fiscal institutionalist literature. Budget institutions cannot always be treated 
as exogenous variables. In the Swedish case, the preferences of politicians across 
the partisan spectrum in favour of greater fiscal discipline determined institutional 
choice. The lesson for budget reformers is that legislative institutions matter, but 
more fundamentally important are the preferences of those who get to make 
institutional choices.
This analysis further raises complex questions about the exact nature of 
parliamentary control. At first glance, the study implies an inverse relationship 
between legislative influence on budget policy and the maintenance of fiscal 
discipline. This suggests that effective parliamentary control has to entail that the
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legislature is able to control itself. In Sweden, the overall design of the reforms 
was in the hands of the Riksdag, and recent adjustments to the role of the Spring 
Fiscal Policy Bill again confirm Parliament’s power over the budget process. In 
short, the constraints of the revised legislative process are essentially self- 
imposed, which in the final analysis makes it difficult to argue that the Riksdag 
has lost budgetary control. Nonetheless, it is evident that individual 
parliamentarians, in particular those on sectoral committees, have relinquished 
some influence over budget policy. I have argued that reduced ex ante influence 
can be compensated by greater accountability for results through improved 
performance reporting and an effective ex post scrutiny process. While full 
effectiveness in this regard has not yet been attained, this remains a significant 
opportunity for reshaping accountability in the post-reform environment. Hence, 
while the fiscal institutionalist literature may be interpreted to suggest that ‘weak’ 
legislatures are fiscally beneficial, a somewhat more nuanced interpretation 
emerges from this chapter: legislatures can be at the same time both powerful, by 
retaining full control of the design of the budget process, as well as constrained, 
by self-imposing institutional devices that support fiscally prudent choices.
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8 Conclusion: Beyond macro-constitutional distinctions
This research had three main aims: (i) to establish and apply a framework for 
assessing how institutional arrangements affect the budgetary role of legislatures, 
(ii) to explore the determinants of cross-national variation in these institutional 
arrangements, and (iii) to assess empirically the impact of legislative budget 
institutions on fiscal policy. I consider each of these in turn, followed by a 
discussion of the relevance of my findings in the context of the broader 
institutionalist research agenda in political science and economics.
8.1 Trajectories and patterns of legislative budgeting
The emergence of modem legislatures is inextricably intertwined with the struggle 
for democratic control of public finances (Einzig 1959, Coombes 1976). From the 
start, this struggle was about the institutional arrangements that govern the 
decision-making process, in particular formal powers (Harriss 1975). Moreover, 
legislative control required an appropriate organisational infrastructure to 
facilitate scmtiny and oversight (Chubb 1952). The institutional foundations of 
legislative control emerged over a number of centuries, and they are shaped by 
local context (Stourm 1917). Yet, different legislatures at different times grappled 
with essentially rather similar issues relating to their formal powers, organisation 
and access to information. This provides a basis for constructing a comparative
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framework to measure the extent to which the institutional prerequisites for 
legislative control of public finances are present.
In analysing the effect of institutional arrangements on legislative budgeting, I 
highlighted an important distinction between two types of impacts: on legislative 
control on the one hand, and budget outcomes, in particular spending levels, on 
the other hand. The size of a legislature’s feasible set of budgetary choices is 
affected by a range of institutions, including constraints on its power to amend the 
budget, the nature of the reversionary outcome, executive vetoes, as well as 
executive authority to alter the approved budget during implementation. However, 
only restrictions on amendment powers and executive impoundment authority 
unambiguously constrain a legislature’s choice of aggregate spending by 
imposing the executive proposal as an upper limit. The hypothesis that 
amendment powers affect fiscal policy outcomes is in line with the literature on 
budget institutions (Poterba and Von Hagen 1999, Strauch and Von Hagen 1999), 
but die analysis challenges some other propositions in this literature, notably with 
regard to the relevance of reversionary budgets and executive virement authority 
(Alesina et al. 1996, Hallerberg and Marier 2004). Moreover, the use of any 
formal legislative powers is likely to involve transaction costs, which can be 
accommodated or lowered through effective organisation of the legislative process 
in a way that maximises time for budget scrutiny and ensures access to relevant 
information, as well as a well-designed committee system that is conducive to 
scrutiny and oversight. These institutional prerequisites affect the extent of
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legislative control of budget policy and provide a theoretical framework for 
comparative empirical work.
To assess cross-national differences, I operationalised these variables in the index 
of legislative budget institutions. The empirical analysis reveals very different 
degrees of legislative control of public finances. The US Congress has an index 
score that is more than three times as great as those for the bottom nine 
legislatures, predominantly Westminster systems. Moreover, there is a substantial 
amount of variation in between these extremes, as suggested by the more recent 
comparative case study literature in the legislative studies tradition (Esaiasson and 
Heidar 2000, Doling 1995a). This challenges the view that legislative financial 
control is fundamentally important for democracy (Fish 2006, Einzig 1959). If the 
power of the purse were indeed fundamentally important for democracy, it is hard 
to explain why legislative bodies in democratic countries should be so differently 
equipped for financial scrutiny.
The historical overview in chapter two in conjunction with the cross-sectional 
assessment in chapter four raises further issues about the trajectory of legislative 
budgeting. Until the nineteenth century, the struggle was to achieve full 
parliamentary control of the budget, both in the UK and the US, as well as France 
(Stourm 1917). Thereafter, however, these legislatures took very different paths. 
Documenting developments in the UK and France respectively, Einzig (1959) and 
Stourm (1917) were writing at times when they regarded the golden age of fiscal 
control as a thing of the past. In the US, however, there is much less of a clear-cut
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trajectory of decline. Congress at various points ceded power to the executive, but 
later struggled to strengthen fiscal control. According to Schick (2000: 8-35), 
budgeting was dominated by Congress until the triumph of the executive budget 
movement with the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, which inaugurated a period 
of presidential dominance. However, following a souring of legislative-executive 
relations under the Nixon presidency, the 1974 Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act signalled congressional resurgence (see also 
Wildavsky and Caiden 2001: 69-92). Hence, while in broad terms the initial 
trajectory of legislative budgeting in these countries was shared, with a common 
goal to achieve legislative fiscal control, developments from about the nineteenth 
century onwards became much more diverse. Taking a comparative snapshot of 
legislative budgeting today, as in chapter four, the US on the one hand and the UK 
as well as France on the other emerge as polar cases, with most of the cross­
national distribution between these extremes.
It is uncertain whether younger and emerging democracies will follow the same 
path as these pioneers of legislative budgeting. For one, the environmental 
conditions for legislative scrutiny have changed in many countries. The origins of 
the battle for legislative fiscal supremacy in the UK and the US owe much to the 
fact that these bodies sought to impose limitations on unelected executives 
(Harriss 1975, Einzig 1959). The fiscal leash was a rare mechanism to impose 
some degree of accountability and control. Nowadays, with more governments 
than ever before accountable via the ballot box (Huntington 1991), this 
historically important driver of fiscal scrutiny is less applicable. However, while
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the historical golden age of legislative budgeting may have little to offer as a 
model to newer democracies, there is still substantial variation in the budgetary 
role of legislatures, even amongst countries with similar levels of democratic 
maturity.
8.2 Explaining the differences
So which factors might account for this variation? Testing a range of plausible 
explanations, I found that UK colonial heritage and divided government affect 
legislative institutions. Thus, legislative budget institutions are shaped by both 
long-term and more immediate factors. This might seem contradictory at first 
glance, but not when considering that different elements of the institutional setting 
are likely to be affected by different factors. Legal frameworks, and constitutional 
provisions in particular, are often deeply entrenched and slowly changing (Lienert 
and Jung 2004). This implies a greater importance of long-term causes such as 
colonial history in shaping these aspects. The key mechanism is institutional 
replication (Lienert 2003). In particular, the UK bequeathed very similar rules to 
its former colonies that greatly limit the potential for legislative influence on 
public finances. On the other hand, legislative organisation and demand for 
information are more variable in the short-term, which explains why they are 
sensitive to more immediate political dynamics, notably occurrences of minority 
government. When partisan control differs across the legislature and the 
executive, there is greater legislative demand for scrutiny (Messick 2002).
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The analysis also challenges the hypothesis that presidential and parliamentary 
systems are inherently different (Lijphart 1992 and 1999). At the very least with 
regard to legislative fiscal control, this does not appear to be the case. After 
controlling for a range of other possible explanatory variables, presidentialism 
does not have a significant effect on a country’s score on the index of legislative 
budget institutions. This may be due to limitations of the data set, in particular 
sample size, but at the same time the finding is in line with at least one other 
recent study that challenges the overriding importance of this macro-constitutional 
regime distinction for the budgetary role of the legislature (Lienert 2005). One 
reason why the regime distinction may be overrated is that many legislative 
researchers have for too long excessively focused on two ‘paradigmatic cases’ 
(Cheibub and Limongi 2002: 168), the UK and the US, but until the work by 
Shugart and Carey (1992) and Doring (1995a) failed to grasp the full range of 
variation in legislative structures and influence that exists amongst both 
presidential and parliamentary systems. My findings highlight the importance of 
careful empirical assessment of the institutional differences within presidential 
and parliamentary systems with regard to the legislature’s budgetary role, so as 
not to prematurely accept the notion that fundamental differences exist between 
these forms of government.
While this study identified factors that account for some of the cross-national 
variation in legislative budget institutions, and some that may not, we can only 
speculate why this variation might be sustained without undermining democratic
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control. Does the absence of effective legislative scrutiny of the budget mean that 
governments are less accountable? Not necessarily. One possibility is the 
functional equivalence of other mechanisms in holding government to account. In 
medieval England, parliamentary control of the purse was the most essential and 
effective tool for controlling the Crown (Harriss 1975). In contrast, modem 
parliaments have a wide range of ‘oversight tools’ at their disposal (Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst 2004: 4). These include committee and plenary hearings, 
commissions of inquiry, parliamentary questions and question time, 
interpellations, as well as access to supportive external bodies such as ombudsmen 
and supreme audit institutions. It may well be that some of these features can be 
substituted for parliamentary control of the budget. Alternatively, the very nature 
of financial control may have shifted from ex ante scrutiny to ex post review and 
accountability, a possibility that I briefly explored in chapter seven in the context 
of Sweden’s budget process (see also Schick 2002: 33-35). Further empirical 
work has to clarify whether parliaments assemble different packages from a menu 
of oversight tools, occasionally abandoning some old ones and honing new ones 
instead.
8.3 Legislatures and fiscal discipline
A number of studies claim that legislative institutions -  such as amendment 
powers, the reversionary budget, top-down voting procedures and bicameralism -  
affect fiscal policy outcomes, focusing on different geographical regions and
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using different datasets (e.g. Von Hagen 1992, Alesina et a l 1996, Gleich 2003). 
This thesis presents the first comprehensive evaluation of the effect of a range of 
legislative institutions on public spending in 25 OECD countries, based on a 
single dataset. In line with the literature on the common pool resource problem in 
budgeting, I found evidence that countries where the legislature has unfettered 
powers to amend the budget proposal of the executive have significantly higher 
levels of public expenditures, estimated to be around 5 percentage points of 
general government spending relative to GDP. This effect holds across different 
operationalisations of this variable, and it withstands a number of robustness 
checks. On the other hand, I found no evidence for other relevant fiscal 
institutionalist hypotheses. These findings challenge thinly theorised claims about 
the fiscal policy impact of other institutional arrangements in the literature on 
fiscal performance, such as the voting sequence of the budget process (Molander 
1999), reversionary budget provisions (Alesina et al. 1996), and whether the 
budget is passed in one vote or separate chapters (Von Hagen 1992).
Chapter six has several significant implications for further empirical work. First, it 
underscores the importance of replication for the credibility of quantitative 
research in this particular area as well as in the social sciences more generally. 
Two decades after Dewald and colleagues (1986) highlighted the embarrassing 
impossibility to replicate many empirical results in a leading economics journal, 
replication is arguably more crucial than ever before but remains both 
undervalued and undersupplied (Hamermesh 2007). In political science, the use of 
quantitative methods in arguably the leading journal of the discipline
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‘skyrocketed’ during the 1960s and has since then become increasingly 
sophisticated (Sigelman 2006: 467). This makes replication, and in particular what 
Hamermesh (2007: 1) refers to as scientific replication (i.e. using a different 
sample, different population and similar model) even more fundamentally 
important. Chapter six highlights how exactly this approach can at the same time 
help to focus, challenge and confirm research. This is an essential process for 
enhancing the credibility of empirical political science research that cannot be 
valued enough (King 1995).
The analysis also has important implications for empirical research on fiscal 
performance. Crucially, greater attention needs to be paid to the dependent 
variable. In terms of indicators, if a theory is about expenditure levels, then 
empirical tests should use public expenditures as the dependent variable rather 
than other indicators of fiscal performance, such as deficits. If the results are not 
strong, this should be transparently reported and discussed. Examples of this 
(notably Stein et a l 1998) are too rare, since the social sciences tend not to value 
‘negative results’ (Lehrer et a l 2007).74 Other disciplines started to acknowledge 
this bias earlier (Hebert et a l 2002) and it is time for the social sciences to catch
74 Lehrer and colleagues (2007) argue that the social sciences require a forum for negative results. 
They distinguish inconclusive results (unstable or highly sensitive to model choice), non-results 
(lacking significant results), confutative results (contradicting established theories) and ersatz 
results (unintended results that are unrelated to theoretic expectations). For more information on 
this initiative, refer to the homepage of the Journal o f Spurious Correlations: 
http://www.jspurc.org/ [last accessed April 2007].
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up. Moreover, much of the fiscal institutionalist literature is far too casual with 
the choice of data source. In coming years, the IMF databases are likely to further 
extend in coverage. As the European Union enlarges and the OECD discusses the 
expansion of its membership, they, too, will provide public finance data for an 
increasing number of countries. The choice of fiscal indicators and data sources 
should be discussed more extensively than is often the case, otherwise there 
remain grounds for suspicions that these are chosen to support particular 
theoretical stances rather than to evaluate them, or that the empirical results may 
simply be an artefact of carelessly chosen poor quality data.
The analysis of Sweden’s budget reforms relied on more in-depth qualitative 
work, and very specific data about the parliamentary impact on fiscal policy. It 
suggests that institutional arrangements other than amendment powers can 
nonetheless impact on fiscal discipline in a legislative setting. However, subtleties 
such as the peculiarities of Sweden’s parliamentary budget procedure are hard to 
capture in cross-country quantitative indices. Here, the approval process pits pairs 
of alternative packages of budget proposals against one another and favours the 
package backed by the largest voting block. Moreover, the study of Sweden’s 
budget reforms also suggests that it is not the sequencing of budgetary decisions 
in itself that matters (Von Hagen 1992), but the centralisation of the decision over 
aggregate budget totals in the Finance Committee (Crain and Muris 1995), which
75 For example, the Journal o f Negative Observations in Genetic Oncology was first published in 
1997, the Journal o f Negative Results in BioMedicine in 2002, and the Journal o f Articles in 
Support o f the Null Hypothesis, which features research in the field of psychology, in 2002.
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again is not captured in crude cross-national indices that score voting sequence 
alone. This finding is entirely consistent with the theory of the common pool 
resource problem in budgeting (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1997). In this way, 
qualitative work can help to clarify exact causal mechanisms, which in turn has 
the potential to feed into constructing better cross-national quantitative measures. 
Moreover, the study shows that the achievement of fiscal discipline need not come 
at the price of emasculating the legislature, as long as the latter maintains control 
over the design of the budget process.
8.4 Taking lower level institutions seriously
A core argument of this thesis is that institutionalist research in public policy 
needs to move beyond broad constitutional parameters to incorporate the more 
detailed organisation of policy-making. In contrast to macro-constitutional 
distinctions, which offer only rough classifications for political systems -  such as 
unitary versus federal states or presidential versus parliamentary forms of 
government -  I refer to these more detailed arrangements interchangeably as 
‘lower level’ or ‘finer grain’ institutions. These institutions might affect only 
particular policy areas, become influential only under certain conditions, or be 
hidden away in secondary legislation. As the proverbial devilish detail, they are 
comparable to the small print in contracts: difficult to decipher and deceptively 
technical, but potentially decisive for the outcome.
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This analysis demonstrates that the details of the policy-making machinery are at 
least as important as macro-level constitutional design.76 To be clear: I am not 
arguing that macro-level constitutional research is unimportant, but that it would 
benefit from incorporating additional features, in particular lower level or finer 
grain institutional variables such as amendment powers (see also Persson and 
Tabellini 2003: 96 and 2006: 85). There are already nascent signs of the research 
agenda developing in this direction, for instance the work by Cheibub (2006), who 
qualifies the impact of presidentialism on fiscal policy with some variables that he 
suggests determine executive authority vis-a-vis the legislature. There has to be 
more systematic study of the interaction of macro-constitutional and lower level 
institutions to better understand how institutional design affects fiscal policy.
The incorporation of lower level or finer grain institutions into the research 
agenda does, however, pose challenges. One is that it requires more careful 
theorising about the effects expected from different institutional arrangements. 
Several of the fiscal institutionalist hypotheses lack the backing of formal 
theoretical analysis, such as the Conjectures about the impact of sequencing (Von 
Hagen 1992, Molander 1999) and reversionary budgets (Alesina et a l 1996, 
Hallerberg and Mailer 2004) on fiscal policy outcomes. The theoretical work in 
chapter three shows that only two institutional arrangements out of six generate 
clear-cut predictions in terms of an effect on relative spending levels, i.e.
76 The empirical analysis in chapter six, where only a single variable had a significant impact on 
aggregate public spending, is not incongruent with this statement. As chapter two demonstrated, 
other institutional features are likely to matter as well, but often in different ways, for instance 
with respect to the composition of the budget. However, chapter six did not test these effects.
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amendment powers and executive impoundment authority, and the econometric 
work in chapter six found evidence only for the hypothesis that limits on 
legislative amendment powers contain aggregate public expenditures. Careful 
modelling can clarify the effects of specific institutional arrangements and help to 
avoid unfounded or exaggerated claims.
Broadening the analysis to lower level institutions also has methodological 
implications. One of the key critiques levelled against the early fiscal 
institutionalist research is that it treats institutions as exogenous (Alesina and 
Perotti 1996: 4). This might be a justifiable assumption for the short to medium- 
term with regard to macro-level constitutional variables, which tend to change 
rarely.77 Depending on sample periods and the choice of cases, these variables 
may even be time invariant in a particular dataset. The lower level institutions for 
policy-making, on the other hand, might be subject to more frequent adjustments. 
Thus, fiscal institutionalist research is challenged to develop its understanding of 
institutional change. One way of doing so, as Poterba (1996: 10) proposes, is 
through methodological diversification. Recent work by some fiscal
77 For instance, in their panel dataset with 60 countries between 1960 and 1998, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003: 88) find no significant change from a majoritarian to a proportional representation 
electoral system during the 1960s and 70s, and only two incidents o f such change in the 1980s 
(France and Cyprus). However, the 1990s saw more change in electoral systems. When they 
classify their sample according to presidential and parliamentary forms o f  government, they find 
hardly any change over the entire sample period, except in Bangladesh, which adopted a 
presidential system in 1991, and a short-lived experiment with parliamentary government in Brazil 
between 1961 and 1963 (Persson and Tabellini 2003: 98).
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institutionalists follows this recommendation and incorporates detailed country 
studies of how budget systems adapt to changing conditions, in particular political 
variables (Hallerberg 2004). Case study research cannot always fully resolve this 
debate, but the analysis of Sweden presented here demonstrates that it can 
complement quantitative work with a more in-depth understanding of how and 
why budget institutions change. This suggests that mixed methods research 
(Lieberman 2005) is one way of tackling the methodological challenges involved 
in incorporating lower level institutions into the research agenda.
The systematic empirical study of how budget systems evolve has to be 
underpinned by high quality institutional data. Up to now, the institutional data 
used is eclectic; there has been little concern with standardising various survey 
efforts. A number of different bodies are now conducting surveys of budget 
systems or particular aspects of them, including the European Commission 
(Deroose et a l 2006), the World Bank (OECD and World Bank 2003), the OECD 
(2002b and 2006), as well as independent think tanks (International Budget 
Project 2006). While quality control remains a concern, these datasets are
78becoming increasingly sophisticated and more useful. If a degree of 
standardisation is achieved, these surveys could yield consistent data on the 
institutional evolution of budget systems over time and for a larger set of 
countries, which would greatly enhance the possibilities for quantitative analysis.
78 The 2006 Open Budget Initiative of the International Budget Project (IBP) at the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) in Washington, D. C., provides an excellent example of a 
high quality and rigorous multi-country research study. This survey included an independent peer 
review process. Each country survey is published along with the comments of the reviewers.
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Overall, the growing popularity of these surveys augurs well for the empirical 
aspects of the fiscal institutionalist research agenda.79
There are a number of possible next steps for advancing this research agenda. One 
of the primary challenges to the fiscal institutionalist literature is to develop its 
theoretical analysis of institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements that 
are included in multi-item indices are often selected on the basis of conjectures 
and short informal arguments. This theoretical underinvestment is reflected in the 
empirical results presented here, which highlight how few (one) of the range of 
institutional features mentioned in the literature unambiguously affect public 
spending. Much more careful work is needed to properly theorise individual 
institutional arrangements. This will help researchers to focus on the truly relevant 
institutions, and to better understand the conditions under which particular 
mechanisms have a certain effect. Of the features analysed in chapter three, the 
reversionary budget in particular deserves further attention, because of the number 
of papers that attribute a fiscal impact to the variable (e.g. Alesina et a l 1996, 
Hallerberg and Marier 2004, Cheibub 2006). In the medium-term, a better balance 
between theory and empirical work would greatly enhance the credibility of fiscal 
institutionalist research.
79 At the time of writing, the LSE Public Policy Group is supporting the OECD in designing a 
standardised budget system survey tool that would allow the gathering of comparable data over a 
number of years and for a large number of countries, including non-OECD members.
244
The analysis in chapter six in particular provides a very strong basis for further 
empirical work and suggests several possibilities. In particular, the finding that 
only legislative powers of amendment have a significant effect on expenditure 
levels amongst a range of legislative institutions may disappoint the purveyors of 
indices, but it is good news for comparative research. The relative simplicity of 
this measure, compared with complex indices, greatly reduces data requirements 
and reliance on elaborate survey tools. Data for this variable can be relatively 
easily collected from constitutional documents and a range of existing surveys for 
a large set of countries. Hence, a first key task is to further test the empirical 
relevance of this variable by increasing the number of observations. My first 
initiative is to gather the relevant data for all countries in the constitutional 
economics dataset used by Persson and Tabellini (2003). While this dataset has 
limitations, such as the nature of the dependent variable and the quality of the 
fiscal data (see section 6.2), the gain in degrees of freedom is substantial. This will 
allow a further test of the relevance of legislative powers in assessing the effects
finof constitutions on fiscal policy.
In particular when extending this work to a large number of developing countries, 
it will be important to revisit the underlying concept of institutions. Already in 
this thesis, it became evident that formal institutional arrangements combine with
80 At the time of finalising this thesis, data collection for this project has already been completed. 
Preliminary analysis is encouraging and indicates that the effects o f limits on legislative 
amendment powers are also present when using a much larger sample as well as a different 
definition and source of fiscal data. The paper presenting the results o f this work has been accepted 
for the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
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non-codified practices -  such as the voting behaviour of the opposition parties 
discussed in chapter seven -  to produce policy outcomes. Still, on average, formal 
institutions are meaningful structures in OECD countries, as this analysis 
demonstrated. However, to what extent can we stretch this analysis to what 
Acemoglu (2005: 1045) refers to as ‘weakly institutionalized polities’? Are formal 
institutions -  constitutions, laws and regulations -  as meaningful in Fiji, 
Nicaragua and Zambia as they are in Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland? 
By combining these countries in a single dataset, Persson and Tabellini (2003 and 
2004) suggest this is the case. However, research on budgeting in developing 
countries confirms that formal rules and procedures are often undermined by 
informal institutions, such as patronage networks (e.g. Rakner et al. 2004). Hence, 
it is likely that we overestimate the relevance of formal institutional structures in 
these contexts. In other words, the highly formalistic definition of institutions 
adopted in the introduction of this thesis has limits and may not be universally 
useful and applicable. How to understand the policy-making process in weakly 
institutionalised polities is thus a fundamental challenge that future research in 
this area will have to tackle (Acemoglu 2005: 1045-1047).
While this thesis focused on institutional variables, there is also substantial scope 
for integrating political variables into the analysis. For example, a number of 
authors investigate the effects of partisan fragmentation on fiscal policy, using 
measures such as the effective number of parties or the excess number of seats the 
governing party commands in the legislature (Volkerink and De Haan 2001, 
Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002). However, an important question is whether the
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effect of partisan fragmentation can be neutralised or mitigated by institutional 
arrangement, and in particular whether the effect of partisan fragmentation in the 
legislature is conditional upon the extent of its amendment powers. While this 
question has been posed (Fabrizio and Mody 2006), it has thus far been neglected 
in the empirical work based on the common pool resource problem in budgeting. 
Taking this question to the data opens up interesting possibilities for interacting 
fluctuating political variables with hardly changing or time-invariant institutional 
variables, in particular the powers of the legislature to amend budgets, in panel 
datasets using standard fixed effects specifications.
Moreover, there is a lack of research about institutional effects on the composition 
of budgets. The analysis in chapter three suggests that a number of institutional 
features affect decisions about the mix of public spending, as well as or rather 
than aggregate fiscal policy outcomes, which I did not test empirically in this 
thesis. A proper exploration of this issue requires combining institutional data 
with information on legislative and executive preferences in different policy areas, 
which is empirically messy (Brauninger 2005). Moreover, there are a range of 
measurement issues that have to be considered in comparing spending categories 
across countries. For instance, the measurement of social expenditure is 
complicated by the use of tax expenditures rather than direct expenditures, the 
effect of taxation of social benefits and indirect taxes on net social transfers, as 
well as the use of private mandatory schemes (Joumard et a l 2003: 116; see also 
Kuhner 2007). While these are difficult data issues that have to be acknowledged, 
they should not detract researchers from tackling this challenge. There are very
247
few examples in the academic literature that engage with the determinants of the 
composition of budgets, and they largely focus on partisan variables (Tsebelis and 
Chang 2004, Brauninger 2005). Further work in this neglected area should
o |
incorporate budget institutions into the analysis.
Finally, research on legislative budgeting would benefit greatly from a cohesive 
body of methodologically rigorous comparative case studies. As the study of 
Sweden’s budget reforms in chapter seven demonstrated, this method is 
particularly well suited for exploring the dynamics of institutional change over 
time, as well as exact causal mechanisms. The available body of case study 
research on this topic is outdated, eclectic in approach, and it lacks analytical 
grounding. Crucial for the success of this element of the research agenda is the 
issue of case selection, which should be based on an explicit framework rather 
than convenient reversion to the usual suspects of comparative legislative studies. 
One particularly promising approach, as developed in this thesis, is to focus on 
those countries that underwent institutional reforms affecting the budgetary role of 
the legislature. This selection approach is particularly suitable for studying 
institutional change. The study of within-unit change controls for a range of time- 
invariant country-specific factors, which can eliminate a number of rival 
hypotheses. Pursued in this way, a set of well-structured and carefully selected
81 There is already some applied research into the role of budget institutions in reallocation, which 
includes useful data on the changing composition of budgets in a sample of OECD countries 
(Kraan and Kelly 2005).
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case studies has the potential to complement the quantitative elements of this 
research agenda.
Conclusions
The study of the design of political institutions and their effects on public policy is 
a burgeoning field of research in both economics and political science. Thus far, 
most of the attention has been paid to macro-level constitutional distinctions. In 
future, increasing attention needs to be paid to studying the more detailed 
machinery for policy-making and how its design affects outcomes in particular 
policy areas. The research on fiscal institutions is one example where this 
approach has already yielded some dividends, but this thesis demonstrates that it 
requires more theorising, greater methodological sophistication and additional 
attention to data issues to fully evaluate institutional impacts on fiscal policy.
To take this research agenda forward, important next steps include further 
theoretical work to better understand the effect of individual institutional 
elements. There also needs to be more systematic work to reassess previous 
empirical findings with larger datasets. Going further, there is plenty of scope to 
explore the interaction of hardly changing institutional variables with fluctuating 
political dynamics and how budget institutions affect the composition of budgets. 
Finally, well-designed case study work can complement quantitative analysis by 
adding a more in-depth understanding of causal mechanisms. Taking lower level
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institutional details seriously is likely to qualify or challenge some of the results 
from macro-constitutional research, but this approach is crucial for the future of 
the institutionalist project in political science and economics.
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Appendix
A Data appendix
Variable Long name M ain sources* Description Coding
ALESINA2 Alesina index OECD (2003), 2.7.C, 2.7.e and 3.2.a.4
Alesina et al.'s (1996) subindex 
3; see text for details.
Ranging from 0 = highest degree of 
legislative power to 20 = lowest degree of 
legislative power
ALESENA2_Z Alesina index (standardised) ALESINA2
Standardised version of 
ALESINA2.
Ranging from 0 = highest degree of 
legislative power to 1 = lowest degree of 
legislative power
AM_ALESI2 Alesina amendment powers OECD (2003), 2.7.e
The amendment powers item 
according to Alesina et al. 
(1996); see text for details.
Ranging from 0 = highest degree of 
legislative power to 10 = lowest degree of 
legislative power
AM_ALESI2_Z Alesina amendment powers (standardised) AM ALESI2
Standardised version of 
AM_ALESI2
Ranging from 0 = highest degree of 
legislative power to 1 = lowest degree of 
legislative power
AMEND2 Powers OECD (2003), 2.7.d
Powers of the legislature to 
amend budgets. Part of Wehner 
(2006a) index; see text for 
details.
0 = accept or reject, 3.3 = cuts only or 
severe restrictions, 6.7 = aggregate 
constraint, 10 = unfettered
AMEND2_Z Powers (standardised) AMEND2 Standardised version of AMEND2.
0 = unfettered, .33 = aggregate constraint, 
.67 = cuts only or severe restrictions, 1 = 
accept or reject
AUDCOM Audit committee Parliamentary websites
Committee capacity for the 
consideration of audit reports. 
Part of Wehner (2006a) index; 
see text for details.
0 = no specialised audit committee, 1.7 = 
audit sub-committee, 3.3 = specialised audit 
committee
BICAM 1 Budgetary bicameralism (version one) Heller (1997); constitutions
Dummy indicating whether the 
second chamber of the 
legislature is co-equal in all 
budgetary matters.
0 = unicameral legislature or upper chamber 
with limited powers, 1 = co-equal second 
chamber
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BICAM2 Budgetary bicameralism (version two) Heller (1997); constitutions
Dummy indicating whether the 
second chamber o f the 
legislature is co-equal in taxation 
matters only.
0 = unicameral legislature or upper chamber 
with limited powers, 1 = co-equal second 
chamber
BUDCOM Budget committee OECD (2003), 2.10.a
Consideration of the draft budget 
by a specialised budget or 
finance committee. Part of 
Wehner (2006a) index; see text 
for details.
0 = no budget committee, 3.3 = budget 
committee
BUDCOM_Z Budget committee (standardised) BUDCOM
Standardised version of 
BUDCOM.
0 = no budget committee, 1 = budget 
committee
CEILING Von Hagen global vote OECD (2003), 2.7.j
Dummy indicating whether the 
legislature establishes aggregate 
expenditure ceilings before 
beginning debate on individual 
expenditure items. Part of Von 
Hagen’s (1992) item two; see 
text for details.
0 = no ceiling, 4 = ceiling
CEILING_Z Von Hagen global vote (standardised) CEILING
Standardised version of 
CEILING 0 = no ceiling, 1 = ceiling
CGEXP99A
Central government 
expenditure GFS data 
(1999 to 2003)
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics
Consolidated central government 
[CG] expenses, accrual basis, as 
percentage of GDP, multiplied 
by 100, 1999 to 2003 average.
N/A
CGEXP99I
Central government 
expenditure IFS data (1999 
to 2003)
IMF International Financial 
Statistics
Consolidated central government 
or budgetary central government 
expenses (line 82) as percentage 
of GDP, multiplied by 100,1999 
to 2003 average.
N/A
CGEXP990
Central government 
expenditure OECD data 
(1999 to 2003)
OECD National Accounts, 
Volume IV General 
Government Accounts
Central government sector 
expenditure as percentage of 
GDP, multiplied by 100,1999 to 
2003 average.
N/A
CHANGE Amendments OECD (2003), 2.7.i
Whether the Legislature does in 
practice make amendments to 
the executive budget proposal.
0 = does not amend, 1 = amends
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COMMI** Former communist country http ://www. wikipedia.org
Dummy for former communist 
countries or their successor 
states.
0 = not former communist country, 1 = 
former communist country
COMS Committees BUDCOM, DEPCOM and AUDIT
Total committee capacity. Part 
o f Wehner (2006a) index; see 
text for details.
Sum of BUDCOM, DEPCOM and 
AUDCOM. Ranging from 0 = low 
committee capacity to 10 = high committee 
capacity
DEPCOM Sectoral committee OECD (2003), 2.10.a
Consideration of the draft budget 
by sectoral or departmental 
committees. Part of Wehner 
(2006a) index; see text for 
details.
0 = no substantive role, 3.3 = decide 
departmental budgets
DIVGOV Divided government index (version one)
World Bank Institute 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2001; Europa 
World Yearbook
Ratio of years in the 1993 to 
2002 period in which the 
government did not have a 
legislative majority in the lower 
house.
Ranging from 0 = always majority support 
to 1 = never majority support
DIVGOVTOT Divided government index (version two)
World Bank Institute 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2001; Europa 
World Yearbook
Ratio of years in the 1993 to 
2002 period in which the 
government did not have a 
legislative majority in either the 
lower or the upper house, if there 
is budgetary bicameralism.
Ranging from 0 = always majority support 
to 1 = never majority support
ENOP99 Effective number of parties
World Bank Institute 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2004
Effective number of parties 
according to Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979); constructed 
using the inverse o f the 
HERFTOT variable, 1999 to 
2003 average.
N/A
EURO 12** EU12 http://www.wikipedia.org
Dummy for the 11 original 
members of the Eurozone plus 
Greece.
0 = not part o f EU12 or before 1992,1 = 
part of EU12 and 1992 or later
EUR015** EU15 http://www.wikipedia.org
Dummy for the IS countries in 
the European Union before the 
expansion on 1 May 2004.
0 = not part ofEU15 or before 1992,1 = 
part of EU12 and 1992 or later
FEDERAL Federalism Griffiths (2002) Dummy for federal countries. 0 = unitary, 1 = federal
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FLEXI Flexibility WHOLD, VTRE and RESERVE
Flexibility of the executive 
during budget execution. Part of 
Wehner (2006a) index; see text 
for details.
Sum of WHOLD, VIRE and RESERVE. 
Ranging from 0 = high executive flexibility 
to 10 = low executive flexibility
FREE99 Freedom http://www.freedomhouse.org Freedom House combined average ratings.
Ranging from 1 = highest degree of freedom 
to 7 = lowest degree o f freedom
GGEXPO** General government expenditure OECD data
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database
General government total 
outlays, as percentage of GDP, 
multiplied by 100.
N/A
GGEXP940
General government 
expenditure OECD data 
(1994 to 2003)
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database
General government total 
outlays, as percentage of GDP, 
multiplied by 100,1994 to 2003 
average.
N/A
GGEXP99A
General government 
expenditure GFS data 
(1999 to 2003)
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics
Consolidated general 
government [GG] expenses, 
accrual basis, as percentage of 
GDP, multiplied by 100,1999 to 
2003 average.
N/A
GGEXP99E
General government 
expenditure Eurostat data 
(1999 to 2003)
Eurostat New Cronos 
Database
Total general government 
expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, multiplied by 100, 1999 to 
2003 average.
N/A
GGEXP990
General government 
expenditure OECD data 
(1999 to 2003)
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database
General government total 
outlays, as percentage o f GDP, 
multiplied by 100,1999 to 2003 
average.
N/A
GGREVO** General government revenue OECD data
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database
General government total tax 
and non-tax receipts, as 
percentage of GDP, multiplied 
by 100.
N/A
GGREV940
General government 
revenue OECD data (1994 
to 2003)
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database
General government total tax 
and non-tax receipts, as 
percentage o f GDP, multiplied 
by 100, 1994 to 2003 average.
N/A
292
GGREV99A
General government 
revenue GFS data (1999 to 
2003)
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics
Consolidated general 
government [GG] expenses, 
accrual basis, as percentage of 
GDP, multiplied by 100, 1999 to 
2003 average.
N/A
GGREV99E
General government 
revenue Eurostat data 
(1999 to 2003)
Eurostat New Cronos 
Database
Total general government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP, 
multiplied by 100,1999 to 2003 
average.
N/A
GGREV990
General government 
revenue OECD data (1999 
to 2003)
OECD Economic Outlook 
Database
General government total tax 
and non-tax receipts, as 
percentage of GDP, multiplied 
by 100, 1999 to 2003 average.
N/A
LNGDP** Log of GDP per capita World Bank World Development Indicators
Natural log of GDP per capita, 
constant 2000 US$. N/A
LNGDP94 Log of GDP per capita (1994 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Natural log o f GDP per capita, 
constant 2000 US$, 1994 to 
2003 average.
N/A
LNGDP99 Log of GDP per capita (1999 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Natural log of GDP per capita, 
constant 2000 US$, 1999 to 
2003 average.
N/A
MAJ1 Plurality rule Persson and Tabellini (2003)
Dummy indicating plurality rule 
for elections to the lower house 
o f the legislature.
0 = not plurality rule, 1 = plurality rule
NO_LAWS Von Hagen one vote on expenditure OECD (2003), 2.8.a
Measures the number of separate 
appropriation laws the 
legislature approves 
expenditures. Part of Von 
Hagen’s (1992) item two; see 
text for details.
0 = one, 2 = two to ten, 4 = more than ten
NO_LAWS_Z Von Hagen one vote on expenditure (standardised) NO_LAWS
Standardised version of 
NO LAWS 0 = one, .5 = two to ten, 1 = more than ten
OECD OECD member before 1993 Persson and Tabellini (2003)
Dummy for OECD membership 
before 1993, excluding Turkey. 0 = not member, 1 = member
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0FFSET2 Von Hagen amendments offsetting OECD (2003), 2.7.h
Dummy indicating whether the 
legislature is required to offset 
any amendments that increase 
spending with commensurate 
cuts elsewhere in the budget.
Part of Von Hagen’s (1992) item 
two; see text for details
0 = no offset, 4 = offset
0FFSET2_Z Von Hagen Amendments offsetting (standardised) OFFSET2
Standardised version of 
OFFSET2. 0 = no offset, 1 = offset
ORGIND Organisation sub-index TIME, COMS and RESCAP s
Legislative organisation sub­
index, the rescaled sum of 
TIME, COMS and RESCAP. 
Part of Wehner (2006a) index; 
see text for details.
Ranging from 0 = lowest degree of 
organisation to 100 = highest degree of 
organisation
POP15** Working age population share
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Population age 15 to 64 as 
percentage of total, multiplied by 
100.
N/A
POP15_94 Working age population share (1994 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Population age 15 to 64 as 
percentage of total, multiplied by 
100, 1994 to 2003 average.
N/A
POP15_99 Working age population share (1999 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Population age 15 to 64 as 
percentage of total, multiplied by 
100, 1999 to 2003 average.
N/A
POP65** Old age population share World Bank World Development Indicators
Population age 65 or above as 
percentage o f total, multiplied by 
100.
N/A
POP65_94 Old age population share (1994 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Population age 65 or above as 
percentage of total, multiplied by 
100, 1994 fo 2003 average.
N/A
POP65_99 Old age population share (1999 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Population age 65 or above as 
percentage of total, multiplied by 
100, 1999 to 2003 average.
N/A
POW JND2 Powers sub-index AMEND, REVBUD and FLEXI
Legislative powers sub-index, 
the rescaled sum o f AMEND, 
REVBUD and FLEXI. Part of 
Wehner (2006a) index; see text 
for details.
Ranging from 0 = lowest degree of 
legislative power to 100 = highest degree of 
legislative power
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PRES President Persson and Tabellini (2003) Dummy for presidentialism. 0 = not presidential, 1 = presidential
RESCALED2 Index of legislative budget institutions
AMEND, REVBUD, FLEXI, 
TIME, COMS and RESCAP s
Index o f legislative budget 
institutions, the rescaled sum of 
AMEND, REVBUD, FLEXI, 
TIME, COMS and RESCAP; see 
text for details.
Ranging from 0 = lowest degree of 
legislative power to 100 = highest degree of 
legislative power
RESCALED2_Z
Index of legislative budget 
institutions /  Wehner index 
(standardised)
RESCALED
Standardised version of the 
index o f legislative budget 
institutions.
Ranging from 0 = highest degree of 
legislative power to 1 = lowest degree of 
legislative power
RESCAP Research OECD (2003), 2.10.e
Specialised legislative budget 
research office. Part of Wehner 
(2006a) index; see text for 
details.
0 = no, 2.5 = less than ten professional staff, 
5 = ten to 25 professional staffi 7.5 = 26 to 
50 professional staff, 4 = Congressional 
Budget Office
RESERVE Reserve OECD (2003), 3.2.C.1
Power of the executive to fund 
new policy initiatives from a 
reserve fund. Part of Wehner 
(2006a) index; see text for 
details.
0 = reserve fund, 3.3 = no reserve fund
RESTRICT2 Von Hagen amendments limited OECD (2003), 2.7.d
Dummy indicating whether the 
legislature has unfettered powers 
to amend the budget proposed by 
the executive. Part of Von 
Hagen’s (1992) item two; see 
text for details.
0 = unlimited powers, 4 = limited powers
RESTRICT2Z Von Hagen amendments limited (standardised) RESTRICT2
Standardised version of 
RESTRICT2. 0 = unlimited powers, 1 = limited powers
REVALESI Alesina reversionary budget
OECD (2003), 2.7.C and 
3.2.a.4
Reversionary budget item 
according to Alesina et al. 
(1996); see text for details.
Ranging from 0 = most disadvantageous for 
the executive to 10 = most advantageous for 
the executive
R E V A L E S IZ Alesina reversionary budget (standardised) REVALESI
Standardised version of 
REVALESI.
Ranging from 0 = most disadvantageous for 
the executive to 1 = most advantageous for 
the executive
REVBUD Reversion OECD 2003,2.7.C
Reversionary budget. Part of 
Wehner (2006a) index; see text 
for details.
0 = executive budget proposal, 3.3 = vote on 
account, 6.7 = last year's budget, 10 = 
legislature approves interim measure
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REVBUDZ Reversion (standardised) REVBUD Standardised version of REVBUD.
0 = legislature approves interim measure, 
.33 = last year's budget, .67 = vote on 
account, 1 = executive budget proposal
TIME Time OECD 2003, 2.7.b
Amount of time the budget is 
tabled ahead of the fiscal year; 
see text for details.
0 = up to two months, 3.3 = two to four 
months, 6.7 = four to six months, 10 = more 
than six months
TRADE** Trade as share of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators
Sum of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP, multiplied 
by 100.
N/A
TRADE94 Trade as share of GDP (1994 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Sum of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP, multiplied 
by 100, 1994 to 2003 average.
N/A
TRADE99 Trade as share of GDP (1999 to 2003)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators
Sum of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP, multiplied 
by 100,1999 to 2003 average.
N/A
UKCOL Former UK colony Persson and Tabellini (2003)
Former UK colonies with 
independence within the past 
150 years.
0 = not former UK colony, 1 = former UK 
colony
UNICAM Budgetary unicameralism BICAM1 Inverse o f BICAM 1.
0 = co-equal second chamber, 1 = 
unicameral legislature or upper chamber 
with limited powers
VHAGEN2 Von Hagen item two OECD (2003), 2.7.d, 2.7.e, 2.7.h, 2.7 j  and 2.8.a
Von Hagen’s (1992) item 2 
(structure of parliamentary 
process); see text for details.
Ranging from 0 = highest degree of 
legislative power to 20 = lowest degree o f 
legislative power
VHAGEN2Z Von Hagen item two (standardised) VHAGEN
Standardised version of 
VHAGEN2.
Ranging from 0 = lowest degree of 
legislative power to 1 = highest degree of 
legislative power
VIRE Virement OECD (2003), 3.2.a.4
Power of the executive to 
reallocate appropriated funds 
from one programme to another. 
Part of Wehner (2006a) index; 
see text for details.
0 = may reallocate funds without legislative 
approval, 3.3 = may not reallocate funds or 
only with legislative approval
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VOTCONF Von Hagen amendments cause fall OECD (2003), 2.7.h
Whether an amendment to the 
budget would be considered a 
vote of no confidence in the 
government. Part of Von 
Hagen’s (1992) item two; see 
text for details.
0 = not vote of confidence, 4 = vote of 
confidence
VOTCONF_Z Von Hagen amendments cause fall (standardised) VOTCONF
Standardised version of 
VOTCONF.
0 = not vote of confidence, 1 = vote of 
confidence
WHOLD Withhold OECD (2003), 3 .l.c
Power of the executive to 
withhold appropriated funds that 
are not available on a legal or 
entitlement basis. Part of 
Wehner (2006a) index; see text 
for details.
0 = may withhold funds without legislative 
approval, 3.3 = may not withhold funds or 
only with legislative approval
WHOLD_Z Withhold (standardised) WHOLD Standardised version of WHOLD variable.
0 = may not withhold funds or only with 
legislative approval, 1 = may withhold funds 
without legislative approval
Notes: N/A stands for ‘not applicable.’ * Excluding sources of specific adjustments to the OECD and World Bank (2003) data, which are documented in detail in 
the text and a data spreadsheet available from the author. ** Variables used in the panel dataset.
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B Summary statistics
Table 21: Cross-section summary statistics for continuous and quasi-continuous variables
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Alesina amendment powers (standardised) 36 0.44 0.45 0.00 1.00
Alesina subindex three (standardised) 36 0.59 0.26 0.10 1.00
Alesina reversionary budget (standardised) 36 0.74 0.21 0.20 1.00
Central government expenditure GFS data 25 34.59 7.95 19.76 50.07
Central government expenditure IFS data 29 28.98 8.52 15.65 45.71
Central government expenditure OECD data 22 29.82 7.29 13.99 41.17
Freedom 36 1.52 0.72 1.00 4.10
General government expenditure Eurostat data 20 47.82 5.66 33.64 58.36
General government expenditure GFS data 26 41.95 8.99 21.55 57.17
General government expenditure OECD data 25 44.47 7.42 25.68 58.34
General government revenue OECD data 25 43.76 7.99 29.39 60.21
Index o f legislative budget institutions / Wehner index (standardised) 36 0.59 0.16 0.11 0.83
Log o f  GDP per capita 35 9.38 0.98 6.71 10.54
Old age population share 35 12.54 4.24 4.29 18.33
Powers (standardised) 36 0.33 0.37 0.00 1.00
Reversion (standardised) 36 0.48 0.38 0.00 1.00
Trade as share o f  GDP 35 76.97 37.70 20.42 173.52
Von Hagen item two (standardised) 36 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.60
Von Hagen one vote on expenditure (standardised) 36 0.19 0.34 0.00 1.00
Working age population share 35 66.24 2.83 56.63 71.72
N o t e s :  Fiscal and socio-economic control variables are averaged over the 1999 to 2003 period. See data appendix for details.
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Table 22: Cross-section summary statistics for dichotomous variables
Obs No Yes
Budget committee (standardised) 36 4 32
Budgetary unicameralism 36 8 28
Federalism 36 26 10
Former UK colony 36 30 6
Plurality rule 36 30 6
President 36 29 7
Von Hagen amendments cause fall (standardised) 36 30 6
Von Hagen amendments limited (standardised) 36 17 19
Von Hagen amendments offsetting (standardised) 36 24 12
Von Hagen global vote (standardised) 36 28 8
Withhold (standardised) 36 17 19
Note: See data appendix for details.
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C OECD and World Bank survey items used in this study
This appendix contains a complete listing of all items from the OECD and World 
Bank’s 2003 Survey on Budget Practices and Procedures that I used in this research, and 
highlights some related issues that are relevant to this work. The listing below is 
verbatim from the original questionnaire, which is also available on the internet: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/18/36930865.pdf. While yielding a unique dataset, 
there are many problems with this survey, in particular poor design of many survey 
items, including non-exclusive and non-exhaustive answer categories, and lack of 
rigorous quality control mechanisms. These problems are not unique to this particular 
survey, but apply to probably most other surveys of budget institutions. To ensure the 
best possible quality of data, I invested heavily in cross-checking the results obtained 
from the 2003 survey database with other sources, in particular surveys that were carried 
out at roughly the same time period (OECD 2002b, Ylaoutinen 2004), and in some cases 
I sought clarification from country experts (see acknowledgements).
Follow-up research can benefit from the results of a substantially revised survey tool. In 
the fall of 2005 the OECD requested a team of postgraduate students from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science to carry out a revised pilot survey targeted 
exclusively at Latin American countries and funded by the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The results are available here: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/23/37848494.xls 
(OECD 2006). On the basis of the pilot study, a team based with the LSE Public Policy 
Group, led by the author, co-ordinated the process of developing a new questionnaire
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and web-based survey tool in the fall of 2006. Amongst the main challenges in revising 
the survey were to substantially cut the number of questions from about 370 in the 2003 
survey to less than 100, to pay much more careful attention to the design of individual 
items, to exploit the advantages of conducting the survey on-line rather than through 
paper-based questionnaires, and to design and implement robust quality control 
mechanisms. The homepage of this revised survey tool is 
http://www.oecdbudgetsurvey.org.
The listing of items from the 2003 OECD and World Bank survey that were used to 
compile the dataset for this study follows below. The numbering refers to the original 
item number in the 2003 survey.
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2.1.h How far in advance of the beginning of the fiscal year does the executive
present its budget to the legislature?
  , %
I I Up to two months. *
I I Two to four months.
I I Four to six months.
I I More than six months.
2.1.c If the budget is not approved by the legislature before the start of the fiscal
year, which of the following describes the consequences:
I I The executive’s budget proposal takes effect in any case.
I I The executive’s budget proposal takes effect on an interim basis in a
constitutional or legislative specified period of time.
I I Last year’s budget takes effect on an interim basis.
I I Last years’ budget concerning continuing expenditures takes effect.
I I Other interim measures are constitutionally/legislatively required and voted on
by the legislature.
I I Other interim measures are voted on by the legislature.
I~1 The executive would resign and new elections would be called
[~1 Other, please specify________________________________________
2.1.A Are there any restrictions on the right of the legislature to modify the 
detailed budget proposed by the executive?
□  Yes.
□  No.
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2.7.e If applicable, what form do these restrictions take?
I I May not make any changes. Legislature can only approve or reject the budget in
whole.
I I May not increase or propose new expenditures, i.e. legislature can only decrease
funding levels.
f~l May only make changes to aggregate levels of spending or revenue.
I I May reallocate and increase funding levels.
□  May reallocate or increase funding levels, but only if it reduces others or
approves new revenue sources, i.e. no net change in total deficit/surplus.
1~1 May reallocate and increase funding levels for only certain programmes
I I May reallocate or increase funding levels for only certain programmes, but only
if it reduces others or approves new revenue sources, i.e. no net change in total 
deficit/surplus.
I I May create new spending items, reallocate and increase funding levels.
I I May create new spending items, reallocate or increase funding levels, but only if
it reduces others or approves new revenue sources, i.e. no net change in total 
deficit/surplus.
I I The Executive must approve any changes proposed by legislature.
I I Other, please specify_________________________________________
2.7.h Notwithstanding any legal restrictions on the legislator’s ability to modify 
the budget, is a vote on the budget considered a vote of confidence in the 
government, i.e., the government would resign if any changes are approved 
to its budget proposal?
□  Yes.
□  No.
2.7.j Are there arrangements in place for the legislature to establish aggregate 
expenditure ceilings before beginning debate on individual expenditure 
items?
I I Yes, the Legislature sets hard spending ceilings.
I I Yes, the Legislature sets notional spending constraints.
I I No, but the legislature engages in a non-binding debate on aggregate spending.
□  No.
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2.8.a In how many separate appropriations laws/acts does the legislature approve 
expenditures?
I~1 One.
I I Two to five.
I I Six to ten.
I I Ten to fifteen.
O  More than fifteen.
2.10.a W hat best describes the committee structure for dealing with the budget?
I I A single budget committee deals with all budget-related matters with no formal 
input from other committees. Sectoral committees may make recommendations, 
but budget committee does not have to follow them.
I I A single budget committee deals with the budget, but members from other
sectoral committees attend meetings of the budget committee when expenditures 
in their specific areas are being dealt with. For example, members of the 
education committee would attend meetings of the budget committee when 
expenditures for the ministry of education were being discussed.
I I A single budget committee deals with budget aggregates (total level of revenue
and spending and their allocation to each sector) and sectoral committees deal 
with spending at the level of each appropriation. For example, the budget 
committee would establish the total level of expenditure for education, but 
member of the education committee would allocate the total among each 
appropriation within the education sector.
I I Sectoral committees deal with appropriations for each respective sector. No
budget committee is in place or offers only technical assistance.
I I Other, please specify_________________________________________
2.10.e Is there a specialised budget research organisation attached to the
legislature that conducts analyses of the budget? (Note this organisation
may be part of the audit office.)
□ Yes, with less than ten professional staff.
□ Yes, with ten to 25 professional staff.
□ Yes, with 26 or more professional staff.
□ No.
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3.1.c Can the Central Budget authority withhold funds that are appropriated, 
but not available on a legal or entitlement basis?
□  Yes.
n  Yes, with approval from the legislature.
I I Yes, with approval from an executive branch committee.
I I Yes, with approval from an executive branch official.
□  No.
3.2.a.4 Can appropriations be reallocated from one programme to another?
I I There are no restrictions on such transfers.
I I There can be transfers, but only with the approval of the Ministry of
Finance/Central Budget Authority.
I I There can be transfers, but only with the approval of the Legislature.
I I There can be transfers, but the legislature must be notified of the transfer.
I I There can be no such transfers.
I I Other, please specify_________________________________________
3.2.C.1 Does the annual budget include any central reserve funds to meet 
unforeseen expenditures? If applicable, please mark more than one.
□  No.
I I A small central reserve fund is operated to meet general unforeseen
expenditures.
I~l A small central reserve fund is operated for only limited contingent purposes.
f~1 A small central reserve fund is operated for new policy initiatives.
I I A large central reserve fund is operated to meet general unforeseen expenditures.
I I A large central reserve fund is operated to meet major forecasting errors in the
economic and other assumptions underlying the budget. The fund is only used if 
such errors occur.
I~1 A large central reserve fund is operated for new policy initiatives.
I~1 Other, please specify_________________________________________
4.5.m Are audit results circulated and discussed in Parliament?
□  No.
I~l No, the reports are too late.
I~1 Yes, by Budget committee.
f~~l Yes, by oversight committee(s).
[~1 Yes, by General Assembly.
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D Use of the xtfevd command in Stata
The procedure of ‘fixed effects vector decomposition’ (FEVD), used in chapter 5, was 
only recently developed (Plumper and Troeger 2007). To illustrate the use of the xtfevd 
command, I append the relevant lines from the Stata do-file:
xtfevd ggexpo lggexpo lngdp popl5 pop65 trade restrict eurol2 /*
*/ pres maj ukcol comini oecd y2-y33 /*
*/ , invariant(restrict pres maj ukcol commi oecd) pcse
xtfevd ggexpo lggexpo lngdp popl5 pop65 trade restrict eurol2 /*
*/ pres maj ukcol commi oecd yl9-y33 if halfl==0/*
*/ , invariant(restrict pres maj ukcol commi oecd) pcse
The statistics reported in this thesis were compiled with Stata 9.2.
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